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1Ẵ1 Ị°¤¶ỵ¦¯µ ệªỵ ¢¯¥ S¤°Ỹ¦
T©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ¢ª®´ µ° ±³°·ª¥¦ ¤­¦¢³≈ ±³¢¤µª¤¢­≈ ±¢¯-¥°®¢ª¯ ¨¶ª¥¢¯¤¦ °¯ µ©¦ ´¢§¦µº ¢´´¶³¢¯¤¦ °§
A¶µ°¯°®°¶´ Sº´µ¦®´ (ASI. I¯ ±¢³µª¤¶­¢³:
• T©¦ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ª´ ª¯µ¦¯¥¦¥ µ° £¦ °§ ¶´¦ µ° ¢ ¸ª¥¦ ³¦¢¥¦³´©ª±, ª¯¤­¶¥ª¯¨: ¥¦·¦­°±¦³´ °§ ¢¶µ°¯°®°¶´
´º´µ¦®´ề A³µªﬁ¤ª¢­ I¯µ¦­­ª¨¦¯¤¦ (AII ¢¯¥ M¢¤©ª¯¦ L¦¢³¯ª¯¨ (MLI ±³¢¤µªµª°¯¦³´ề ´¢§¦µº ¦¯¨ª¯¦¦³´ề
³¦¨¶­¢µ°³º ¢¶µ©°³ªµª¦´ề ¢¯¥ ®¢¯¢¨¦³´ (¢µ ¢ ³¢¯¨¦ °§ ­¦·¦­´I.
• T©¦³¦ ª´ ¢ ¥¦­ª£¦³¢µ¦ §°¤¶´ °¯ ¢´±¦¤µ´ ¥ª³¦¤µ­º ³¦­¢µ¦¥ µ° ¢¶µ°¯°®º, ¢¯¥ ¦¯¢£­ª¯¨ µ¦¤©¯°­°¨ª¦´ ´¶¤©
¢´ AI ¢¯¥ML, ³¢µ©¦³ µ©¢¯®°³¦ ¨¦¯¦³¢­ ´¢§¦µº ¦¯¨ª¯¦¦³ª¯¨ °³ ´º´µ¦® ¦¯¨ª¯¦¦³ª¯¨, ¸©¦³¦ ªµ ª´ ¢´´¶®¦¥
µ©¢µ ³¦­¦·¢¯µ ¨¦¯¦³¢­ ´µ¢¯¥¢³¥´, ¨¶ª¥¦­ª¯¦´ ¢¯¥ £¦´µ ±³¢¤µª¤¦ ¸ª­­ £¦ ¢±±­ª¦¥. T©¦ ª¯µ¦¯µ ª´ µ° ¢·°ª¥
¥¶±­ª¤¢µª¯¨ ¦¹ª´µª¯¨ ¨¶ª¥¢¯¤¦ ³¦­¢µª¯¨ µ° µ©¦´¦ ¨¦¯¦³¢­ µ°±ª¤´.
• T©¦³¦ ª´ ¢ ¥¦­ª£¦³¢µ¦ §°¤¶´ °¯ AS µ©¢µ ¶´¦ AI ¥¦·¦­°±¦¥ ¶´ª¯¨ ML. A­µ©°¶¨© ªµ ª´ ±°´´ª£­¦ µ° ¦¯·ª´¢¨¦
AS µ©¢µ ¥° ¯°µ ¶´¦ µ©¦´¦ µ¦¤©¯°­°¨ª¦´, AI ¢¯¥ ML ¢³¦ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¦¥ µ° ³¦±³¦´¦¯µ µ©¦ ¨³¦¢µ¦´µ ¢´´¶³¢¯¤¦
¤©¢­­¦¯¨¦´ề µ©¦º ¢³¦ ¢­´° ¦¹±¦¤µ¦¥ µ° £¦ ¸ª¥¦­º ¶´¦¥.
• T©¦ ¨¶ª¥¢¯¤¦ ª´ ª¯µ¦¯¥¦¥ µ° £¦ ¸ª¥¦­º ¢±±­ª¤¢£­¦. Iµ ª´ ¯°µ µª¦¥ µ° ¢¯º ´±¦¤ªﬁ¤ ¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ
¢±±³°¢¤©, ´º´µ¦® ­ª§¦¤º¤­¦ °³ ´¢§¦µº ¢³¨¶®¦¯µ ´µ³¶¤µ¶³¦. T° ¢¤©ª¦·¦ µ©ª´ ¸ª¥¦ ¢±±­ª¤¢£ª­ªµº, µ¦³®´
­ª¬¦ “¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦” ¢¯¥ “´¶ªµ¢£­¦” ¢³¦ °¤¤¢´ª°¯¢­­º ¶´¦¥. I¯ ´¶¤© ¤¢´¦´, ¶´¦³´ °§ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ¸°¶­¥
£¦ ¦¹±¦¤µ¦¥ µ° ¥¦´¤³ª£¦, ¢¯¥ ѡ¶´µª§º, ©°¸ µ©¦´¦ µ¦³®´ ©¢·¦ £¦¦¯ ª¯µ¦³±³¦µ¦¥ ª¯ µ©¦ª³ ´±¦¤ªﬁ¤ ¤°¯µ¦¹µ.
• T©¦³¦ ª´ ª¯µ¦¯µª°¯¢­­º ·¦³º ­ªµµ­¦ ®¦¯µª°¯ °§ ­¦¨¢­ ¢¯¥ / °³ ³¦¨¶­¢µ°³º ³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦®¦¯µ´. Iµ ª´ ¢´´¶®¦¥ µ©¢µ
µ©¦´¦ ¸ª­­ £¦ ª¥¦¯µªﬁ¦¥ ¢¯¥ ¥¦®°¯´µ³¢£­º ¤°®±­ª¦¥ ¸ªµ© ¢´ ±¢³µ °§ ¯°³®¢­ ±³¢¤µª¤¦.
• I´´¶¦´ ³¦­¢µ¦¥ µ° ´µ¢f ¤°®±¦µ¦¯¤ª¦´ ¢³¦ ¥¦­ª£¦³¢µ¦­º ¦¹¤­¶¥¦¥ §³°® ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯. Sª®ª­¢³­º, ª´´¶¦´
µ©¢µ ¢³¦ ®°´µ ¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦­º ¢¥¥³¦´´¦¥ ¢µ ¢¯ °³¨¢¯ª´¢µª°¯¢­, °³ ¦¯µ¦³±³ª´¦, ­¦·¦­ ¢³¦ ¢­´° ¦¹¤­¶¥¦¥.
T©¦´¦ ¢³¦ ¦¹±¦¤µ¦¥ µ° £¦ ¤°·¦³¦¥ £º ¢¯ ¦¹ª´µª¯¨ S¢§¦µº M¢¯¢¨¦®¦¯µ Sº´µ¦® (SMSI, ¸©ª¤© ¤°¶­¥ £¦
´¶±±­¦®¦¯µ¦¥ £º µ©¦ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯´ ª¯ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ.
• I´´¶¦´ ³¦­¢µ¦¥ µ° ¥°®¢ª¯-´±¦¤ªﬁ¤ ¤¦³µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ (¦.¨., ­ª¢ª´°¯ ¸ªµ© ³¦¨¶­¢µ°³´I ¢³¦ ¥¦­ª£¦³¢µ¦­º ¦¹¤­¶¥¦¥
§³°® ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯.  °¸¦·¦³, µ©¦ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´ ­ª´µ¦¥ ª¯ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ¸°¶­¥ £¦ ¦¹±¦¤µ¦¥ µ° ª¯§°³® ¢¯º
¥ª´¤¶´´ª°¯´ ¸ªµ© ³¦¨¶­¢µ°³º ¢¶µ©°³ªµª¦´.
• T©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ®¢¬¦´ ¯° ¥ª´µª¯¤µª°¯ £¢´¦¥ °¯ ¤³ªµª¤¢­ªµº ­¦·¦­, µ©¢µ ª´, µ©¦³¦ ª´ ¯° ¦Ѩ¶ª·¢­¦¯µ °§ S¢§¦µº
I¯µ¦¨³ªµº L¦·¦­´ (SIL´I °³ Ị¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ A´´¶³¢¯¤¦ L¦·¦­´ (ỊAL´I. T©¦´¦ µº±¦´ °§ ¥ª´µª¯¤µª°¯ ®¢º £¦
ª¯¤­¶¥¦¥ ª¯ §¶µ¶³¦ ·¦³´ª°¯´ °§ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ.
1ẴẸ Ọ³¢ỵ¦¸°³ự´Ẳ Ỗ³°Ự¦¤µª°¯´ ¢¯¥ ổỨỰ¦¤µª·¦´
T©³¦¦ §³¢®¦¸°³¬´ ©¢·¦ £¦¦¯ ¶´¦¥ µ° ¥¦·¦­°± ¢¯¥ ´µ³¶¤µ¶³¦ µ©¦ ¨¶ª¥¢¯¤¦: ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯ề ¢¶µ°¯°®º
¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦ề ¢¯¥ ±­¢µ§°³®.
T©¦´¦ §³¢®¦¸°³¬´ ¢³¦ ¶´¦¥ ±¶³¦­º ¢´ ¢ µ°°­ §°³ µ©¦ ´±¦¤ªﬁ¤ ±¶³±°´¦ °§ ª¥¦¯µª§ºª¯¨ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´ µ©¢µ ¯¦¦¥ µ°
£¦ ¢¥¥³¦´´¦¥ µ° ¢¤©ª¦·¦ ¥¦®°¯´µ³¢£­º ´¢§¦ ¢¶µ°¯°®°¶´ ´º´µ¦®´. Ịªf¦³¦¯µ §³¢®¦¸°³¬´ ®¢º £¦ ¢±±­ª¤¢£­¦
µ°, °³ ®°³¦ ¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦ §°³, µ©¦ ´º´µ¦®´ µ©¢µ ¢³¦ £¦ª¯¨ ¥¦·¦­°±¦¥ £º ¶´¦³´ °§ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ. I¯ ´¶¤© ¤¢´¦´
µ©¦³¦ ª´ ¯° ¦¹±¦¤µ¢µª°¯ µ©¢µ ¶´¦³´ ´µ³¶¤µ¶³¦ µ©¦ª³ ¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ ¦f°³µ´ µ° ¥ª³¦¤µ­º ¢­ª¨¯ ¸ªµ© µ©¦ §³¢®¦¸°³¬´
¢¥°±µ¦¥ ª¯ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ.S
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T©¦ §³¢®¦¸°³¬´ ¶´¦¥ ª¯ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ¢³¦ £³ª¦ﬂº ¥¦´¤³ª£¦¥ £¦­°¸:
• T©¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ §³¢®¦¸°³¬ ¢¥¥³¦´´¦´ ª®±­¦®¦¯µ¢µª°¯ ¢µ µ©¦ ´°§µ¸¢³¦ ¢¯¥ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯¢­
©¢³¥¸¢³¦ ­¦·¦­´. Iµ §°¤¶´¦´ °¯ ®¢±±ª¯¨ ¢¯ ª¯±¶µ µ° ¢¯ °¶µ±¶µ. A¤µª·ªµª¦´ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ ¸ªµ© µ©ª´ ­¦·¦­
µº±ª¤¢­­º ³¦­¢µ¦ µ° §¢¶­µ ±³¦·¦¯µª°¯. T©ª´ ª´ µ©¦ ­°¸¦´µ ¤°¯¤¦±µ¶¢­ ­¦·¦­ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¦¥.
• T©¦ ¢¶µ°¯°®º ¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦-­¦·¦­ §³¢®¦¸°³¬ ¢¥¥³¦´´¦´ ©°¸ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯´ ¤¢¯ £¦ ª¯µ¦¨³¢µ¦¥ ª¯µ° ¢
´º´µ¦®, °³ ±­¢µ§°³®. A¤µª·ªµª¦´ ¢µ µ©ª´ ­¦·¦­ µº±ª¤¢­­º ³¦­¢µ¦ µ° §¢¶­µ µ°­¦³¢¯¤¦.
• T©¦ ±­¢µ§°³®-­¦·¦­ §³¢®¦¸°³¬ ¢¥¥³¦´´¦´ ¸©¢µ µ©¦ ﬁ¯¢­ ¢¶µ°¯°®°¶´ ¦¯µªµº ´©°¶­¥ ¥° ¢¯¥ ¸©¢µ ¦f¦¤µ´
ªµ ´©°¶­¥ ©¢·¦ °¯ ªµ´ ¦¯·ª³°¯®¦¯µ. I¯ ¦´´¦¯¤¦, µ©¦ §°¤¶´ ª´ °¯ ³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦®¦¯µ´. T©ª´ ª´ µ©¦ ©ª¨©¦´µ
¤°¯¤¦±µ¶¢­ ­¦·¦­ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¦¥.
I¯ ¨¦¯¦³¢­, ¢ ±­¢µ§°³® ®¢º ¤°¯µ¢ª¯ ®¶­µª±­¦ ¢¶µ°¯°®º ¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦´, ¦¢¤© °§ ¸©ª¤© ®¢º ¤°¯µ¢ª¯ ®¶­µª±­¦
¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯´. T©ª´ ³¦­¢µª°¯´©ª± ª´ ª­­¶´µ³¢µ¦¥ ª¯  ª¨¶³¦ 1, ¸©¦³¦ ¥¢´©¦¥ ¨³¦º ­ª¯¦´ ³¦±³¦´¦¯µ °±µª°¯¢­ ªµ¦®´.
 Platform 
 Autonomy Architecture 
Computation 
 Autonomy Architecture 
Computation 
 ª¨¶³¦ 1: R¦­¢µª°¯´©ª± £¦µ¸¦¦¯  ³¢®¦¸°³¬ L¦·¦­´
T¢£­¦ 1 ª¯¤­¶¥¦´ µ¸° ¦¹¢®±­¦´ µ©¢µ ª­­¶´µ³¢µ¦ µ©¦ ¥ª´µª¯¤µª°¯ £¦µ¸¦¦¯ ±­¢µ§°³®, ¢¶µ°¯°®º ¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦ ¢¯¥
¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯ ¸ªµ©ª¯ µ©¦ ¤°¯µ¦¹µ °§ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ.
T¢£­¦ 1:  ¹¢®±­¦ P­¢µ§°³®´, A¶µ°¯°®º A³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦ C°®±°¯¦¯µ´ ¢¯¥
C°®±¶µ¢µª°¯´
Iµ¦® I­­¶´µ³¢µª°¯ O¯¦ I­­¶´µ³¢µª°¯ T¸°
 ¹¢®±­¦ P­¢µ§°³® S¦­§-Ị³ª·ª¯¨ C¢³ M¦¥ª¤¢­ Ịª¢¨¯°´ª´ A±±­ª¤¢µª°¯
 ¹¢®±­¦ A¶µ°¯°®º A³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦
C°®±°¯¦¯µ´
S¦¯´°³  ¦¢­µ© C©¦¤¬´, S¢¯ªµº
C©¦¤¬´ °¯ G¦¯¦³¢µ¦¥ R°¶µ¦
I¯µ¦¨³ªµº C©¦¤¬´ °¯ S¶±±­ª¦¥
I®¢¨¦, U´ª¯¨ M¶­µª±­¦ C­¢´´ªﬁ¦³´
 ¹¢®±­¦ C°®±¶µ¢µª°¯ R°¶µ¦ P­¢¯¯ª¯¨
I®¢¨¦ C­¢´´ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ (B¦¯ª¨¯ /
M¢­ª¨¯¢¯µI
A ´¦³ª¦´ °§ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯´ ª´ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ ¸ªµ© ¦¢¤© §³¢®¦¸°³¬. T©¦ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯´ ±³°·ª¥¦ ¥ªf¦³¦¯µ ±¦³´±¦¤µª·¦´ề
µ©¦º ±³°·ª¥¦ ¥ªf¦³¦¯µ ¸¢º´ °§ ·ª¦¸ª¯¨ ¦¢¤© §³¢®¦¸°³¬, ª¯ °³¥¦³ µ° ¦­ª¤ªµ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´.
C°¯´¦Ѩ¶¦¯µ­º, ¸©ª­´µ ¦¢¤© ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯ ¦®±©¢´ª´¦´ ¢ ±¢³µª¤¶­¢³ ¢´±¦¤µ µ©¢µ ª´ ³¦­¦·¢¯µ µ° µ©¦ §³¢®¦¸°³¬
­¦·¦­, µ©¦ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯´ ¢³¦ ¯°µ ª¯µ¦¯¥¦¥ µ° £¦ ´µ³ª¤µ­º ª¯¥¦±¦¯¥¦¯µ, ¥ª´µª¯¤µ °³ ¯°¯-°·¦³­¢±±ª¯¨. W©ª­´µ µ©¦º
©¢·¦ £¦¦¯ ¶´¦§¶­ ª¯ ¥¦·¦­°±ª¯¨ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ, §°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, £º ´±­ªµµª¯¨ µ©¦ °·¦³¢­­ ´¤°±¦ ª¯µ° ®¢¯¢¨¦¢£­¦
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±¢³µ´, µ©¦ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯´ µ©¦®´¦­·¦´ ¢³¦ ¯°µ ª¯µ¦¯¥¦¥ µ° £¦ °§ ¢¯º ¨³¦¢µ ´ª¨¯ªﬁ¤¢¯¤¦ ª¯ µ©¦ª³ °¸¯ ³ª¨©µ. A´
¸¢´ µ©¦ ¤¢´¦ ¸ªµ© µ©¦ §³¢®¦¸°³¬´, µ©¦³¦ ª´ ¯° ¦¹±¦¤µ¢µª°¯ µ©¢µ ¢ ¶´¦³ °§ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ¸ª­­ ´µ³¶¤µ¶³¦ µ©¦ª³
¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ ¦f°³µ´ ¢³°¶¯¥ µ©¦ ´±¦¤ªﬁ¤ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯´ ¶´¦¥ ¸ªµ©ª¯ µ©ª´ ¨¶ª¥¢¯¤¦.
A ¤°­­¦¤µª°¯ °§ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´ ¢³¦ ­ª´µ¦¥ ¢¨¢ª¯´µ ¦¢¤© ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯.  ·¦¯ µ©°¶¨© µ©¦ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯ ©¢´ £¦¦¯ ¶´¦¥
¢´ ±¢³µ °§ µ©¦ ±³°¤¦´´ °§ ¦­ª¤ªµª¯¨ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´, ¢¯ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦’´ ´¤°±¦ ®¢º £¦ ¸ª¥¦³ µ©¢¯ ªµ´ ±¢³¦¯µ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯ề
¦Ѩ¶ª·¢­¦¯µ­º, µ©¦ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯ ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¤°¯µ¦¹µ, ³¢µ©¦³ µ©¢¯ £°¶¯¥´, §°³ µ©¦ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦.
 ¢¤© °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦ ª´ ¢¤¤°®±¢¯ª¦¥ £º ¢ ¥ª´¤¶´´ª°¯ µ©¢µ ª­­¶´µ³¢µ¦´ ©°¸ µ©¦ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦ ¤°¯µ³ª£¶µ¦´ µ° AS ´¢§¦µº.
T©ª´ ª´ §°­­°¸¦¥ £º ¦¹¢®±­¦´ °§ ¢±±³°¢¤©¦´ µ©¢µ ¤°¶­¥ £¦ µ¢¬¦¯ µ° ´¢µª´§º, °³ ±¢³µª¢­­º ´¢µª´§º, µ©¦ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦.
T©¦´¦ ¦¹¢®±­¦´ ¢³¦ ¯°µ ª¯µ¦¯¥¦¥ µ° £¦ ±³¦´¤³ª±µª·¦ề µ©¦³¦ ®¢º £¦ °µ©¦³ ¸¢º´ °§ ´¢µª´§ºª¯¨ ¢¯ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦.
Lª¬¦¸ª´¦, µ©¦ ¦¹¢®±­¦´ ¥° ¯°µ ¯¦¤¦´´¢³ª­º ³¦±³¦´¦¯µ ¢ ±³¦§¦³³¦¥ ¸¢º °§ ´¢µª´§ºª¯¨ ¢¯ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦. T©¦º ¢³¦
ª¯¤­¶¥¦¥ ´°­¦­º µ° ¥¦®°¯´µ³¢µ¦ µ©¦ §¦¢´ª£ª­ªµº °§ ´¢µª´§ºª¯¨ ¢µ ­¦¢´µ ±¢³µ °§ µ©¦ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦.
A´ ¸ªµ© §³¢®¦¸°³¬´ ¢¯¥ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯´, µ©¦³¦ ª´ ¯° ¦¹±¦¤µ¢µª°¯ µ©¢µ ¢ ¶´¦³ °§ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ¸ª­­ ´­¢·ª´©­º §°­­°¸
µ©¦ ¸¢º µ©¦ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´ ©¢·¦ £¦¦¯ °³¥¦³¦¥ ¢¯¥ ´µ³¶¤µ¶³¦¥ ¸ªµ©ª¯ µ©ª´ ¨¶ª¥¢¯¤¦.  °³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, ¢ ¶´¦³ ®¢º
±³¦§¦³ µ° ³¦-°³¨¢¯ª´¦ µ©¦ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´ ´° µ©¢µ µ©¦º ¢³¦ ®°³¦ ¤­°´¦­º ¢­ª¨¯¦¥ ¸ªµ©, §°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, µ©¦ª³ ¤©°´¦¯
´º´µ¦® ¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦, µ©¦ª³ ¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ ±³°¤¦´´¦´ °³ µ©¦ª³ °³¨¢¯ª´¢µª°¯¢­ ´µ³¶¤µ¶³¦´.
 °¸¦·¦³, ªµ ª´ ¦¹±¦¤µ¦¥ µ©¢µ ¶´¦³´ °§ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ¸°¶­¥ ±³°·ª¥¦ ¦·ª¥¦¯¤¦ µ° ¥¦®°¯´µ³¢µ¦ µ©¢µ µ©¦
°£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´ ©¢·¦ £¦¦¯ ´¢µª´ﬁ¦¥. T©¦º ®¢º ¢­´° ±³°·ª¥¦ ¦·ª¥¦¯¤¦-£¢´¦¥, ´µ³¶¤µ¶³¦¥ ¢³¨¶®¦¯µ´ µ° ѡ¶´µª§º
¸©º ¢ ±¢³µª¤¶­¢³ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦ ¯¦¦¥ ¯°µ £¦ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¦¥ §°³ µ©¦ª³ ±¢³µª¤¶­¢³ ¢±±­ª¤¢µª°¯. Sª®ª­¢³­º, ¶´¦³´ ®¢º ¢­´°
¢³¨¶¦ ¸©º ¢ ±¢³µª¤¶­¢³ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦ ¯¦¦¥´ °¯­º µ° £¦ ¤°·¦³¦¥ ¢µ ¢ ´¶±¦³ﬁ¤ª¢­ ­¦·¦­.
1Ẵ3 Ị°¤¶ỵ¦¯µ Sµ¢µ¶´
T©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ¸¢´ ¢¶µ©°³¦¥ £º µ©¦ S¢§¦µº °§ A¶µ°¯°®°¶´ Sº´µ¦®´ W°³¬ª¯¨ G³°¶± (SASWGI, ¸©ª¤© ª´
¤°¯·¦¯¦¥ ¶¯¥¦³ µ©¦ ¢¶´±ª¤¦´ °§ µ©¦ S¢§¦µº C³ªµª¤¢­ Sº´µ¦®´ C­¶£ (SCSCI. T©¦ ﬁ³´µ ·¦³´ª°¯ °§ µ©¦ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ,
³¦­¦¢´¦¥ ª¯ ​¢¯¶¢³º 2019, °¯­º ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¦¥ µ©¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ §³¢®¦¸°³¬. T©¦ ¤¶³³¦¯µ ·¦³´ª°¯, ³¦­¦¢´¦¥
ª¯ ​¢¯¶¢³º 2020, ³¦±³¦´¦¯µ´ µ©¦ ﬁ³´µ µª®¦ µ©¢µ ¢­­ µ©³¦¦ §³¢®¦¸°³¬ ­¦·¦­´ ©¢·¦ £¦¦¯ ¢¥¥³¦´´¦¥.
T©¦ ª¥¦¯µªﬁ¦¥ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´ (¢¯¥ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ §³¢®¦¸°³¬´I ©¢·¦ £¦¦¯ ¥¦·¦­°±¦¥ ®¢ª¯­º §³°® ¢ µ©¦°³¦µª¤¢­
£¢´ª´.  °¸¦·¦³, ¦f°³µ´ ©¢·¦ £¦¦¯ ®¢¥¦ µ° ¤©¦¤¬ µ©¦ª³ ·¢­ª¥ªµº.  °³ ¦¹¢®±­¦: ¸©¦³¦ ±°´´ª£­¦, µ©¦ ¢¥°±µ¦¥
§³¢®¦¸°³¬´ ©¢·¦ £¦¦¯ ¤°®±¢³¦¥ ¢¨¢ª¯´µ ±°´´ª£­¦ ¢­µ¦³¯¢µª·¦´ề µ©¦ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´ ©¢·¦ ¢­´° £¦¦¯ ¤°®±¢³¦¥
¢¨¢ª¯´µ ³¦­¦·¢¯µ ±¦¦³-³¦·ª¦¸¦¥ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ´. I¯ ¢¥¥ªµª°¯, µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ’´ ¤°¯µ¦¯µ´ ©¢·¦ £¦¦¯ ³¦·ª¦¸¦¥
§³°® µ©¦ ¤°¯µ¦¹µ °§ µ©¦ O³¨¢¯ª´¢µª°¯ §°³  ¤°¯°®ª¤ C°-°±¦³¢µª°¯ ¢¯¥ Ị¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ (O CỊI P³ª¯¤ª±­¦´ °¯
AI1. T©¦´¦ ¤°­­¦¤µ¦¥ ¢¤µª·ªµª¦´ ±³°·ª¥¦ ´°®¦ ¤°¯ﬁ¥¦¯¤¦ µ©¢µ µ©¦ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´ ¢³¦ ´¶ªµ¢£­¦ §°³ µ©¦ª³ ª¯µ¦¯¥¦¥
¶´¦.
Ị¦´±ªµ¦ µ©°´¦ ¢¤µª·ªµª¦´, ªµ ´©°¶­¥ £¦ ¯°µ¦¥ µ©¢µ, ¢´ º¦µ, µ©¦ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´ ©¢·¦ ¯°µ £¦¦¯ ´¶£ѡ¦¤µ¦¥ µ° ±³¢¤µª¤¢­
¶´¦ ¢¤³°´´ ¢¯ ¦¯µª³¦ AS. I¯ ´©°³µ, µ©¦ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´ ©¢·¦ ¯°µ £¦¦¯ “±³°·¦¯ µ©³°¶¨© ¶´¦”. Iµ ª´ ¦¹±¦¤µ¦¥ µ©¢µ
µ©¦ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´ ¢¯¥, ¦´±¦¤ª¢­­º, µ©¦ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ ¦¹¢®±­¦ ¢±±³°¢¤©¦´ ¸ª­­ ¤©¢¯¨¦ ¢´ ¦¹±¦³ª¦¯¤¦ ª´ ¨¢ª¯¦¥.
C°¯´¦Ѩ¶¦¯µ­º, §¦¦¥£¢¤¬ §³°® µ©¦ ´¢§¦µº, AS, AI ¢¯¥ ML ¤°®®¶¯ªµª¦´ ª´ ¦¯¤°¶³¢¨¦¥. T©ª´ ¤¢¯ £¦ ±³°·ª¥¦¥
£º ¦®¢ª­ª¯¨ µ©¦ ¢¥¥³¦´´ ¯°µ¦¥ °¯ µ©¦ ª¯¯¦³ §³°¯µ ¤°·¦³.
1 ©µµ±´://¸¸ .¸°¦¤¥.°³¨/¨°ª¯¨-¥ª¨ªµ¢­/¢ª/±³ª¯¤ª±­¦´/.
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1Ẵ4 T¦³ỵª¯°­°¨º
T©¦ SASWG ©¢´ ¥¦­ª£¦³¢µ¦­º ¢·°ª¥¦¥ ¥¦ﬁ¯ª¯¨ µ©¦ µ¦³® ¢¶µ°¯°®°¶´, ±³¦§¦³³ª¯¨ µ° ¸°³¬ §³°® ¦¹¢®±­¦´ ¢¯¥
¢´´¶®ª¯¨ µ©¢µ, ¨¦¯¦³¢­­º ´±¦¢¬ª¯¨, ªµ ª´ ¦¢´º µ° ª¥¦¯µª§º ¸©¦µ©¦³ ¢ ´±¦¤ªﬁ¤ ´º´µ¦® ª´ ¢¶µ°¯°®°¶´, ¦·¦¯
µ©°¶¨© ¢ ¨¦¯¦³¢­ ¥¦ﬁ¯ªµª°¯ ª´ ¥ªﬃ¤¶­µ µ° ¢¤©ª¦·¦. T©¦ ¥¦´ª³¦ µ° ¢·°ª¥ ±³°µ³¢¤µ¦¥ ¢¯¥ ­¢³¨¦­º ¶¯ª¯§°³®¢µª·¦
¥¦£¢µ¦´ ¢£°¶µ ¥¦ﬁ¯ªµª°¯´ ¦¹µ¦¯¥´ ¢¤³°´´ ®¶¤© °§ µ©¦ SASWG’´ ¸°³¬. N¦·¦³µ©¦­¦´´, ªµ ª´ ©¦­±§¶­ µ° ±³°·ª¥¦
°¶µ­ª¯¦ ¥¦´¤³ª±µª°¯´ §°³ ´°®¦ µ¦³®´ ¶´¦¥ ª¯ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ. S±¦¤ªﬁ¤¢­­º:
• A ±­¢µ§°³® ¥¦­ª·¦³´ ¢¯ ¦¯¥ ¶´¦³ ¤¢±¢£ª­ªµº ¥¶³ª¯¨ ¯°³®¢­ °±¦³¢µª°¯. Iµ ª´, µº±ª¤¢­­º ´±¦¢¬ª¯¨, ¢¯
ª¯¥ª·ª¥¶¢­ ·¦©ª¤­¦ ³¢µ©¦³ µ©¢¯, §°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, ¢ ´¸¢³® °§ ¤°°±¦³¢µª¯¨ ·¦©ª¤­¦´ °³ µ©¦ ¤°¯µ³°­ ­°¨ª¤ §°³
·¦©ª¤­¦ ¯¢·ª¨¢µª°¯. T©¦ ´¢®¦ ¨¦¯¦³¢­ ­¦·¦­ ¢±±­ª¦´ µ° ¢¶µ°¯°®°¶´ ´º´µ¦®´ µ©¢µ ¢³¦ ¯°µ ·¦©ª¤­¦-£¢´¦¥:
§°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, ¢ ±­¢µ§°³® µ° ´¶±±°³µ ®¦¥ª¤¢­ ¥ª¢¨¯°´ª´ ®¢º ª¯¤­¶¥¦ ±¢µª¦¯µ ³¦¤°³¥´, ¢ ´¤¢¯¯¦³ ¢¯¥
¤°®®¶¯ª¤¢µª°¯ ¯¦µ¸°³¬´, ¢´ ¸¦­­ ¢´ ¢¯ ¢¶µ°¯°®°¶´ ¥¦¤ª´ª°¯-®¢¬ª¯¨ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®. A ¬¦º ¤°¯¤¦±µ ª´
µ©¢µ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³® ¤¢¯, ¢¯¥ ¨¦¯¦³¢­­º ¸°¶­¥, ª¯¤­¶¥¦ ¦­¦®¦¯µ´ µ©¢µ ¢³¦ ¥¦·¦­°±¦¥ ¶´ª¯¨ µ³¢¥ªµª°¯¢­
¢±±³°¢¤©¦´.
• A¯ ¢¶µ°¯°®°¶´ ´º´µ¦® ¤¢¯ £¦ ·ª¦¸¦¥ §³°® ®¶­µª±­¦ ­¦·¦­´ °§ ¢£´µ³¢¤µª°¯.  °³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, ªµ ¤°¶­¥
£¦ ·ª¦¸¦¥ ¢´ ¢ ±­¢µ§°³® (¦.¨., ¢ ´¦­§-¥³ª·ª¯¨ ¤¢³I °³ ¢´ ¢ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯ ¸ªµ© ¢¯ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ ¢¶µ°¯°®º
¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦ (¦.¨., ¢ ¤°®±°¯¦¯µ µ©¢µ ±³°·ª¥¦´ µ©¦ ­°¤¢µª°¯´ °§ ±¦¥¦´µ³ª¢¯´ ª¯ ¢¯ ª®¢¨¦I. Ị¦±¦¯¥ª¯¨
°¯ µ©¦ ¥°®¢ª¯, ¦ªµ©¦³ ¶´¦ ®¢º £¦ ¤°®®°¯. T©ª´ ª´ ¸©º, ¸ªµ©ª¯ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ, µ©¦ ©ª¨©¦´µ-­¦·¦­
§³¢®¦¸°³¬ ª´ µªµ­¦¥ “±­¢µ§°³®” ³¢µ©¦³ µ©¢¯ “´º´µ¦®”. N¦·¦³µ©¦­¦´´, ª¯ ®¢¯º ¤¢´¦´ µ©¦ µ¦³®´ “±­¢µ§°³®”
¢¯¥ “´º´µ¦®” ®¢º £¦ ·ª¦¸¦¥ ¢´ ª¯µ¦³¤©¢¯¨¦¢£­¦.
• A¯ ¢­¨°³ªµ©® ª´ ¢ ¸¦­­-¥¦ﬁ¯¦¥ ±³°¤¦¥¶³¦ µ©¢µ ª®±­¦®¦¯µ´, ±°´´ª£­º ª¯¥ª³¦¤µ­º, ¢´±¦¤µ´ °§ ¢ ´º´µ¦®’´
£¦©¢·ª°¶³.  °³ µ©¦ ±¶³±°´¦´ °§ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ, ¨¦¯¦³¢­­º ´±¦¢¬ª¯¨, ¢¯ ¢­¨°³ªµ©® §°³ ¢¶µ°¯°®°¶´
¢´±¦¤µ´ ¸°¶­¥ £¦ ¢ ´ª¯¨­¦ ª®±­¦®¦¯µ¢µª°¯ ¥¦·¦­°±¦¥ ¶´ª¯¨ ¢¯ ML µ¦¤©¯ªѨ¶¦, §°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦: ¢ N¦¶³¢­
N¦µ¸°³¬ (NNIề ¢ S¶±±°³µ V¦¤µ°³ M¢¤©ª¯¦ (SVMIề °³ ¢ ³¢¯¥°® §°³¦´µ. A ±­¢µ§°³® ®¢º ª¯¤­¶¥¦ ®¶­µª±­¦
¢­¨°³ªµ©®´.
• A ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯ ª´ µ©¦ ±©º´ª¤¢­ ¦®£°¥ª®¦¯µ °§ ¢¯ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®. I¯ ´°®¦ ¤°¯µ¦¹µ´, µ©¦ ¸°³¥´ ¢³¦ ­¢³¨¦­º
ª¯µ¦³¤©¢¯¨¦¢£­¦. A ¬¦º ¥ª´µª¯¤µª°¯ ª´ µ©¢µ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯ ª¯¤­¶¥¦´ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯´ ³¦­¢µ¦¥ µ° ´¶±±°³µª¯¨
´°§µ¸¢³¦ ¢¯¥ µ° ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯¢­ ©¢³¥¸¢³¦ề ¯¦ªµ©¦³ °§ µ©¦´¦ ª´ ª¯¤­¶¥¦¥ ¸ªµ©ª¯ “¢­¨°³ªµ©®”.
• A ±­¢µ§°³®, °³ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®, ª´ ª¯ °±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ¶´¦ ¸©¦¯ ªµ ª´ £¦ª¯¨ ¶´¦¥ §°³ ªµ´ ª¯µ¦¯¥¦¥ ±¶³±°´¦ề µ©¢µ
ª´, ¸©¦¯ ªµ´ °¶µ±¶µ´ ©¢·¦ ³¦¢­-¸°³­¥ ¤°¯´¦Ѩ¶¦¯¤¦´. N°µ¦ µ©¢µ ªµ ª´ ±°´´ª£­¦ §°³ ­¦¢³¯ª¯¨ µ° ¤°¯µª¯¶¦
¸©ª­´µ ¢ ±­¢µ§°³®, °³ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®, ª´ ª¯ °±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ¶´¦.
• A ¥¢µ¢ ´¦µ ª´ ¶´¦¥ µ° µ³¢ª¯, µ¦´µ ¢¯¥ ·¦³ª§º ¢¯ ¢­¨°³ªµ©® ¶´ª¯¨ ML µ¦¤©¯ªѨ¶¦´. T©¦ ±¢³µ °§ µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢
´¦µ ¶´¦¥ µ° ¥¦·¦­°± µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©® ª´ ³¦§¦³³¦¥ µ° ¢´ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ ¥¢µ¢ề µ©¦ ±¢³µ ¶´¦¥ §°³ µ¦´µª¯¨ ª´ µ¦´µ ¥¢µ¢.
B°µ© µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ ¥¢µ¢ ¢¯¥ µ¦´µ ¥¢µ¢ ¢³¦ ¶´¦¥ £º µ©¦ ¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ µ¦¢®. A ´¦±¢³¢µ¦, ±°´´ª£­º °·¦³­¢±±ª¯¨,
¥¢µ¢ ´¦µ, µ¦³®¦¥ ·¦³ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ ¥¢µ¢ ®¢º £¦ ¶´¦¥ §°³ ¢´´¶³¢¯¤¦, ª¯¥¦±¦¯¥¦¯µ °§ µ©¢µ µ¦¢®. N°µ¦ µ©¢µ
µ©¦´¦ ¥¦ﬁ¯ªµª°¯´ ¢±±­º ¸©¦¯ µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢ ª´ ¶´¦¥ ¢´ ±¢³µ °§ ¢ ±³¦-¥¦±­°º®¦¯µ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ ¢¯¥ ¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ
±©¢´¦, ¢´ ¸¦­­ ¢´ ¸©¦¯ µ©¦³¦ ª´ ¤°¯µª¯¶¢­ ­¦¢³¯ª¯¨.
• T©¦ ¥¢µ¢ ´¦µ ª´ ®¢¥¦ ¶± °§ ¢ ¯¶®£¦³ °§ ´¢®±­¦´ (¦.¨., ª®¢¨¦´ §³°® ¢ ¤¢®¦³¢I.  ¢¤© ´¢®±­¦ ¤°®±³ª´¦´
¢ ¯¶®£¦³ °§ §¦¢µ¶³¦´ (¦.¨., µ©¦ ¤°­°¶³ °§ ¢ ¨ª·¦¯ ±ª¹¦­ ª¯ µ©¢µ ´¤¦¯¦I. T©¦ ¤°­­¦¤µª°¯ °§ §¦¢µ¶³¦´ ¥¦ﬁ¯¦´
µ©¦ ª¯±¶µ ¥°®¢ª¯. Ị¶³ª¯¨ °±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ¶´¦ µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©® ª´ ±³°·ª¥¦¥ ¸ªµ© ª¯±¶µ´.
• P³°·ª¥ª¯¨ ¢ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯ ¸ªµ© ¢¯ ª¯±¶µ (°³, ¥¶³ª¯¨ ¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ, ¢ ´¢®±­¦I ³¦´¶­µ´ ª¯ ¢¯ °¶µ±¶µ. T©ª´
¥¦´¤³ª±µª°¯ ª¯¤­¶¥¦´ ¤¢´¦´ ¸©¦³¦ ®¶­µª±­¦ ´¢®±­¦´ ¢´ ¶´¦¥ (¦.¨., ´µ³¦¢®ª¯¨ ¥¢µ¢I ¢¯¥ ¤¢´¦´ ¸©¦³¦
µ©¦ °¶µ±¶µ ª´ ®¶­µª-¥ª®¦¯´ª°¯¢­ (¦.¨., ¢ ·¦¤µ°³ °§ ¤­¢´´-®¦®£¦³´©ª± ±³°£¢£ª­ªµª¦´I.
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T©¦ ³¦®¢ª¯¥¦³ °§ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ª´ ´µ³¶¤µ¶³¦¥ ¢´ §°­­°¸´:
• S¦¤µª°¯ 2 ¥¦´¤³ª£¦´ µ©¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ §³¢®¦¸°³¬.
• S¦¤µª°¯ 3 ¥ª´¤¶´´¦´ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´.
• S¦¤µª°¯ 4 ¥¦´¤³ª£¦´ µ©¦ ¢¶µ°¯°®º ¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦-­¦·¦­ §³¢®¦¸°³¬.
• S¦¤µª°¯ 5 ¥ª´¤¶´´¦´ ¢¶µ°¯°®º ¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦-­¦·¦­ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´.
• S¦¤µª°¯ 6 ¥¦´¤³ª£¦´ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³®-­¦·¦­ §³¢®¦¸°³¬.
• S¦¤µª°¯ 7 ¥ª´¤¶´´¦´ ±­¢µ§°³®-­¦·¦­ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´.
• S¦¤µª°¯ 8 ¤°¯µ¢ª¯´ ¢ ´¶®®¢³º ­ª´µ °§ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´.
• A±±¦¯¥ª¹ A ±³°·ª¥¦´ ѡ¶´µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ §°³ µ©¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ §³¢®¦¸°³¬.
• A±±¦¯¥ª¹ B ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢¥¥ªµª°¯¢­ ѡ¶´µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ (£¦º°¯¥ µ©¢µ ¸©ª¤© ª´ ª¯¤­¶¥¦¥ ª¯ S¦¤µª°¯ 3I §°³ µ©¦
¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´.
• A±±¦¯¥ª¹ C ±³°·ª¥¦´ ѡ¶´µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ §°³ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³®-­¦·¦­ §³¢®¦¸°³¬.
• A±±¦¯¥ª¹ Ị ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢ µ°±-­¦·¦­ ®¢±±ª¯¨ £¦µ¸¦¦¯ µ©¦ ¢³¨¶®¦¯µ ´µ³¶¤µ¶³¦ ª¯ µ©¦ A´´¶³ª¯¨ A¶µ°¯°®º
I¯µ¦³¯¢µª°¯¢­ P³°¨³¢®®¦ (AAIPI B°¥º O§ ﻿¯°¸­¦¥¨¦ (BO﻿I ¢¯¥ µ©¦ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´ ­ª´µ¦¥ ª¯ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ.
T©ª´ ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢¥¥ªµª°¯¢­ ѡ¶´µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ §°³ ¢­­ µ©³¦¦ §³¢®¦¸°³¬´ ¢¥°±µ¦¥ £º µ©¦ SASWG.
• A±±¦¯¥ª¹   ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢ µ°±-­¦·¦­ ®¢±±ª¯¨ £¦µ¸¦¦¯ µ©¦ ¬¦º ´¦¤µª°¯ ©¦¢¥ª¯¨´ ª¯ UL4600, “T©¦ Sµ¢¯¥¢³¥
§°³ S¢§¦µº §°³ µ©¦  ·¢­¶¢µª°¯ °§ A¶µ°¯°®°¶´ P³°¥¶¤µ´”, ¢¯¥ µ©¦ ¤°¯µ¦¯µ´ °§ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ (¦ªµ©¦³
°£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´ °³ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯´I. A´ ¸ªµ© µ©¦ ±³¦·ª°¶´ ¢±±¦¯¥ª¹, µ©ª´ ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢¥¥ªµª°¯¢­ ѡ¶´µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ §°³ µ©ª´
¥°¤¶®¦¯µ’´ ¤°¯µ¦¯µ´.
• A±±¦¯¥ª¹   ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢¯ ª­­¶´µ³¢µª°¯ °§ ©°¸ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ’´ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦´ ´¶±±°³µ µ©¦ O CỊ P³ª¯¤ª±­¦´
°¯ AI.
• A±±¦¯¥ª¹ G ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢ ­ª´µ °§ ¬¯°¸¯ ª´´¶¦´, ¸©ª¤© ¸ª­­ £¦ ³¦´°­·¦¥ ª¯ §¶µ¶³¦ ·¦³´ª°¯´.
• A±±¦¯¥ª¹   ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢ ­ª´µ °§ ¢££³¦·ª¢µª°¯´.
• A±±¦¯¥ª¹ I ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢ ­ª´µ °§ ³¦§¦³¦¯¤¦´.
• A±±¦¯¥ª¹ ​ ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢ ­ª´µ °§ ¤°¯µ³ª£¶µ°³´.
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SCSC-153A (​¢¯ 2020I
Ẹ C°ỵỸ¶µ¢µª°¯-L¦·¦­ Ọ³¢ỵ¦¸°³ự: Ị¦´¤³ªỸµª°¯
T©ª´ ´¦¤µª°¯ ¥¦´¤³ª£¦´ µ©¦ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬ ¢¥°±µ¦¥ £º µ©¦ SASWG §°³ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯´≈ Ѯ©ª¤©
ª´ £¢´¦¥ °¯ µ©¦ °¯¦ ±³¦´¦¯µ¦¥ £º F¢³ª¢ ª¯ {30}≤ T©¦ «¶´µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ §°³ ¢¥°±µª¯¨ µ©ª´ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬ ª´ ±³°·ª¥¦¥ ª¯
A±±¦¯¥ªѯ A≤
T©¦ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬ ¤°¯´ª´µ´ °§ ﬁ·¦ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯´≈ ¦¢¤© °§ Ѯ©ª¤© ·ª¦Ѯ´ µ©¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯’´ ±³°±¦³µª¦´ ¢­°¯¨ ¢
¥ªf¦³¦¯µ ¢ѯª´≤ T©¦ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯´ ¢³¦ ¯°µ ª¯µ¦¯¥¦¥ µ° £¦ ´µ³ª¤µ­º ª¯¥¦±¦¯¥¦¯µỀ µ©¦º ±³°·ª¥¦ ¥ªf¦³¦¯µ Ѯ¢º´
°§ ·ª¦Ѯª¯¨ µ©¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯≈ ª¯ °³¥¦³ µ° ¦­ª¤ªµ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ °£«¦¤µª·¦´≤ T° §¢¤ª­ªµ¢µ¦ ¥ª´¤¶´´ª°¯≈ µ©¦ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯´
©¢·¦ £¦¦¯ ¢³³¢¯¨¦¥ ª¯ ¢¯ ¢±±³°ѯª®¢µ¦ ©ª¦³¢³¤©ª¤¢­ °³¥¦³≈ Ѯ°³¬ª¯¨ §³°® ®°³¦ ¢£´µ³¢¤µ µ° ®°³¦ ¤°¯¤³¦µ¦
¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯´≈ ´±¦¤ªﬁ¤¢­­ºỀ ¦ѯ±¦³ª¦¯¤¦ề µ¢´¬ề ¢­¨°³ªµ©®ề ´°§µѮ¢³¦ề ©¢³¥Ѯ¢³¦≤ E¢¤© °§ µ©¦´¦ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯´ ª´
¤°¯´ª¥¦³¦¥≈ ª¯ µ¶³¯≈ ª¯ µ©¦ §°­­°Ѯª¯¨ ´¶£´¦¤µª°¯´≤ T©¦ ´¦¤µª°¯ ¤°¯¤­¶¥¦´ Ѯªµ© ¢ £³ª¦§ µ¢£¶­¢³ ´¶®®¢³º °§
µ©¦ ¦¯µª³¦ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬≤
ẸẴ1 Ỗ³°Ự¦¤µª°¯´
ẸẴ1Ẵ1 E¹Ỹ¦³ª¦¯¤¦
T©ª´ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯ §°¤¶´¦´ °¯ µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢ ´¦µ ¶´¦¥ µ° µ³¢ª¯ ¢¯¥ ¥¦·¦­°± µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®≤ W©¦¯ ³¦­¦·¢¯µ≈ µ©ª´ ¢­´°
ª¯¤­¶¥¦´ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ µ©¢µ ¤°¯µª¯¶¦´ ¥¶³ª¯¨ °±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ¶´¦≈ £¢´¦¥ °¯ µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢ ´¦µ ±³°·ª¥¦¥ £º µ©¦ ´º´µ¦®’´
¦ѯ±¦³ª¦¯¤¦´≤
Iµ ª¯¤­¶¥¦´ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯ °§ ©°Ѯ µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢ Ѯ¢´ ¨¦¯¦³¢µ¦¥≈ °³ ¤°­­¦¤µ¦¥≈ ¢´ Ѯ¦­­ ¢´ µ©¦ ¶´¦ °§ ±³¦-¦ѯª´µª¯¨ ¥¢µ¢
´¦µ´ ¢¯¥ µ©¦ ¯¢µ¶³¦ °§ ¢¯º ±³¦±³°¤¦´´ª¯¨ ¢¤µª·ªµª¦´ (¦.¨., µ° ´º¯µ©¦´ª´¦ ®ª´´ª¯¨ ·¢­¶¦´I. Iµ ¢­´° ¦¯¤°®±¢´´¦´
¸©¦µ©¦³ µ©¦ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ ¥¢µ¢ ª´ ´¶ªµ¢£­º ³¦±³¦´¦¯µ¢µª·¦ °§ ¥¢µ¢ µ©¢µ ª´ °£´¦³·¦¥ (°³ ¦¹±¦¤µ¦¥ µ° £¦ °£´¦³·¦¥I
¥¶³ª¯¨ °±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ¶´¦ề µ©ª´ ª¯¤­¶¥¦´ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯ °§ µ©¦ ¦¯·ª³°¯®¦¯µ(´I ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ ¸ªµ© µ©¦ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ ¥¢µ¢.
T©¦ µº±¦ °§ ¤°¯ﬁ¨¶³¢µª°¯ ®¢¯¢¨¦®¦¯µ ¢±±­ª¦¥ µ° µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢ ª´ ¢­´° ³¦­¦·¢¯µ ¸ªµ©ª¯ µ©ª´ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯.
ẸẴ1ẴẸ T¢´ự
T©ª´ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯ §°¤¶´¦´ °¯ µ©¦ ±¦³§°³®¢¯¤¦ °§ µ©¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯. A´ ´¶¤©, ªµ ª´ ®¢ª¯­º ¤°¯¤¦³¯¦¥ ¸ªµ©
³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦®¦¯µ´, µ©¢µ ª´, ¸©¢µ µ©¦ ´º´µ¦® ³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦´ §³°® µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®.
Iµ ª¯¤­¶¥¦´ µ©¦ ®¦µ³ª¤´ µ©¢µ ¢³¦ ¶´¦¥ µ° ®¦¢´¶³¦ ±¦³§°³®¢¯¤¦, ¢´ ¸¦­­ ¢´ µ©¦ ±¦³§°³®¢¯¤¦ µ©³¦´©°­¥
³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦¥ µ° ¢­­°¸ µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©® µ° £¦ ¶´¦¥ ´¢§¦­º ¸ªµ©ª¯ ¢ ´º´µ¦® (¸©ª¤© ®¢º ¥¦±¦¯¥ °¯ µ©¦ ª¯µ¦¯¥¦¥
°±¦³¢µª¯¨ ¦¯·ª³°¯®¦¯µI. Iµ¦®´ µº±ª¤¢­­º ¶´¦¥ µ° ®¦¢´¶³¦ µ©¦ ±¦³§°³®¢¯¤¦ °§ ML-£¢´¦¥ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯´, ­ª¬¦
¢¤¤¶³¢¤º, ±³¦¤ª´ª°¯ ¢¯¥ ³¦¤¢­­ ¢³¦ ³¦­¦·¢¯µ ©¦³¦ ¢­µ©°¶¨©, £º µ©¦®´¦­·¦´, µ©¦º ®¢º ¯°µ £¦ ´¶ﬃ¤ª¦¯µ. T©¦³¦
®¢º, §°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, £¦ ¢ ¯¦¦¥ µ° ±³°·ª¥¦ ¤°¯ﬁ¥¦¯¤¦ ª¯ ¢¯ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®’´ °¶µ±¶µ. A¥¥ªµª°¯¢­­º, µ©¦³¦ ®¢º £¦ ¢
¯¦¦¥ µ° ¥¦®°¯´µ³¢µ¦ ´°®¦ ¯°¯-§¶¯¤µª°¯¢­ ¤©¢³¢¤µ¦³ª´µª¤´ (¦.¨., ¢¯ °¶µ±¶µ ¸ª­­ ¢­¸¢º´ £¦ ±³°·ª¥¦¥ ¸ªµ©ª¯ ¢
¨ª·¦¯ µª®¦I.
ẸẴ1Ẵ3 ệ­¨°³ªµ©ỵ
T©ª´ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯ §°¤¶´¦´ °¯ µ©¦ ¤©°ª¤¦ °§ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®, §°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, ¸©¦µ©¦³ ¢¯ NN, ¢ SVM, ¢ ³¢¯¥°® §°³¦´µ,
°³ ´°®¦ °µ©¦³ ¢±±³°¢¤© ª´ ¶´¦¥. A´ ´¶¤©, ªµ ª´ ®¢ª¯­º ¤°¯¤¦³¯¦¥ ¸ªµ© ±³°·ª¥ª¯¨ ѡ¶´µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ §°³ ¥¦¤ª´ª°¯´
³¦­¢µª¯¨ µ° µ©¦ ¤©°´¦¯ ª®±­¦®¦¯µ¢µª°¯.
Iµ ª¯¤­¶¥¦´ µ©¦ ¤©°ª¤¦ °§ ¢¯º ©º±¦³-±¢³¢®¦µ¦³´ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ ¸ªµ© µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®: §°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, µ©¦ ´µ³¶¤µ¶³¦SC
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°§, ¢¯¥ ¢¤µª·¢µª°¯ §¶¯¤µª°¯ ¶´¦¥ ¸ªµ©ª¯, ¢ NN, °³ µ©¦ ¯¶®£¦³ °§ µ³¦¦´ ª¯ ¢ ³¢¯¥°® §°³¦´µ. Iµ ¢­´° ª¯¤­¶¥¦´
¥¦¤ª´ª°¯´ ³¦­¢µ¦¥ µ° µ©¦ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ ±³°¤¦´´: §°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, µ©¦ ¯¶®£¦³ °§ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ ¦±°¤©´ µ©¢µ ¢³¦ ¶´¦¥, °³ µ©¦
´µ°±±ª¯¨ ¤°¯¥ªµª°¯ µ©¢µ ª´ ª®±­¦®¦¯µ¦¥.
ẸẴ1Ẵ4 S°§µ¸¢³¦
T©ª´ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯ §°¤¶´¦´ °¯ µ©¦ ´°§µ¸¢³¦ ª¯´µ¢¯µª¢µª°¯ °§ µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®ề µ©¢µ ª´, µ©¦ µ³¢¯´­¢µª°¯ °§ ¢ ¥¦´ª¨¯,
®¢µ©¦®¢µª¤´ °³ ±´¦¶¥°-¤°¥¦ ª¯µ° ¢ §°³® µ©¢µ ¤¢¯ £¦ ¥ª³¦¤µ­º ¦¹¦¤¶µ¦¥ °¯ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯¢­ ©¢³¥¸¢³¦. M°³¦
´±¦¤ªﬁ¤¢­­º, µ©ª´ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯ ª´ ¤°¯¤¦³¯¦¥ ¸ªµ© ¸©¦µ©¦³ µ©¦ ª®±­¦®¦¯µ¢µª°¯ ª´ ¢ ·¢­ª¥ ³¦±³¦´¦¯µ¢µª°¯ °§ µ©¦
¢­¨°³ªµ©®.
T©¦ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯ ª¯¤­¶¥¦´ µ©¦ ¤©°ª¤¦ °§ ±³°¨³¢®®ª¯¨ ­¢¯¨¶¢¨¦. Iµ ¢­´° ª¯¤­¶¥¦´ µ©¦ ¤©°ª¤¦ °§ ´°§µ¸¢³¦
­ª£³¢³ª¦´ ¶´¦¥ µ° ´¶±±°³µ µ©¦ ¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ ¢¯¥ °±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ª®±­¦®¦¯µ¢µª°¯ °§ ¢¯ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®. T°°­´ ¶´¦¥
µ° ´¶±±°³µ ´°§µ¸¢³¦ ¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ ¢¯¥ ·¦³ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ ¢³¦ ¢­´° ¤¢±µ¶³¦¥ ª¯ µ©ª´ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯.
T©¦ ¤©°ª¤¦ °§, §°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, ±³°¨³¢®®ª¯¨ ­¢¯¨¶¢¨¦ ¢¯¥ ´¶±±°³µª¯¨ µ°°­´ ®¢º £¦ ¥ªf¦³¦¯µ ¥¶³ª¯¨ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨
µ©¢¯ ª¯ °±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ¶´¦.  ¦¯¤¦, ªµ ª´ ¤°¯·¦¯ª¦¯µ µ° ¤°¯´ª¥¦³ µ©ª´ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯ µ¸ª¤¦: °¯¤¦ §³°® ¢ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ ¢¯¥
¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ ±¦³´±¦¤µª·¦ ¢¯¥ °¯¤¦ §³°® µ©¦ ±¦³´±¦¤µª·¦ °§ °±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ¶´¦ °§ µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®.
M¢¯º °§ µ©¦ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯´ ³¦­¦·¢¯µ §°³ µ©ª´ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯ ¢³¦ ¢¥¦Ѩ¶¢µ¦­º ¢¥¥³¦´´¦¥ £º ¦¹ª´µª¯¨ ´°§µ¸¢³¦ ´¢§¦µº
´µ¢¯¥¢³¥´.
ẸẴ1Ẵ5 H¢³¥¸¢³¦
T©ª´ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯ §°¤¶´¦´ °¯ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯¢­ ©¢³¥¸¢³¦. Iµ ª¯¤­¶¥¦´ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯ °§ µ©¦ µº±¦ °§ ©¢³¥¸¢³¦,
§°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦: C¦¯µ³¢­ P³°¤¦´´ª¯¨ U¯ªµ (CPUIề G³¢±©ª¤¢­ P³°¤¦´´ª¯¨ U¯ªµ (GPUIề T¦¯´°³ P³°¤¦´´ª¯¨ U¯ªµ (TPUIề
 ª¦­¥ P³°¨³¢®®¢£­¦ G¢µ¦ A³³¢º ( PGAI. Iµ ¢­´° ª¯¤­¶¥¦´ ¸©¦µ©¦³ µ©ª´ ©¢³¥¸¢³¦ ª´ ¥¦¥ª¤¢µ¦¥ µ° °¯¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®
°³ ¸©¦µ©¦³ ªµ ª´ ¶´¦¥ µ° ´¶±±°³µ ®¶­µª±­¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®´ (°³ ®¶­µª±­¦ ´º´µ¦® §¦¢µ¶³¦´, ª¯¤­¶¥ª¯¨ ¯°¯-AI °¯¦´I.
A´ ¸ªµ© µ©¦ ±³¦·ª°¶´ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯, ªµ ª´ ¤°¯·¦¯ª¦¯µ µ° ¤°¯´ª¥¦³ µ©¦ ©¢³¥¸¢³¦ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯ §³°® £°µ©
¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ ¢¯¥ °±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ¶´¦ ±¦³´±¦¤µª·¦´.
Lª¬¦ µ©¦ ±³¦·ª°¶´ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯, ®¢¯º °§ µ©¦ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯´ ³¦­¦·¢¯µ §°³ µ©ª´ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯ ¢³¦ ¢¥¦Ѩ¶¢µ¦­º
¢¥¥³¦´´¦¥ £º ¦¹ª´µª¯¨ (¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯¢­I ©¢³¥¸¢³¦ ´¢§¦µº ´µ¢¯¥¢³¥´.
ẸẴẸ S¶ỵỵ¢³º
T¢£­¦ 2 ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢ £³ª¦§ ´¶®®¢³º °§ µ©¦ ﬁ·¦ ±³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯´ ª¯ µ©¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ §³¢®¦¸°³¬ µ©¢µ ©¢´ £¦¦¯
¢¥°±µ¦¥ £º µ©¦ SASWG.
T¢£­¦ 2: S¶®®¢³º °§ P³°ѡ¦¤µª°¯´ Wªµ©ª¯ µ©¦ C°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-L¦·¦­
 ³¢®¦¸°³¬
P³°«¦¤µª°¯ O¶µ­ª¯¦
 ¹±¦³ª¦¯¤¦
 °¤¶´¦¥ °¯ µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢ µ©¢µ ª´ ¢·¢ª­¢£­¦ µ° µ³¢ª¯ (°³ ¥¦·¦­°±I
µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®
T¢´¬
 °¤¶´¦¥ °¯ µ©¦ ±¦³§°³®¢¯¤¦ °§ µ©¦ ª®±­¦®¦¯µ¦¥
¢­¨°³ªµ©®ề ¦®±©¢´ªѱ¦´ ³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦®¦¯µ´
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P³°«¦¤µª°¯ O¶µ­ª¯¦
A­¨°³ªµ©®
 °¤¶´¦¥ °¯ µ©¦ µº±¦ °§ ¢­¨°³ªµ©® µ©¢µ ª´ ¶´¦¥ề
¦®±©¢´ªѱ¦´ ª®±­¦®¦¯µ¢µª°¯
S°§µ¸¢³¦
 °¤¶´¦¥ °¯ µ©¦ ´°§µ¸¢³¦ ¶´¦¥ µ° ¥¦·¦­°± µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®
¢¯¥, ´¦±¢³¢µ¦­º, ´¶±±°³µ ªµ´ °±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ¶´¦
 ¢³¥¸¢³¦
 °¤¶´¦¥ °¯ µ©¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯¢­ ©¢³¥¸¢³¦ µ©¢µ ª´ ¶´¦¥,
£°µ© §°³ ¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ ¢¯¥ §°³ °±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ¶´¦
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SCSC-153A (​¢¯ 2020I
3 C°ỵỸ¶µ¢µª°¯-L¦·¦­ Ọ³¢ỵ¦¸°³ự: ổỨỰ¦¤µª·¦´
T©ª´ ´¦¤µª°¯ ­ª´µ´ µ©¦ °£«¦¤µª·¦´ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ Ѯªµ© ¦¢¤© ±³°«¦¤µª°¯ °§ µ©¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬≤
S¶±±°³µª¯¨ «¶´µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ §°³ µ©¦´¦ °£«¦¤µª·¦´ ª´ ±³°·ª¥¦¥ ª¯ A±±¦¯¥ªѯ Ỉ≤
3Ẵ1 E¹Ỹ¦³ª¦¯¤¦
T©¦ ¦ѯ±¦³ª¦¯¤¦ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯ ª´ §°¤¶´¦¥ °¯ µ©¦ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ ¥¢µ¢ µ©¢µ ª´ ¶´¦¥ µ° ¥¦·¦­°± µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®≤ T©ª´ ¥¢µ¢
ª´ ¤³¶¤ª¢­­º ª®±°³µ¢¯µ £¦¤¢¶´¦ ªµ ¦¯¤°¥¦´ µ©¦ ³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦®¦¯µ´ µ©¢µ µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©® ©¢´ µ° ´¢µª´§º≤ U¯§°³µ¶¯¢µ¦­º≈
µ©ª´ ¦¯¤°¥ª¯¨ ª´ ª®±­ª¤ªµ≈ ª¯ µ©¦ §°³® °§ µ©¦ ¥¦´ª³¦¥ ª¯±¶µ-°¶µ±¶µ ³¦­¢µª°¯´©ª±≈ ´° ªµ ¤¢¯¯°µ £¦ ¥ª³¦¤µ­º
¦ѯ¢®ª¯¦¥≤ H¦¯¤¦≈ ¢´´¶³¢¯¤¦ µ©¢µ µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®’´ £¦©¢·ª°¶³ Ѯª­­ £¦ ¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦ ©¢´ µ° ª¯¤­¶¥¦ ¢´±¦¤µ´
³¦­¢µª¯¨ µ° µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢≤
T©¦³¦ ¢³¦ §°¶³ °£«¦¤µª·¦´ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ Ѯªµ© µ©ª´ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯≤
COM1-1Ề D¢µ¢ ª´ ¢¤²¶ª³¦¥ ¢¯¥ ¤°¯µ³°­­¦¥ ¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦­ºẴ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề  ¢µ¢ ª´ °£·ª°¶´­º ¢ ·¦³º ª®±°³µ¢¯µ ±¢³µ °§ ¢¯ ồỒ ¢±±³°¢¤©≤ C°¯´¦Ѩ¶¦¯µ­º≈ ¢¯º ¢´´¶³¢¯¤¦
¢³¨¶®¦¯µ µ©¢µ ¢¥¥³¦´´¦´ µ©¦ ồỒ-±³°¥¶¤¦¥ ¢­¨°³ªµ©® ¢­´° ©¢´ µ° ¢¥¥³¦´´ µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢ ¶´¦¥ µ° ´¶±±°³µ ªµ´
¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ≤ ồ°³¦ ±¢³µª¤¶­¢³­º≈ ª§ µ©¦ ´°¶³¤¦ °§ µ©¦ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨≈ µ¦´µ ¢¯¥ ·¦³ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ ¥¢µ¢ ¤¢¯¯°µ £¦ ¢¥¦Ѩ¶¢µ¦­º
¥¦ﬁ¯¦¥≈ °³ ª§ µ©ª´ ´°¶³¤¦ ª´ ¯°µ ¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦ §°³ µ©¦ ª¯µ¦¯¥¦¥ ¶´¦≈ µ©¦¯ ªµ Ѯª­­ £¦ ¥ªﬃ¤¶­µ µ° ±³°¥¶¤¦ ¢
¤°®±¦­­ª¯¨ ¢´´¶³¢¯¤¦ ¢³¨¶®¦¯µ≤
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề T©¦ ﬁ³´µ ±¢³µ °§ µ©ª´ °£«¦¤µª·¦ ³¦­¢µ¦´ µ° µ©¦ Ѯ¢º µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢ ª´ ¢¤Ѩ¶ª³¦¥≤ F°³ ¦ѯ¢®±­¦≈ µ©ª´ ¤°¶­¥
ª¯·°­·¦ °£´¦³·ª¯¨ ¢ ¯¢µ¶³¢­ ±³°¤¦´´ °·¦³ Ѯ©ª¤© ­ªµµ­¦ ¤°¯µ³°­ ¤¢¯ £¦ ¢±±­ª¦¥≈ °³ ªµ ¤°¶­¥ ª¯·°­·¦ ¤°¯µ³°­­¦¥
µ³ª¢­´ề ¢­µ¦³¯¢µª·¦­º≈ ªµ ¤°¶­¥ ª¯·°­·¦ µ©¦ ¶´¦ °§ ¢ ´º¯µ©¦µª¤ ¦¯·ª³°¯®¦¯µ §³°®Ѯ©ª¤© µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ ¥¢µ¢ ª´ ¨¦¯¦³¢µ¦¥≤
I¥¦¢­­º≈ µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢ Ѯ°¶­¥ £¦ ¢¤Ѩ¶ª³¦¥ ª¯ ¢ ¤°¯µ³°­­¦¥ ®¢¯¯¦³ ¶´ª¯¨ ¢ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ¦¥ ±³°¤¦´´≈ Ѯ©ª¤© µ¢¬¦´
¢¤¤°¶¯µ °§ µ©¦ ±³¦·¢ª­ª¯¨ ¦¯·ª³°¯®¦¯µ¢­ §¦¢µ¶³¦´ (¦.¨., ¸¦¢µ©¦³, ´º´µ¦® ¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦I ¥¶³ª¯¨ ¤°­­¦¤µª°¯.
C©¢¯¨¦´ µ° µ©¦ ¢¤Ѩ¶ª´ªµª°¯ ®¦µ©°¥ ¸°¶­¥ £¦ §°³®¢­­º ®¢¯¢¨¦¥. A­´°, ¢¯º ´°§µ¸¢³¦ ¶´¦¥ µ° ´¶±±°³µ ¥¢µ¢
¢¤Ѩ¶ª´ªµª°¯ ¸°¶­¥ £¦ ´©°¸¯ µ° £¦ ¤°³³¦¤µ. I¯ ´°®¦ ¸¢º´, µ©¦´¦ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯´ ®ª³³°³ µ©°´¦ ³¦­¢µ¦¥ µ° µ©¦
¶´¦ °§ P³°¥¶¤µ S¦³·ª¤¦  ª´µ°³º (PS I ª¯ µ©¦ ¢·ª¢µª°¯ ¥°®¢ª¯ ỡ16ợ.
I§ ¢ ¤°®±­¦µ¦ ¥¢µ¢ ´¦µ ª´ ¢¤Ѩ¶ª³¦¥ §³°® ¢¯ ¦¹µ¦³¯¢­ ±¢³µº µ©¦¯ ¤¢³¦ ´©°¶­¥ £¦ µ¢¬¦¯ µ° ¦¯´¶³¦ µ©¢µ ªµ ©¢´
¯°µ £¦¦¯ ´¶£ѡ¦¤µ µ° “Ị¢µ¢ P°ª´°¯ª¯¨”ề §°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, µ©¦ ¢¥¥ªµª°¯ °§ ¢ ´®¢­­ ¯¶®£¦³ °§ ®¢­ª¤ª°¶´­º ¤³¢§µ¦¥
´¢®±­¦´ ¤¢¯ ¤³¦¢µ¦ ¢ £¢¤¬¥°°³ ỡ17ợ. T©¦ ´¢®¦ µ¦¤©¯ªѨ¶¦´ ¶´¦¥ µ° ¤°¯ﬁ³® µ©¦ ¢¶µ©¦¯µª¤ªµº °§ ª¯§°³®¢µª°¯
¥°¸¯­°¢¥¦¥ §³°® µ©¦ I¯µ¦³¯¦µ (¦.¨., ¤©¦¤¬´¶®´I ®¢º £¦ ©¦­±§¶­ ©¦³¦. W©¦¯ ¶´ª¯¨ ¥¢µ¢ §³°® ¢¯ ¦¹µ¦³¯¢­
±¢³µº, ¤¢³¦ ¢­´° ¯¦¦¥´ µ° £¦ µ¢¬¦¯ µ° ¦¯´¶³¦ ªµ ª´ ¯°µ ¢¤¤ª¥¦¯µ¢­­º ﬂ¢¸¦¥, §°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, £¦¤¢¶´¦ °§ µ³¢¯´­¢µª°¯
ª´´¶¦´ (¦.¨, µ©³°¶¨© ¥ªf¦³¦¯µ ¶´¦ °§ ¤°®®°¯ µ¦³®´ ­ª¬¦ “´±¦¦¥”I.
R¦¨¢³¥­¦´´ °§ ©°¸ µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢ ª´ ¢¤Ѩ¶ª³¦¥ µ©¦³¦ ª´ ¢­´° ¢ ¯¦¦¥ µ° ¢¯¢­º´¦ ¢¯¥ Ѩ¶¢¯µª§º ¶¯¤¦³µ¢ª¯µº. T©ª´
®¢º ¢³ª´¦, §°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, §³°® ´¦¯´°³ ¯°ª´¦ ¸©¦¯ ®¦¢´¶³ª¯¨ ´¢®±­¦´. A¯°µ©¦³ ±°µ¦¯µª¢­ ´°¶³¤¦ ª´ ­¢£¦­­ª¯¨
¶¯¤¦³µ¢ª¯µº: §°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, ´©°¶­¥ ¢ ±¦³´°¯ ¸¢­¬ª¯¨ ¯¦¹µ µ° ¢ £ª¤º¤­¦ £¦ ¤­¢´´ªﬁ¦¥ ¢´ ¢ ±¦¥¦´µ³ª¢¯ °³ ¢ ¤º¤­ª´µễ
T©ª´ ¤¢¯ £¦ ¢¯ ª´´¶¦ ª§ ­¢£¦­­ª¯¨ ª´ ¤°¯¥¶¤µ¦¥ £º ¢ µ¦¢® °§ ©¶®¢¯´ ỡ22ợ.
T©¦ ´¦¤°¯¥ ±¢³µ °§ µ©ª´ °£ѡ¦¤µª·¦ ³¦­¢µ¦´ µ° ¤°¯µ³°­ °§ µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢. M°³¦ ´±¦¤ªﬁ¤¢­­º, µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢ ¸°¶­¥ £¦
¦¹±¦¤µ¦¥ µ° £¦ ´¶£ѡ¦¤µ µ° ´°®¦ §°³® °§ ¤°¯ﬁ¨¶³¢µª°¯ ®¢¯¢¨¦®¦¯µ ±³°¤¦´´, ¸©ª¤© ±³°µ¦¤µ´ ªµ §³°®
¢¤¤ª¥¦¯µ¢­ °³ ¶¯¢¶µ©°³ª´¦¥ ¤©¢¯¨¦´. Sµ¢¯¥¢³¥ ¤°¯ﬁ¨¶³¢µª°¯ ®¢¯¢¨¦®¦¯µ µ°°­´ ¢³¦ ­ª¬¦­º µ° £¦ ´¶ªµ¢£­¦
§°³ µ©ª´ ±¶³±°´¦, ¢­µ©°¶¨© µ©¦ ±³°±¦³µª¦´ °§ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ ¥¢µ¢ ®¢º ®¦¢¯ µ©¦º ¢³¦ ¯°µ °±µª®¢­.
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N°µ¦ µ©¢µ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®´ §¦¢µ¶³ª¯¨ °¯­ª¯¦ ­¦¢³¯ª¯¨ ¸ª­­ ¤°¯µª¯¶¦ µ° ³¦¤¦ª·¦ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ ¥¢µ¢ ¥¶³ª¯¨ °±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ¶´¦.
T©ª´ ª¯¥ª¤¢µ¦´ µ©¦³¦ ®¢º £¦ ¢ ¯¦¦¥ µ° ª¯¤­¶¥¦ ´¢§¦¨¶¢³¥´ ´° µ©¢µ °¯­º ´¶ªµ¢£­¦ ¥¢µ¢ ª´ ¶´¦¥ §°³ ­¦¢³¯ª¯¨
±¶³±°´¦´. T©¦´¦ ¤°¶­¥, §°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, ¤©¦¤¬ µ©¢µ ª¯±¶µ´ ¢³¦ ´¶ﬃ¤ª¦¯µ­º ´ª®ª­¢³ µ° µ©°´¦ µ©¢µ ©¢·¦ £¦¦¯ ´¦¦¯
£¦§°³¦, ¦ªµ©¦³ £¦¤¢¶´¦ µ©¦º ¸¦³¦ ª¯¤­¶¥¦¥ ª¯ µ©¦ °³ª¨ª¯¢­, ±³¦-¥¦±­°º®¦¯µ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ ¥¢µ¢ °³ £¦¤¢¶´¦ µ©¦º
©¢·¦ ±³¦·ª°¶´­º £¦¦¯ °£´¦³·¦¥ ª¯ °±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ¶´¦ề µ©¦´¦ µ¸° ¤°¯¥ªµª°¯´ ¢­­°¸ ¨³¢¥¶¢­ ¦¹±¢¯´ª°¯ °§ µ©¦
³¢¯¨¦ °§ ´¶ªµ¢£­¦ ¥¢µ¢ ¢´ µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©® ­¦¢³¯´. T©¦ ¯°µª°¯ °§ “´¶ﬃ¤ª¦¯µ ´ª®ª­¢³ªµº” £¦¢³´ ´°®¦ ³¦­¢µª°¯ µ°
µ©¦ ¤°¯¤¦±µ °§ ¥ª´µ³ª£¶µª°¯ ´©ª§µ2 ỡ61ợ, £¶µ ©¦³¦ ªµ ª¯·°­·¦´ ¤°®±¢³ª¯¨ ¢ ´ª¯¨­¦ ´¢®±­¦ ¸ªµ© ¢ ¥ª´µ³ª£¶µª°¯,
³¢µ©¦³ µ©¢¯ µ©¦ ®°³¦ µº±ª¤¢­ ¤¢´¦ °§ ¤°®±¢³ª¯¨ µ¸° ¥ª´µ³ª£¶µª°¯´.
COM1-2: Ỗ³¦-±³°¤¦´´ª¯¨ ®¦µ©°¥´ ¥° ¯°µ ª¯µ³°¥¶¤¦ ¦³³°³´Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề ​¶´µ £¦¤¢¶´¦ ¥¢µ¢ ©¢´ £¦¦¯ ¤°­­¦¤µ¦¥ ª¯ ¢ ¤°¯µ³°­­¦¥ ®¢¯¯¦³ (¢´ ª¯¥ª¤¢µ¦¥ £º O£ѡ¦¤µª·¦
COM1-1I, ªµ ¥°¦´ ¯°µ ¯¦¤¦´´¢³ª­º §°­­°¸ µ©¢µ µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢ ª´ ´¶ªµ¢£­¦ §°³ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ ¢¯ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®. I¯ ®¢¯º ML
¢±±­ª¤¢µª°¯´, µ©¦³¦ ª´ ¢ ´µ¦± £¦µ¸¦¦¯ ¢¤Ѩ¶ª³ª¯¨ ¥¢µ¢ ¢¯¥ ©¢·ª¯¨ ¥¢µ¢ ª¯ ¢ §°³® ´¶ªµ¢£­¦ §°³ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®
¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ. T©ª´ ´µ¦± ¨¦¯¦³¢­­º ª¯·°­·¦´ ±³¦-±³°¤¦´´ª¯¨ µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢. Iµ ¤°¶­¥ ª¯¤­¶¥¦, §°³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, ¥¦µ¦¤µª¯¨
®ª´´ª¯¨ ¥¢µ¢ ªµ¦®´ ¢¯¥ ³¦±­¢¤ª¯¨ µ©¦® ¸ªµ© ´¶ªµ¢£­¦ ´¶³³°¨¢µ¦ ·¢­¶¦´ề ªµ ¤°¶­¥ ¢­´° ª¯¤­¶¥¦ ¯°³®¢­ª´ª¯¨
§¦¢µ¶³¦´. Sª¯¤¦ ±³¦-±³°¤¦´´ª¯¨ ¥ª³¦¤µ­º ¢f¦¤µ´ µ©¦ ¥¢µ¢ ¶´¦¥ µ° ¥¦·¦­°± µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®, ¢¯º ¦³³°³´ ª¯
±³¦-±³°¤¦´´ª¯¨ ¤°¶­¥ ¶¯¥¦³®ª¯¦ ¢ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ ¢´´¶³¢¯¤¦ ¢³¨¶®¦¯µ.
P³¦-±³°¤¦´´ª¯¨ ª´ ­ª¬¦­º µ° °¤¤¶³ ¥¶³ª¯¨ °±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ¶´¦ ¢´ ¸¦­­.  °³ ¦¹¢®±­¦, ³¢¸ ´¦¯´°³ ³¦¢¥ª¯¨´ ¢³¦
­ª¬¦­º µ° £¦ ±³°¤¦´´¦¥ ª¯ ´°®¦ ¸¢º £¦§°³¦ £¦ª¯¨ ±³°·ª¥¦¥ ¢´ ª¯±¶µ´ µ° ¢¯ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®. A­µ©°¶¨© ªµ ª´
ª®±°³µ¢¯µ, µ©ª´ µº±¦ °§ ±³¦-±³°¤¦´´ª¯¨ ª´ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¦¥ µ° £¦ ¢¯ ¢¶µ°¯°®º ¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦-­¦·¦­ ª´´¶¦, ³¢µ©¦³
µ©¢¯ ¢ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ ª´´¶¦.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Tº±ª¤¢­­º, ±³¦-±³°¤¦´´ª¯¨ ¸°¶­¥ £¦ ¦¹±¦¤µ¦¥ µ° £¦ ¢¤©ª¦·¦¥ ¶´ª¯¨ µ³¢¥ªµª°¯¢­ µº±¦´ °§ ´°§µ¸¢³¦.
T©ª´ ®¦¢¯´ µ©¢µ µ©¦ ¢±±³°¢¤©¦´ ¶´¦¥ µ° ±³°·ª¥¦ ¢´´¶³¢¯¤¦ §°³ µ³¢¥ªµª°¯¢­ ´°§µ¸¢³¦ ¢³¦ ¢­´° ¢±±­ª¤¢£­¦ ©¦³¦
(¦.¨., ỡ69ợI. I¯ ¢¥¥ªµª°¯, ±³¦-±³°¤¦´´ª¯¨ ´°§µ¸¢³¦ £¦¢³´ ´°®¦ ´ª®ª­¢³ªµª¦´ µ° µ°°­´ ¶´¦¥ µ° ´¶±±°³µ µ³¢¥ªµª°¯¢­
´°§µ¸¢³¦ ¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ. O¯¦ ¸¢º °§ ¢¤©ª¦·ª¯¨ ¤°¯ﬁ¥¦¯¤¦ µ©¢µ µ©°´¦ µ°°­´ ¥° ¯°µ ª¯µ³°¥¶¤¦ ¦³³°³´ ª´ µ©¦
¯°µª°¯ °§ T°°­ Qualiﬁcation. Hence, concepts like Tool Qualiﬁcation Levels (TQLs) [70] are also relevant. In
that speciﬁc context, pre-processing software can be considered as a tool that can introduce errors into
the operational software (rather than a tool that can only fail to detect an error).
The approaches used for traditional software should ensure that pre-processing software is under
appropriate control, including archive retrieval, if necessary. Similarly, the control measures (discussed
under Objective COM1-1) should ensure that the “raw” (i.e., not pre-processed) data remains available,
should this be required.
COM1-ẹ: D¢µ¢ ¤¢±µ¶³¦´ µ©¦ ³¦²¶ª³¦¥ ¢­¨°³ªµ©® £¦©¢·ª°¶³Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Even if the data is suitable for training an algorithm, it does not necessarily follow that it is
suitable for training a ´±¦¤ªﬁ¤ algorithm. Fundamentally, training data encodes the requirements that the
algorithm’s behaviour is intended to satisfy, so a data set suitable for training an algorithm to recognise
road signs will not be suitable for training an algorithm to recognise human emotions. Unfortunately, the
data does not encode the requirements in an explicit manner. Consequently, these requirements cannot
be directly reviewed by stakeholders or algorithm developers. This means an argument needs to be made
as to why a particular set of data is appropriate for a speciﬁc algorithmic behaviour.
2 Distribution shift is also considered in Objective COM1-4.
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E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Exploratory data analysis [81] would be a sensible ﬁrst step in understanding the properties of
a data set and, consequently, its applicability to a particular algorithm. This could include plotting marginal
distributions of each feature, calculating two-way correlation coeﬃcients and producing pairwise scatter
plots for diferent pairs of features [44]. It can also be helpful to identify typical and outlier samples
(possibly on a class-by-class basis, for classiﬁcation problems) [7]. The concept of outlier samples can
also be extended to include rare situations, the presence (or absence) of which is likely to be informative.
The insights gained from this work can inform discussions involving domain experts and ML specialists, as
well as supporting an assurance argument.
In essence, part of this objective is about understanding the relationship between the training data and the
algorithm’s application domain. This could be informed by previous uses of the data [34]. In some cases,
the relationship can be quite subtle. Consider, for example, an algorithm intended to recognise British
traﬃc signs. Despite the restriction of the algorithm’s domain to British traﬃc signs it may be appropriate
to train it on British, Continental European, and worldwide, traﬃc signs. Along with apparent economic
beneﬁts (e.g., if the same algorithm could subsequently be employed in diferent markets), this approach
could increase algorithm robustness.
A related, but more extreme, version of this general approach is transfer learning, where a pre-trained
network is specialised, or ﬁne-tuned, for a speciﬁc task. This approach is often used for image recognition
tasks. In this case, the nature of the pre-trained network would be expected to be discussed in any
assurance argument. This discussion would also be expected to address the possibility of the pre-trained
network introducing a backdoor, or otherwise undesirable, behaviour [37].
COM1-Ẻ: A¥·¦³´¦ ¦f¦¤µ´ ¢³ª´ª¯¨ §³°® ¥ª´µ³ª£¶µª°¯ ´©ª§µ ¢³¦ ±³°µ¦¤µ¦¥ ¢¨¢ª¯´µẴ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Distribution shift occurs when the operational inputs provided to the algorithm difer, in a
statistically meaningful sense, from the samples used during development. This is important because, in
addition to encoding requirements, training data also captures information relating to the domain in which
the algorithm can safely be used.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề There are a number of diferent types of distribution shift, including cases where the inputs
change and cases where the input-output relationship changes [61]. The possibility of each type of
distribution shift would be expected to be considered and appropriate protection provided. Any detection
of distribution shift is statistical in nature. This means that a balance needs to be struck between the
possibility of false alarms (i.e., false positives) and the possibility of false negatives; this balance may be a
hard wired feature, or it may be tuneable.
Since the algorithm is meant to generalise the input-output mapping of the training data, there are
dangers in taking too rigid a statistical approach. More speciﬁcally, the inputs seen by the algorithm during
operational use are not expected to be precisely the same as those used during training. Consequently,
the algorithm may be better suited to providing operational predictions for inputs that lie inside (i.e., within
the convex hull of) the training data than to providing predictions for inputs that lie outside the training
data.
There are other reasons why a naive comparison of training and operational distributions is likely to
be inappropriate. For example, to increase robustness the training data may be supplemented with
adversarial examples [36]. Additionally, the frequency of “rare but important” examples may be artiﬁcially
increased within the training data by generating synthetic data.
Also note that, in some cases, data can be statistically similar, but semantically diferent. Consider a
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distribution with zero mean, that is symmetric about this value; swapping the sign on all samples would
produce a data set that was statistically similar, but semantically diferent. This possibility should be
considered and, if appropriate, protected against.
There is also the possibility that data is semantically similar but, statistically diferent. Obviously, this
depends on the speciﬁc nature of the statistical test that is being used. However, there are examples
of statistical diferences being found between training and test data, but these diferences having no
discernible efect on algorithm performance [66].
From a computation-level perspective, the focus is on detecting distribution shift. Appropriate responses
are best enacted at other framework levels (see, for example, Objective ARC1-2 from the autonomy
architecture level).
3ẴẸ T¢´ự
This projection is focused on the performance of the algorithm; that is, whether it can be safely used
within the intended system context. As with traditional safety-related software, requirements would be
expected to be passed down from the system level. Whilst there are some similarities, there are also some
diferences between evidence that traditional software satisﬁes its requirements and the corresponding
evidence for algorithms developed using ML techniques. This evidence is, obviously, an important
component of an assurance argument.
There are seven objectives associated with this projection.
COM2-1: Ọ¶¯¤µª°¯¢­ ³¦²¶ª³¦®¦¯µ´ ª®±°´¦¥ °¯ µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©® ¢³¦ ¥¦ﬁ¯¦¥ ¢¯¥ ´¢µª´ﬁ¦¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Ultimately, the algorithm is expected to be used as part of a system. In order to perform as
part of that system, the algorithm will have to satisfy a number of functional requirements. For example,
rather than returning a single prediction, it could be required to return a probability vector that expresses
the likelihood of an input belonging to each of a collection of classes. Alternatively, or additionally, it may
be required to provide some measure of conﬁdence in its prediction.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Traditional software testing techniques may be helpful in demonstrating some of an algorithm’s
functional properties. Depending on the criticality of the algorithm, these may involve formal review of test
cases and tests being independently conducted (and witnessed).
InML approaches, functional requirements are not systematically decomposed into low-level requirements
that can be unambiguously coded against. This means that traditional software testing techniques should
be supplemented by other types of testing. These could include the types of test that are more traditionally
seen at the system level.
Note that the performance of the algorithm is considered in Objective COM2-3.
COM2-2: N°¯-§¶¯¤µª°¯¢­ ³¦²¶ª³¦®¦¯µ´ ª®±°´¦¥ °¯ µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©® ¢³¦ ¥¦ﬁ¯¦¥ ¢¯¥
´¢µª´ﬁ¦¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề The algorithm will be embodied in a wider system. This means it will have to satisfy some
non-functional requirements. For example, it may be required to produce an answer within a given time.
14 SC
SC
-1
53
A
(J
an
20
20
)
3
C
O
ồ
PU
TA
TI
O
ǰ
-Ồ
EỜ
EỒ
FR
A
M
EW
O
R
K:
O
B
JE
C
TI
VE
S
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Similar to Objective COM2-1, traditional software testing techniques may be helpful in
demonstrating some of an algorithm’s non-functional properties, but they should be supplemented by
other forms of testing. This could be informed by a set of standard scenarios [18]. The choice of scenarios
would be expected to be described and justiﬁed as part of the computation’s assurance argument. Care
needs to be taken to ensure that the selection of scenarios is suitable for the intended use. However,
experience from other areas suggests this may be possible: for example, a standard set of situations is
used when testing an aircraft ﬂight simulator [28]. The notion of situation coverage could also inform this
decision [3].
This will depend, however, on the technologies in use. AS often use novel technology, and it may be that
there are no established techniques for measuring a given non-functional property.
A key non-functional requirement for traditional safety-related software is execution time. Consequently,
signiﬁcant efort is often expended measuring (or, in some cases, calculating) the Worst Case Execution
Time (WCET). Many algorithms developed using ML techniques will apply exactly the same computational
process, regardless of the input; this is the case for NNs, for example. This means that establishing WCET
for these algorithms may be no worse than is the case for traditional software.
There are, however, uses of AI for which this is unlikely to be the case; route planning is a possible
example. In such circumstances, WCET estimates would be expected to be guided by both knowledge
of the algorithm and the likely ways in which it will be used.
COM2-ẹ: A­¨°³ªµ©® ±¦³§°³®¢¯¤¦ ª´ ®¦¢´¶³¦¥ °£«¦¤µª·¦­ºẴ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Fundamentally, this objective is about ©°¸ performance is measured. The question of what
level of performance is required is, essentially, a system-level concern. The way that performance is
measured should directly relate to the algorithm’s requirements, passed down from the system level.
Typically, an algorithm would be expected to achieve at least a minimum level of performance. For
classiﬁcation algorithms, this often involves measuring properties like precision, recall or accuracy. These
are measured using a validation data set, which is withheld from the training process for this purpose.
Note, however, that this involves a statistical measure of correctness.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Although they can be useful, there are limits to what can be gained from measuring properties
like precision, recall and accuracy. For example, the existence of adversarial inputs (i.e., inputs that are
very close to a sample in the training data, but which are conﬁdently predicted as belonging to a diferent
class) for well-performing algorithms (e.g., [78]) indicates these measures are unlikely to capture all relevant
features of algorithm behaviour.
Special care needs to be taken if the data set is imbalanced; for example, if in a classiﬁcation problem a
large proportion of the data falls within a single class. In such cases poorly chosen performance measures
can be dominated by the algorithm’s performance on the large class [39].
In some cases, it may be appropriate, or necessary, to consider algorithm fairness. This could require
changes to the training data (pre-processing), alterations to the model training approach (in-processing) or
changes to baseline model outputs (post-processing). A variety of algorithms have been developed to help
detect and protect against unintentional bias [11].
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COM2-Ẻ: Ỗ¦³§°³®¢¯¤¦ £°¶¯¥¢³ª¦´ ¢³¦ ¦´µ¢£­ª´©¦¥ ¢¯¥ ¤°®±­ª¦¥ ¸ªµ©Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Depending on the nature of the algorithm’s input domain, theremay be some combinations of
features that do not represent a valid input. Consider, for example, the classic Iris data set that is available
from the University of California, Irvine (UCI) Machine Learning Repository [24]. This relates information
on speciﬁc Iris features (e.g., petal sizes) to the associated species of plant. In this case, there is some
relationship between the length and width of an Iris petal. Hence, even though it would fall inside an
algorithm’s input domain, it would be unreasonable to expect the algorithm to predict Iris species for a
very wide, very short petal (since this combination does not occur in nature).
More generally, as noted above (in the experience projection, subsection 3.1), the training, test and
veriﬁcation data encodes information about the region of applicability for the algorithm. Since this data
covers the scope over which the algorithm has been developed and tested, this also establishes boundaries
(albeit fuzzy ones) within which the measured performance may, in some sense, be expected.
Note that the question of what response should be provided if the algorithm receives an invalid input is
best addressed at the system level. If appropriate, this response could also be extended to realistic, but
very unlikely, points in the input domain.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề The approach to this objective is similar to that of Objective COM1-4. However, the two
objectives difer in that COM1-4 adopts a more theoretical, data-focused approach, whereas this objective
takes greater consideration of the wider system and application domain. Ensuring that the platform can
tolerate operational inputs that are outside the algorithm’s performance boundary is achieved via Objective
ARC1-2 in the autonomy architecture-level framework.
COM2-ẻ: T©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©® ª´ ·¦³ªﬁ¦¥ ¸ªµ© ¢¯ ¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦ ­¦·¦­ °§ ¤°·¦³¢¨¦Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Branch coverage, statement coverage and Modiﬁed Condition / Decision Coverage (MC/DC)
[19] are well established measures of test coverage for traditional software [69]. These measures, and
other related ones, allow judgements to be made regarding the suﬃciency of a test set (e.g., one based on
the software requirements). More colloquially, in some sense they allow an informed decision to be made
that suﬃcient testing has been achieved.
From the perspective of an algorithm developed using ML approaches there is a similar need to provide
objective evidence that a suﬃcient level of testing has been completed.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Algorithm-related coverage measures would be expected to consider two perspectives: one
focused on the input domain; and one focused on the internal features of the algorithm.
Approaches that address the former perspective (i.e., the input domain) are likely to be common across
all ML approaches. These may consider the input domain it its raw form (i.e., as measured by system-level
sensors); alternatively, they may consider a simpler representation of this data, for example, one developed
using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). In some cases, they may also involve approach-speciﬁc
characteristics, for example, considering the feature space represented by a particular layer in a neural
network. However, since this space is dependent on the training data, by themselves these types of
consideration would not be suﬃcient. One option may be to consider characteristic sets that categorise
input scenarios (e.g., by weather, road type, traﬃc level) and then establish a form of combinatorial
coverage across these sets [18].
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Approaches that address the latter perspective (i.e., algorithm internal features) are likely to be speciﬁc to a
particular type of algorithm, or family of algorithms. For example, in the case of random forests, a measure
of howmany branches are covered in each tree by the veriﬁcation data may be informative. Understanding
how this value varies across individual trees in the forest (and, especially, the minimum value) is also likely
to be informative. In the case of neural networks, measures based on neuron activations are likely to be
helpful [77], especially those based on activations of combinations of (rather than individual) neurons.
Another potentially useful approach to establishing test coverage is that of negation. Consider, for example,
a pedestrian detection function. This could be tested with images that: should be classiﬁed as containing
pedestrians; might be classiﬁed as containing pedestrians; should deﬁnitely not be classiﬁed as containing
pedestrians. More generally, the latter class (which can be viewed as negating the requirement) can be an
easy way of generating powerful test cases.
COM2-Ẽ: T©¦ µ¦´µ ¦¯·ª³°¯®¦¯µ ª´ ¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Since test results will form part of the assurance argument, there must be conﬁdence in
the test environment that produced these results. This environment includes physical assets, software
code and test cases. In addition, the test environment would be expected to be under conﬁguration
management, so that it could not be arbitrarily changed.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Much of this objective would be satisﬁed by traditional approaches to the development of
safety-critical, or safety-related, software. However, it is possible, perhaps likely, that the test environment
will include some representation of the real world, for example, because the test environment includes
a representation of the system within which the algorithm is embodied or because it includes a
representation of the real world process that generated the training data. In either case, there is a
need to validate the representation of the real world entity, or process. This could be achieved using
standard approaches for simulation validation [73], potentially supported by a standard set of scenarios
(as discussed in Objective COM2-2).
COM2-ẽ: E¢¤© ¢­¨°³ªµ©® ·¢³ª¢¯µ ª´ µ¦´µ¦¥ ¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦­ºẴ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề For the purposes of this document, it is helpful to distinguish between instantiations, which
®¢º yield diferent behaviour, and variants, which are ª¯µ¦¯¥¦¥ to yield diferent behaviour. For example,
diferent algorithm instantiations would be expected in autonomous vehicles operating in the United States
of America, whilst diferent variants would be needed to obey state-level driving laws. More generally,
algorithm variants can facilitate adherence to local legislation, or local practices.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề The question of how much testing of one variant can be read across into another is, inevitably,
situation speciﬁc. Nevertheless, the use of algorithm variants has some similarity to the notion of software
product line development [64].
It is also related to the level of conﬁdence that can be gained from, for example, a pre-trained network
that has been subject to some testing. If the testing of the pre-trained network is closely related to the
intended operational domain then it may be possible to gain considerable conﬁdence. Conversely, if there
are signiﬁcant diferences between the earlier testing and the intended domain then little conﬁdence may
be gained from earlier testing.
Similar considerations also apply to cases where analysis of operational inputs is used to create new,
updated algorithm variants. Whilst some conﬁdence may be gained from the testing of earlier variants,SC
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this will inevitably degrade as more variants are produced. It may be necessary to have a minimal set of
test cases that are always run, to check that an update (to produce a new variant) has not undermined any
critical properties of the algorithm. This has similarities to the notion of regression testing for traditional
software.
3Ẵ3 ệ­¨°³ªµ©ỵ
Diferent types of algorithm have diferent strengths and weaknesses. Hence, the type of algorithm that is
used has to be suitable for the task in hand. In particular, the choice of algorithm should be based on the
requirements it has to satisfy and the application domain; it should not be an arbitrary choice, nor should
it be based solely on developer familiarity.
There are four objectives associated with this projection.
COMẹ-1: A¯ ¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©® µº±¦ ª´ ¶´¦¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề A variety of algorithm types are available, including NNs, random forests, SVMs and
Reinforcement Learning (RL). There are further divisions within each type. For example, the NN family
includes: Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), which feature hidden layers of neurons; Recurrent Neural
Networks (RNNs), which have loops within the network structure; and Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs), which have features designed for image classiﬁcation.
In most cases, the ML process that produces these algorithms is controlled by hyper-parameters. These
may include, for example: the way the available data is split between development and veriﬁcation activities;
the number of layers, and the number of neurons in each layer, of a NN; the neuron activation function;
and dropout rates [76].
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Any computation-level assurance argument would be expected to include justiﬁcation
for the chosen algorithm and, also, any hyper-parameters that were used. This could include
appropriately-referenced theoretical arguments, for example, arguing that the available literature
demonstrates the utility of CNNs in image classiﬁcation tasks [52].
Empirical arguments are also likely to be required; for example, the performance of a number of diferent
algorithms could be investigated in order to justify the choice of the ﬁnal algorithm. Likewise, a structured
investigation of the efect of diferent hyper-parameter settings would be expected.
COMẹ-2: Tº±ª¤¢­ ¦³³°³´ ¢³¦ ª¥¦¯µªﬁ¦¥ ¢¯¥ ±³°µ¦¤µ¦¥ ¢¨¢ª¯´µẴ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Broadly speaking, there are four diferent places where errors can arise: within the training (or
veriﬁcation) data; within the way individual steps are composed to form an algorithm; within a supporting
framework; and within the execution environment [88]. These approximately map to the experience,
algorithm, software and hardware projections, respectively. Consequently, this objective is concerned with
issues relating to ML approaches in general, the class of algorithm and hyper-parameter choices.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Comparatively, there is much less experience as to what typical errors may be in algorithms
trained using ML techniques than for traditional safety-related software. Nevertheless, there are some
indications of things that should be avoided [40]. One example is over-ﬁtting, where the algorithm learns
the speciﬁc data rather than the generic relationship. Another is data leakage, where the algorithm has18 SC
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access to information that should not legitimately be available. Adversarial examples may also be a typical
error for large-dimensional data sets [35]. Another typical error may be the under-representation of rare
events in the training data [85].
Whilst some indicative typical errors are beginning to emerge, it is less clear how these errors can be
detected and corrected. In the speciﬁc case of over-ﬁtting, it appears that groups of neurons that ﬁre for a
single class may be indicative of memorising the speciﬁc training data, rather than generalisation [60].
Although supporting frameworks can simplify the use of ML approaches, their nature can make it diﬃcult
to detect errors. For example, many learning processes have stochastic features; this means that bugs are
hard to reproduce and, furthermore, success criteria are statistical in nature (which means incorrect code
can appear to be working) [88].
COMẹ-ẹ: T©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®’´ £¦©¢·ª°¶³ ª´ ¦¹±­¢ª¯¢£­¦Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Algorithms developed using ML approaches do not feature the formal, traceable, hierarchical
decomposition of requirements that is typical of traditional safety-related software [8]. This lack of
traceable decomposition contributes to a lack of understanding regarding how a speciﬁc piece of algorithm
behaviour contributes to the ﬁnal output. Expressed another way, it is easy to see ¸©¢µ an algorithm is
doing; it may be less easy to see ¸©º.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề There are two main perspectives that should be considered when thinking about explaining
behaviour [38]:
• Explaining a single output from an algorithm. A number of approaches have been proposed,
including: training simpliﬁed (human-understandable) models to represent the algorithm’s behaviour
for the input of interest [67]; and providing visual representations [43].
• Explaining algorithm behaviour in general. There is apparently less work in this area. It is notable
that behaviour in general cannot be explained by looking at behaviour in even a large number of
individual cases: the non-linear nature of many ML-developed algorithms means it is not appropriate
to extrapolate from the speciﬁc to the general.
There is, in general, a tension between explainability and performance. The objective of explainable
behaviour suggests a preference for low-complexity approaches but, in isolation, these approaches may
not be able to achieve the required level of performance. Combining several algorithms, either in series or
in parallel, may be a suitable way forward.
Depending on the way the algorithm is used, the need to explain the algorithm’s behaviour, which is
an important part of any computation-level assurance argument, may have to be balanced against the
possible efects an explanation may have. Consider, for example, a medical diagnosis system that uses
doctor’s notes as one of many inputs. If the doctors were informed that using a particular word (e.g.,
“unusual”) was a signiﬁcant trigger for a particular decision from the algorithm, this may change the way
they write their notes (which would be a form of distribution shift, so Objective COM1-4 is relevant). Whilst
this is a platform-level consideration, it is informed by computation-level knowledge.
Although the precise details are outside the scope of this document, it should be noted there may be legal
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(or ethical) factors that afect the extent to which an algorithm’s behaviour has to be explained [83].
COMẹ-Ẻ: Ỗ°´µ-ª¯¤ª¥¦¯µ ¢¯¢­º´ª´ ª´ ´¶±±°³µ¦¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề The process of air accident investigation is, arguably, one of the main reasons that air travel is
comparatively safe. Given the relative immaturity of autonomous systems, analysis of incidents (including
those that do not result in an accident) is likely to make a signiﬁcant contribution to safety in this ﬁeld.
Consequently, the algorithm is expected to support post-incident analysis.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề This objective is related to Objective COM3-3 in that explanation of a single result (or a small
number of results) from the algorithm will be an important part of the post-incident analysis. However,
suﬃcient information needs to be recorded to allow the algorithm’s behaviour to be reconstructed after
the incident. This may involve storing internal state information, including any data used to support
non-deterministic choices within the algorithm.
Some aspects of this (e.g., provision of suﬃcient storage space) are autonomy architecture-level or
platform-level issues. Other aspects may afect both the platform and the algorithm: for example, a
requirement to support post-incident analysis for anything that has occurred sometime in the last 30 days
may drive a diferent algorithm design to a requirement to support investigations over a 30-second period.
A computation-level assurance argument would be expected to demonstrate that post-incident analysis
can be conducted. One way this may be achieved is by treating discoveries during development and testing
as pseudo-incidents and conﬁrming that suﬃcient information was recorded to support post-incident
analysis.
3Ẵ4 S°§µ¸¢³¦
Any algorithm will rely on software. Consequently, software needs to be considered in a computation-level
assurance argument. The software associated with development of the algorithm is likely to be diferent
to the software employed during operational use. Consequently, it is helpful to consider objectives in the
software projection from both development and operational use perspectives.
There are two objectives associated with this projection.
COMẺ-1: T©¦ ´°§µ¸¢³¦ ª´ ¥¦·¦­°±¦¥ ¢¯¥ ®¢ª¯µ¢ª¯¦¥ ¶´ª¯¨ ¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦ ´µ¢¯¥¢³¥´Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Even though supporting libraries, or tool kits, are available, at some point an algorithm will
almost certainly rely on some traditional-style software (e.g., because this is what the supporting library is
implemented in). Faults in this software have the potential to undermine an assurance argument.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Much of this objective is likely to be addressed through the use of an existing standard
for safety-critical software development (e.g., [69]). This should help prevent typical errors (e.g., integer
overﬂow) from being introduced. There are, however, a number of areas where an existing standard may
not be straightforward to apply.
Firstly, generally speaking, supporting libraries are not developed to such rigorous standards. There are
several potential approaches to this challenge. For example, it may be possible to provide additional
evidence that relates to the portion of the framework that is actually used. Alternatively, it may be possible
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to compare the results from diferent (independently developed) libraries [75]. It may also be possible
to re-implement the ML algorithm from scratch (e.g., use a library to investigate multiple algorithms,
then re-implement only the chosen one). Whatever approach is adopted, a computation-level assurance
argument would be expected to provide a justiﬁcation as to why any supporting framework is suitable.
Secondly, the pervasive nature of the framework means it is inappropriate to treat it as Software of
Uncertain Pedigree (SOUP) [49]. In particular, it is not possible to put the framework in a bounded,
protected environment and carefully monitor the inputs and outputs to that environment.
Thirdly, rather than developing an algorithm from scratch, signiﬁcant savings might be achieved by starting
with a pre-trained model. However, there is a possibility that these models could include backdoors that
cause the model to exhibit inappropriate behaviour in very speciﬁc circumstances [37]. The nature of
these backdoors means it is unlikely that they will be discovered simply by running tests through the
model. Consequently, any use of pre-trained models would be expected to be explicitly justiﬁed in any
computation-level assurance argument. For example, pre-trained models should be obtained from trusted
sources, using a distribution mechanism that provides strong guarantees on integrity.
COMẺ-2: S°§µ¸¢³¦ ®ª´£¦©¢·ª°¶³ ¥°¦´ ¯°µ ³¦´¶­µ ª¯ ª¯¤°³³¦¤µ °¶µ±¶µ´ §³°® µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Generally speaking, most safety-related systems that use software include protections against
software failures or, equivalently, cases where the software does not behave as expected. This prevents
errors propagating through the system and allows restorative measures to be implemented (e.g., restarting
an application). The key issue is that software misbehaviour is detected and responded to [65].
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Algorithms developed using ML approaches do not fail (or misbehave) in the same way as
traditional software. In particular, it is not apparent that all failures will be readily detectable from outside
the algorithm. Hence, there may be beneﬁt in including some form of Built-In Test (BIT) in the algorithm,
which provides conﬁdence that it is operating as expected [74].
Some algorithms may provide a measure of conﬁdence associated with their output. That is, rather than
simply classifying an image as a “cat”, the information provided may be a 75% conﬁdence the image is a
“cat”, a 13% conﬁdence the image is a “dog”, and so on. Whilst it may be helpful in some circumstances,
this may not be suﬃcient to fully address this objective, not least because adversarial examples show NN
can be conﬁdent in their output yet still wrong [78].
3Ẵ5 H¢³¥¸¢³¦
In order to function, any algorithm will rely on computational hardware. Consequently, hardware needs to
be considered in a computation-level assurance argument. The hardware associated with development of
the algorithm is likely to be diferent to the hardware employed during operational use. Consequently, it
is helpful to consider objectives in the hardware projection from both development and operational use
perspectives.
There are two objectives associated with this projection.
COMẻ-1: A±±³°±³ª¢µ¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯¢­ ©¢³¥¸¢³¦ ´µ¢¯¥¢³¥´ ¢³¦ ¦®±­°º¦¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Similar to Objective COM4-1, ultimately, any algorithmwill run on some form of computationalSC
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hardware. This hardware needs to be considered in a computation-level assurance argument.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Again, similar to Objective COM4-1, much of this objective may be addressed by existing
standards (e.g., [68]). In some cases this may be straightforward; in others, the specialist, complex nature
of the hardware may pose challenges. For example, this hardware could include GPUs or TPUs, used for
massively parallel calculations; alternatively, it may involve a complex System-on-Chip (SoC), featuring a
combination of processor cores, GPUs (or TPUs) and bespoke components (e.g., video coders / decoders).
If novel, or complex, hardware is involved then it may be necessary to understand the extent to which the
behaviour of this hardware is predictable. These considerations could be informed by recent experience
with multi-core processors [29].
COMẻ-2: H¢³¥¸¢³¦ ®ª´£¦©¢·ª°¶³ ¥°¦´ ¯°µ ³¦´¶­µ ª¯ ª¯¤°³³¦¤µ °¶µ±¶µ´ §³°® µ©¦ ¢­¨°³ªµ©®Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề There are several reasons why computational hardware may not behave as expected;
Single Event Upsets (SEUs) are one example. Another aspect, speciﬁc to algorithms developed using
ML techniques, is diferences in development hardware and operational hardware (which may mean the
operational performance difers from what would be expected).
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Any computation-level assurance argument would be expected to consider the possibility
of hardware misbehaviour and ofer protections against it. This includes SEUs. It also includes the
efect of diferent numerical precisions being used on development and operational hardware, as well
as the possibility of non-deterministic behaviour on GPUs, even if the algorithm does not feature
non-deterministic components [63].
Considerations relating to Size, Weight and Power (SWaP) maymean the computation hardware used to run
the algorithm is also used for other purposes. In such cases, the assurance argument would be expected
to demonstrate neither of these uses will interfere with the other. Standard approaches to partitioning are
likely to be helpful.
Depending on the system, allocation of software to computational hardware may be ﬁxed at design time
or it may be dynamically allocated, possibly changing during operation. In either case, a computation-level
assurance argument would be expected to demonstrate that suﬃcient resources will be available to allow
the algorithm to complete its processing within the expected amount of time.
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4 ệ¶µ°¯°ỵº ệ³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦-L¦·¦­ Ọ³¢ỵ¦¸°³ự: Ị¦´¤³ªỸµª°¯
T©ª´ ´¦¤µª°¯ ¥¦´¤³ª£¦´ µ©¦ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬ ¢¥°±µ¦¥ £º µ©¦ SASWG §°³ ¢¶µ°¯°®º ¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦-­¦·¦­
¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯´≤ Iµ ª´ ©¦¢·ª­º £¢´¦¥ °¯ µ©¦ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯´ ¥ª´¤¶´´¦¥ ª¯ {Ẽ}≤ U¯­ª¬¦ µ©¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­
§³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬ (Section 2) and the platform-level framework (Section 6) there are no obvious comparator items
that can be used to support the choice of this framework. However, some conﬁdence can be gained by the
overall comparison of objectives with contents of the AAIP BOK [41] (in Appendix D) and the main section
headings in UL4600 [82] (in Appendix E).
The framework consists of three projections, each of which views the autonomy architecture’s properties
along a diferent axis. The projections are not intended to be strictly independent: they provide
diferent ways of viewing the autonomy architecture, in order to elicit associated objectives. To facilitate
discussion, the projections have been arranged in an approximate order, working from things more
closely associated with an individual computation to more general considerations, speciﬁcally: tolerance;
information provision; and adaptation. Each of these projections is considered, in turn, in the following
subsections. The section concludes with a brief tabular summary of the entire framework.
4Ẵ1 Ỗ³°Ự¦¤µª°¯´
4Ẵ1Ẵ1 T°­¦³¢¯¤¦
This projection focuses on faults and failures, related to the computation, that the autonomy architecture
must tolerate.
This covers situations where: the computation inputs are invalid (so, for example, they cannot be used for
alternative, non-AI based approaches); the computation inputs are valid but they are outside the domain of
the computation (so, limited conﬁdence can be gained from previously-conducted testing and veriﬁcation);
and the computation output is invalid. It involves monitoring various aspects, including the health of
sub-systems that provide computation inputs (e.g., vehicle-based sensors) and the internal properties of
the computation.
4Ẵ1ẴẸ I¯§°³ỵ¢µª°¯ Ỗ³°·ª´ª°¯
This projection focuses on the way the autonomy architecture records and maintains information so it can
be provided to relevant stakeholders.
This information may be used in a variety of ways, including: communicating with other entities in the
operational environment (e.g., people and systems); supporting maintenance and further development
of the computation algorithm; and facilitating post-incident analysis. Note that this projection is only
concerned with making sure the required information is available and ready to be used. Actual use of
the information is a platform-level responsibility.
4Ẵ1Ẵ3 ệ¥¢Ỹµ¢µª°¯
This projection focuses on management and control of changes to the algorithm after its initial operational
use. It also includes changes associated with, for example, supporting software frameworks and
computational hardware. Speciﬁcally, it is concerned with updates that would not be produced by following
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the full engineering process associated with development of an algorithm using ML techniques. It includes,
for example, considerations related to on-line learning and provision of regular (e.g., nightly) updates, as
well as changes to computational hardware.
4ẴẸ S¶ỵỵ¢³º
Table 3 provides a brief summary of the three projections in the autonomy architecture-level framework
that has been adopted by the SASWG.
Table 3: Summary of Projections Within the Autonomy Architecture-Level
Framework
P³°«¦¤µª°¯ O¶µ­ª¯¦
Tolerance
Focused on tolerating faults and failures in
computation-related items
Information Provision
Focused on recording and maintaining information for
subsequent use
Adaptation
Focused on how updates to the algorithm (and
associated software and hardware) are managed
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5 ệ¶µ°¯°ỵº ệ³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦-L¦·¦­ Ọ³¢ỵ¦¸°³ự: ổỨỰ¦¤µª·¦´
T©ª´ ´¦¤µª°¯ ­ª´µ´ µ©¦ °£«¦¤µª·¦´ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ Ѯªµ© ¦¢¤© ±³°«¦¤µª°¯ °§ µ©¦ ¢¶µ°¯°®º ¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦-­¦·¦­
§³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬≤
5Ẵ1 T°­¦³¢¯¤¦
I¯ °³¥¦³ µ° £¦ ¶´¦¥ ª¯ ¢ Ѯª¥¦³ ´º´µ¦®≈ ¢¯ ¢¶µ°¯°®º-³¦­¢µ¦¥ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯ (i.e., the software and hardware
that embody an algorithm) needs to be able to cope with the consequences of real world usage. These
may take the form of faults or failures, for example, of sensor systems that provide input data for the
computation. Alternatively, they may occur if the autonomous system is being used outside its intended
operational domain, through deliberate adversarial action, intentional user action or unanticipated
environmental events
Regardless of how they occur, these types of issue need to be handled in safe manner. Equivalently, they
need to be tolerated. The autonomy architecture provides the means by which this is achieved.
There are ﬁve objectives associated with this projection.
ARC1-1: Ọ¢ª­¶³¦´ °§ ´¶£-´º´µ¦®´ µ©¢µ ±³°·ª¥¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯ ª¯±¶µ´ ¢³¦ µ°­¦³¢µ¦¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề This objective is concerned with failures in the wider system that may afect computation
inputs, how these failures may be detected and how they may be responded to.
When talking about computation inputs, it can be helpful (as described in [6]) to distinguish between
inputs received: when the model is used within the intended operational domain; when there are failures
elsewhere in the system; or when being attacked by an adversary. This objective just relates to the second
case: inputs under failure conditions. The ﬁrst case is covered in Objective ARC1-2; the third case is
covered in Objective ARC1-4.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề An important part of tolerating failure-related inputs is knowing the health of the sub-systems
that provide computation inputs, noting that these sub-systems could be quite complex. Such a
sub-system could, for example, combine a physical sensor with some form of processing, possibly including
some history-based features (e.g., a moving average). Health-related information would be expected to be
provided by BIT, whether this be periodic or initiated in response to some external demand (e.g., from the
autonomy architecture).
If an input-providing sub-system is known to be faulty then there are several options available to the
autonomy architecture, including: using the last known good input value; using a constant “good” (or “safe”)
input value; using an input value derived from another sub-system; declaring the computation output as
incorrect (using one of the approaches discussed under Objective ARC1-5).
ARC1-2: O±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ª¯±¶µ´ ª¯¤°¯´ª´µ¦¯µ ¸ªµ© µ©¦ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨, µ¦´µ ¢¯¥ ·¦³ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ ¥¢µ¢ ¢³¦
µ°­¦³¢µ¦¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề This objective recognises that a computation is only valid for operational inputs that are, in
some sense, consistent with (or supported by) the data that was used to develop it.
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Note that this notion of consistency is distinct from that of distribution shift. For example, the training data
may have been supplemented with synthetic examples to address a class imbalance [55]. In such cases,
the training data may exhibit roughly similar numbers of samples in each class, whereas the operational
data may be highly biased towards a subset of classes. Consequently, the operational data would show
an expected distribution shift in comparison with the training data. This shift need not afect the validity
of a single computation, provided that computation’s input is consistent with the data used to develop the
computation (i.e., the training, test and veriﬁcation data).
There are two ways that an operational input could be inconsistent with this data: ﬁrstly, the data could
inadequately cover the operational domain; secondly, the autonomous system could be used outside
its intended operational domain. Sometimes, the distinction between these two alternatives might not
be clear. The ﬁrst of these considerations relates to the experience projection of the computation-level
framework (subsection 3.1). The second consideration is the focus of this objective.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề The ﬁrst aspect of meeting this objective involves detecting that an operational input is
inconsistent with the Training, Test and Veriﬁcation (TTV) data.
The simplest approach to this would be to store the minimum and maximum values for each feature
present in the TTV data and to declare an operational input as being consistent if it is within the
hyper-rectangle deﬁned by these bounds. Whilst it would be easy to implement, this approach has some
limitations. For example, there may be large parts of this hyper-rectangle that do not contain any samples
[7]; a potential mechanism for detecting such regions is provided in [53]. Additionally, an operational input
that was just outside these bounds would, perhaps unfairly, be declared as being inconsistent; this could
be countered by extending the bounds by a suitably-chosen distance. However, justifying the use of a
particular distance may be challenging: a short distance in one dimension may be of much greater import
than a long distance in another dimension, for example. In addition, repeated extensions of this type could
extend the bounds without limit so they should be guarded against.
The approach discussed in the preceding paragraph relies on a summary of the TTV data, speciﬁcally,
suitably-extended bounds of the TTV data and the location of any large empty hyper-rectangles within
these bounds. Other ways of summarising the TTV could be used as the basis for alternative approaches.
For example:
• Developing a model that given an operational input returns an estimate of the distance to the nearest
TTV sample. In this case it may be challenging to determine what threshold distance should be used
to determine whether a particular operational input is inconsistent with the TTV data; this could,
possibly, be informed by statistics on the distances between nearest-neighbours within the TTV data.
Alternatively, it may be informed by expert judgement.
• Developing a binary classiﬁer that determines whether a given operational input is inconsistent.
This would treat all of the samples in the TTV data as the “consistent” class. Samples deﬁning
the “inconsistent” class could be synthetically-generated. Additionally, it may be possible to train a
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) to represent the TTV data, similar to the way that a GAN can
be used to augment training data [5]. The GAN could then be used to determine if an operational
input was consistent with the TTV data.
Regardless of the approach that is used, there needs to be suﬃcient assurance that the detection of
“inconsistent” operational inputs will be suitably accurate. Depending on the application, that may mean,
for example: no false positives (i.e., points declared as being consistent when they are not); no false
negatives; or neither too many false positives nor too many false negatives.
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The second aspect of meeting this objective involves responding appropriately to the provision of an
“inconsistent” input. In some cases, this may be achieved using the approaches discussed against Objective
ARC1-1. Another option may be to map the operational input to the closest (or, more generally, an
appropriate) input that is consistent with the TTV data; at least in some cases, it should be relatively easy
to extend the detection approaches outlined above to also perform this function. Finally, as was the case
for Objective ARC1-1, another option is to declare the whole computation invalid and rely on one of the
approaches discussed under Objective ARC1-5.
ARC1-ẹ: Ọ¢¶­µ´ ¢¯¥ §¢ª­¶³¦´ ª¯µ¦³¯¢­ µ° µ©¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯ ¢³¦ µ°­¦³¢µ¦¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề There are a number of ways that internal faults and failures can be detected in traditional
software. Examples include the use of defensive programming, exception handling (e.g., relating to ﬂoating
point numbers) and hardware-based watchdog timers. These types of approach would be expected to be
implemented, for example, as part of meeting the objectives associated with the software projection of the
computation-level framework (subsection 3.4).
In addition, there are a number of related approaches that are speciﬁcally tailored to the use of
autonomy-related computations. This objective is concerned with implementing approaches relevant to
AI and ML.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề A potential approach, speciﬁcally related to neural networks, is provided in [74]. This was
developed to provide protection against random hardware errors, speciﬁcally, random bit ﬂips. However,
the underlying technique, which is based on anomaly detection in intermediate outputs of the neural
network, may have more general applicability.
Other techniques exploit the general notion of tracking intermediate values within a neural network and
comparing them against expectations. These expectationsmay be formed by analysing intermediate values
and the associated results during the training process [56].
ARC1-Ẻ: A¥·¦³´¢³ª¢­ ¢µµ¦®±µ´ µ° ¥ª´³¶±µ µ©¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯ ¢³¦ µ°­¦³¢µ¦¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề In the ML community, the notion of adversarial examples is often restricted to small
perturbations, generally undetectable by humans, that cause signiﬁcant output diferences (e.g., conﬁdent
mis-classiﬁcation) [78]. Whilst this is an interesting, and important, phenomenon this objective has a much
wider scope. For example, it includes: adversarial poisoning of training data [17]; adversarial inﬂuence of
pre-trained networks [37]; and adversarial impact via software frameworks and tools.
Despite this wide breadth, it should be noted that this objective does not seek to address all cyber-related
considerations associated with an autonomous system. For example, this objective does not consider
protection of design information or staf screening. These, and other, wider objectives would be expected
to be covered as part of the normal security engineering process. The Department for Transport (DfT)
Guidelines for Cyber Security for Connected and Automated Vehicles [23], suitably re-interpreted for the
relevant domain, may be helpful in this regard.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề There is a large body of research aimed at providing protection against adversarial inputs (e.g.,
[51]). Likewise, there is considerable research aimed at demonstrating the robustness of ML approaches
(generally of neural networks used for classiﬁcation tasks) against adversarial inputs: this is typically
expressed as the size of “ball” around each training sample within which inputs will be given the same class
as the sample [86]. At the time of writing, there has been less work on run-time detection of adversarialSC
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inputs, although some examples are beginning to emerge (e.g., [56], [7]).
As discussed in Objective COM1-1, obtaining data from known, trusted sources and applying strong
guarantees on integrity during transmission can help protect against the risk of data poisoning; these
approaches are also relevant to the use of pre-trained networks. Similarly, applying formal Conﬁguration
Management (CM) processes to data and pre-trained networks are likely to be beneﬁcial, noting that
traditional CM tools may be challenged by the volume and pace of change of these items.
Conceptually, adversarial risks associated with software frameworks and tools may be protected against
by using appropriate development methods during their creation (as discussed in Objective COM4-1).
However, from a practical perspective, most ML pipelines make extensive use of open source frameworks
and tools which, generally speaking, do not provide the same type of assurance evidence as is delivered by
development processes for critical software. Furthermore, traditional approaches to the use of SOUP can
be diﬃcult to employ, especially in the case of frameworks, because their role prevents them from being
placed in a tightly bounded sandbox and because their size prevents widespread reverse engineering
of evidence artefacts. Possible options include using a framework to explore diferent approaches
then re-coding the chosen one using appropriate development processes. Reverse engineering relevant
evidence artefacts for a suitably-small part of the framework may be another option.
In some cases, software behaviour may be suﬃciently predictable to allow for attack code to be detected as
something that is “not normal” [21]. If such a situation is detected then it may be possible to reload original
software from a known good store. Of course, this assumes the known good store is suitably protected,
the loss of processing whilst the reload occurs can be tolerated and false positives are suﬃciently rare.
ARC1-ẻ: I¯¤°³³¦¤µ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯ °¶µ±¶µ´ ¢³¦ µ°­¦³¢µ¦¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề If incorrect outputs are considered to be failures then even the best performing AI
computation (developed using ML techniques) is likely to have an error density orders of magnitude greater
than that of traditional safety-critical software. It follows that the autonomy architecture has to be tolerant
to incorrect outputs.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề There are several architectural approaches that could be used to support this objective [6].
Three examples are illustrated in Figure 2:
• The ﬁrst architecturemakes use of a validity checker, developed using traditional software techniques.
If this detects an incorrect output then the computation is re-run, either using the same input (if the
ML model includes a random element) or a suitably adjusted input. The simplicity of this architecture
is an attraction, but designing a checker that provides the appropriate protection without unduly
constraining the ML model may be challenging.
• The second architecture is inspired by multiplex avionics systems. It uses a number of distinct
computations (or ML models) in parallel, combining their output with some form of voting or
aggregation function. Although it bears some similarities to ensemble methods, the motivation
is diferent: in particular, ensemble methods aim to improve general performance, whereas this
architecture aims to provide protection against incorrect outputs (e.g., for “edge cases”). The nature
of ML may make it easier to produce separate channels than would be the case for traditional
software [9]. However, it may be diﬃcult to achieve suﬃcient diversity between the diferent channels,
especially if they share large amounts of training data. This may make it diﬃcult to provide conﬁdence
that the multi-channel architecture has a suﬃciently low error density.
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• The third architecture features two channels, one of which uses AI (implemented as anMLmodel), the
other of which is implemented using traditional software. The intent is that the traditional software
channel implements an always safe, but low (perhaps very low) performance algorithm, whereas
the ML model ofers higher performance with a concomitant risk of incorrect (i.e., unsafe) outputs.
A safety switch, implemented in a similar manner to the validity checker in the ﬁrst architecture,
controls which channel provides the output to the wider system. Note that in this type of architecture
it may be possible for much of the assurance burden to be borne by the traditional software and the
(traditionally-implemented) safety switch, thus reducing the level of assurance required for the ML
model.
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Figure 2: Example Architecture Options
5ẴẸ I¯§°³ỵ¢µª°¯ Ỗ³°·ª´ª°¯
The autonomy architecture is concerned with integrating computations into a platform, or system. Part
of these considerations include providing information related to these computations to the wider system,
often for onward transmission to users, stakeholders or other systems. In order to support this information
provision, there is an associated need to support information recording and retrieval. These topics are the
focus for this projection.
There are four objectives associated with this projection.
ARC2-1: R¦­¦·¢¯µ ª¯§°³®¢µª°¯ ª´ ±³¦´¦¯µ¦¥ µ° ª¯µ¦³¢¤µª¯¨ ±¢³µª¦´Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề In order to be safe an autonomous system may need to provide information on what it is
currently doing and what it is planning on doing, as well as the reasons for these decisions. This type of
information may need to be presented to a range of parties, including other systems (both autonomous
and traditional) and humans. In the latter case, this information may be provided purely to inform a passive
user, alternatively, it may be provided to support teaming between the human and the AS, facilitating a
collaborative decision making process.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề An initial step towards satisfying this objective involves identifying the relevant interactingSC
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parties and understanding what information they require. Attributes of this information, for example,
accuracy, timeliness and availability should also be considered: the data-related attributes listed in [79]
may be helpful in this regard.
Part of this objective relates to the concept of “explainable AI”, which is an active research area. There are,
for example, established ways of explaining the result of a classiﬁer [67].
It is important to recognise that the nature of any explanation needs to be tailored to the receiving entity
and the prevailing situation. For example, in time-critical situations, a brief explanation that can be rapidly
understood may be more valuable than a detailed justiﬁcation. Similarly, when working alongside humans
there may be a requirement to overcome a human’s initial belief that a diferent course of action should be
pursued [4].
ARC2-2: R¦­¦·¢¯µ ª¯§°³®¢µª°¯ ª´ ¢·¢ª­¢£­¦ µ° ´¶±±°³µ ®¢ª¯µ¦¯¢¯¤¦ ¢¯¥ §¶µ¶³¦
¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µẴ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Objective ARC2-1 focused on operational use. In contrast, this objective is concerned with
information use during other phases within the system lifecycle.
There are several reasons why autonomous systems, and especially the associated ML-enabled
computations, are likely to be updated more frequently than traditional systems. Firstly, it is diﬃcult (if
not impossible) to capture all relevant situations in TTV data; secondly, it is diﬃcult (if not impossible) to
address all potential edge cases during veriﬁcation activities; thirdly, the dynamic nature of the operational
environment means new requirements may emerge; fourthly, the relative ease (from a technological
perspective) with which updates can be deployed may lower the threshold associated with update
deployment.
This objective is concerned with providing information to support these updates; the update process itself
is the focus of the adaptation projection (subsection 5.3). Also note that this objective relates to general
maintenance and future development. Information (and actions) in response to incidents and accidents
are covered in Objective ARC2-3.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Satisfying this objective should be relatively straightforward. Inspiration as to the type of
information that is needed should be readily available from test and evaluation activities earlier in the
system development lifecycle. For vehicles, this information would be expected to include data relating to
sensors and control systems, as well as data about the vehicle’s movement [15].
ARC2-ẹ: R¦­¦·¢¯µ ª¯§°³®¢µª°¯ ª´ ±³¦´¦³·¦¥ µ° ´¶±±°³µ ±°´µ-ª¯¤ª¥¦¯µ ¢¯¢­º´ª´Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Learning from experience is an important part of a mature safety culture. This learning needs
to occur at several levels, including platform-speciﬁc, within a domain (e.g., air, rail, road) and cross-domain.
The former of these may be contained within a single organisation, but the latter two require information to
be distributed across wider communities: air accident investigations are an example of this. This learning
is predicated on suitable information being available.
Legislative and voluntary structures that allow “no blame” sharing of this type of information are important,
but they are outside the scope of this objective (and this document). In particular, this objective is focused
solely on the preservation of computation-related information.
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E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Part of this objective relates to preserving information following a catastrophic accident. This
preservation is likely to require crash-survivable recorders. The precise nature (including, but not limited
to, time bounds) of the required information is, inevitablly, application speciﬁc. In the case of road vehicles,
an indication of the duration for which information needs to be recorded is provided in [15].
Another part of this objective relates to managing the immediate aftermath of an accident. In this case,
suitable information needs to be made available to ﬁrst responders. This needs to be presented in an
intelligible manner without the need for complex analysis or interpretation techniques [15].
A key challenge in the context of autonomous systems is that it might not be readily apparent that the
system has been involved in an accident. This could be the case if, for example, the accident resulted in
damage to other entities but left the platform unscathed. It could also be the case if an incident was a
near miss, which led to no damage. Providing suﬃcient information to support these types of analyses is
likely to require complex trade-ofs between: the volume of information recorded; the period for which the
information is stored; and the location at which the analysis is conducted (e.g., on-platform or of-platform).
It is also likely to require regular analysis of logged information [62].
ARC2-Ẻ: I¯§°³®¢µª°¯ ª´ ®¢¯¢¨¦¥ ´¦¤¶³¦­ºẴ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề The preceding objectives in this projection have demonstrated the safety-related importance
of a wide variety of information. It follows that this information needs to be managed securely.
This will require traditional approaches to cyber security, for example, those promoted by the National
Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)3. However, there are aspects of ML that may warrant speciﬁc consideration.
For example, both the trained model and the training data may need to be kept conﬁdential.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề In general, there is a trade between allowing use of a model and preventing it, or its training
data, being reverse engineered.
Successful attacks that allow models to be recreated after a limited number of queries have been
demonstrated [80]. There are several possible approaches that could be used to reduce, but not eliminate,
this risk. Examples include: limiting the number of queries a single user can make of a model (which
requires some way of identifying users); and adding noise to the model’s output (which requires some
way of identifying how much noise should be added). These approaches also adversely afect the model’s
performance. More generally, inspiration may be gained from privacy-preserving data mining [2].
An alternative approach may involve using the autonomy architecture to prevent potential adversaries
getting direct access to the inputs and outputs from an ML model, for example, by passing them through
pre-processing algorithms. This would require traditional cyber security approaches to protect these
algorithms.
There are also attacks that can expose aspects of the training data, for example [32]. Again, protecting
against these may involve using the autonomy architecture to protect against adversaries obtaining direct
access to unﬁltered model inputs and outputs.
3 https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/.
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5Ẵ3 ệ¥¢Ỹµ¢µª°¯
In some cases, an instance of a computation may be left unaltered after it is deployed into operational
use. Alternatively, all subsequent releases may progress through a full engineering development process.
If either of these approaches is adopted then the adaptation projection is not relevant to that application.
However, it is expected that many computations developed using ML techniques will be adapted in some
way following their initial operational use. This could be achieved using a variety of mechanisms, including:
online learning (where the computation continues learning and, consequently, adapts during operational
use); and nightly over-the-air updates (which are released after a reduced amount of regression testing,
rather than following the full engineering process).
There are two objectives associated with this projection.
ARCẹ-1: I¯¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦ °³ ¶¯¢¶µ©°³ª´¦¥ ¢¥¢±µ¢µª°¯´ ¥° ¯°µ °¤¤¶³Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Fundamentally, an adaptation changes some aspect of the computation’s behaviour. This
means adaptations have the potential to undermine an assurance case and need to be managed carefully.
For the purposes of this objective, an ª¯¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦ adaptation would be one that did not achieve
the intended aims. As such, the notion of what is inappropriate is, inevitably, context speciﬁc.
Potential examples include an adaptation that: unintentionally reduces the computation’s performance
in common situations; unintentionally reduces the computation’s performance in rare situations; alters the
computation’s non-functional behaviour in a way that detrimentally afects interfacing items. An adaptation
that was ª¯¤°³³¦¤µ, perhaps because it did not correspond to the expected information format, would also
be considered to be inappropriate.
Conversely, an ¶¯¢¶µ©°³ª´¦¥ adaptation would be one that was made without appropriate authorisation.
This could, for example, occur if a malicious third party, or a rogue employee, implemented an adaptation
that was intended to cause harm. Alternatively, an adaptation that was released by the computation
developers but which had not completed the necessary pre-release processes would also be considered
unauthorised.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Since it uses a very distinct approach it is simplest to consider online learning as a special case.
This is most commonly achieved via RL. There are a variety of approaches to ensuring adaptations via RL
are appropriate, including: constraining the optimisation criterion; adopting a risk-sensitive optimisation
criterion; having the computation ask for help; and using risk-directed exploration [33]. Alternatively, or
additionally, it may be possible to provide a set of abstract policies that formally constrain the exploration
of an RL agent [57] or including a representation of fear within the learning mechanism [54].
The nature of online learning is that it happens continuously, as a natural part of the computation’s
use. Hence, the mechanism by which adaptations are achieved forms part of the full engineering cycle
associated with initial release to operational use. Consequently, the notion of an unauthorised adaptation
does not apply in this case.
For computations whose behaviour is not altered by their use, an adaptation involves a deliberate act,
typically loading new parameters (or hyper-parameters). For example, in the case of an NN, an adaptation
may involve loading new network weights and biases. Considerations associated with Parameter Data
Items (PDIs) are important, for example, the data being managed as a distinct entity and its efect on
computation behaviour being understood [69]; this latter point may, for example, require some form of
regression testing before the adaptation is deployed.32 SC
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Some form of testing would be expected to be conducted before an adaptation was performed. This
should be suﬃcient to prevent cases where the adaptation unintentionally reduces the computation’s
performance in common situations. One way of achieving this would be to deﬁne a collection of situations,
along with a minimum level of performance in each. Adaptations would only be considered ¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦ if at
least the minimum level of performance (including safety and security) was achieved in each situation. This
collection of situations can be viewed as being analogous to a minimal set of regression tests for traditional
software. It can also be viewed as analogous to the criteria used to validate ﬂight simulation training devices
[28]. Note, however, that aviation is a well-understood domain. Determining an appropriate collection of
situations is likely to be more diﬃcult in many other domains. Also note that the collection may need to
change, either in response to changes in the computation, or changes in the external environment in which
the system is used.
Protecting against the case where the adaptation unintentionally reduces the computation’s performance
in rare situations is more diﬃcult. Inmany cases a balance has to be found between enacting an adaptation
that will demonstrably beneﬁt computation performance in common situations against the possibility
that the same adaptation could reduce performance (in a way that afects safety) in rare situations. An
evidence-based, structured argument is likely to be required to demonstrate that an appropriate balance
has been achieved. Features of the autonomy architecture, especially those related to the tolerance
projection (subsection 5.1), could protect against egregious safety failures; if present, these could also
simplify the “balance” argument.
There are several aspects to understanding how an adaptation may afect interfacing items. Broadly
speaking, three categories of interfacing item can be considered: items within the same platform as the
computation; items within other systems; and interactions with humans. Platform-level testing ought to
ensure the adaptation does not adversely afect interfacing items within the system. Likewise, this testing
also ought to cover (planned) interactions with other systems. Interactions with humans are more subtle,
especially if the human requires training or certiﬁcation in order to use the computation. In this case, the
impact of the adaptation on user training or certiﬁcation needs to be considered. These considerations
need to take account of not just the latest adaptation, but the cumulative efect of all adaptations that have
occurred since the last training or certiﬁcation.
There are two main aspects to preventing unauthorised adaptations: cyber security; and management.
Guidance on cyber security is available from a number of sources, including cyber security principles for
connected and automated vehicles [23] (which can be generalised to cover a wide range of autonomous
systems) and the NCSC. General engineering processes, especially those associated with safety-related
systems, would be expected to contain safeguards that prevent unauthorised releases.
The preceding discussion has focused on changes to the computation. Changes to supporting software
and computational hardware are also important, but these should be manageable within normal
engineering processes.
ARCẹ-2: C°®±¶µ¢µª°¯ £¦©¢·ª°¶³ ª´ ¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦ £¦§°³¦, ¥¶³ª¯¨ ¢¯¥ ¢§µ¦³ ¢¯ ¢¥¢±µ¢µª°¯Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề This objective recognises a number of things, speciﬁcally: adaptations should be performed
against a known baseline; a computation may be in use when an adaptation request (or command) is
received; an adaptation cannot be applied instantaneously; and the process of applying the adaptation
may fail.
Any of these factors could undermine an assurance argument. Some, like the ﬁnite amount of time taken
to apply an adaptation, may only undermine an assurance argument for a relatively small amount of time;SC
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others, like the consequences of a failed adaptation, may be persistent (unless appropriate action is taken).
This objective also recognises that many diferent types of computation behaviour may be appropriate.
This is a consequence of requirements being implicitly expressed via the training data, rather than being
formally decomposed (in a traceable manner) as is the case for traditional safety-related software.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề If all objectives associated with the computation-level framework have been satisﬁed then the
computation behaviour ought to be appropriate before an adaptation is applied.
In some cases it may be possible to instantiate two (or more) autonomy architectures. Such an
arrangement would allow one instantiation to adapt whilst the other continues to respond to operational
inputs; it would also have the additional beneﬁt of increasing reliability in the context of hardware failures.
If two copies are available then the system can determine a suitable time to switch from the pre-adaptation
computation to the post-adaptation one. This switch can be implemented in software, meaning it can be
completed without a noticeable impact on the computation’s ability to respond to operational inputs. More
speciﬁcally, this arrangement provides a means of demonstrating that computation behaviour remains
appropriate during an adaptation.
If two (or more) architectures are not available then the computation is likely to have to stop processing
operational inputs before allowing the adaptation to occur. This will require communication between the
computation and the system to ensure the gap in processing can be accommodated safely. For example,
in the case of an autonomous vehicle, an adaptation could be postponed until vehicle car is stationary, the
parking brake is on, the engine is turned of and there are no people in the vehicle. An alternative may
be to designate safe regions (e.g., the owner’s garage, the dealer’s service area) and only allow adaptations
to occur when the vehicle is in one of these regions. Whatever approach is used, care needs to be taken
to protect against the possibility of platforms not being in a situation where an adaptation is allowed for a
prolonged period of time. Additionally, care needs to be taken to prevent removal of the system from the
safe region until the adaptation is complete (and conﬁrmed successful).
Some aspects of ensuring that behaviour is appropriate after an adaptation are covered by the ¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦
part of Objective ARC3-1. The current objective includes cases where the adaptation process did not
complete successfully. Failed adaptations should be detectable using standard approaches to data
integrity and post-adaptation BIT. In many cases, the most suitable way of handling a failed adaptation
is to revert to the previous “last known good” conﬁguration. This requires storing the pre-adaptation
computation parameters in some way (which happens naturally if there are multiple instantiations of the
autonomy architecture).
In some cases (e.g., when the adaptation addresses a serious ﬂaw in the computation) reversion to the
previous conﬁguration may not be desirable, regardless of whether this is readily available. It follows that
every platform ought to be capable of being put in a safe state that can be maintained for a considerable
period.
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6 Ỗ­¢µ§°³ỵ-L¦·¦­ Ọ³¢ỵ¦¸°³ự: Ị¦´¤³ªỸµª°¯
T©ª´ ´¦¤µª°¯ ¥¦´¤³ª£¦´ µ©¦ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬ ¢¥°±µ¦¥ £º µ©¦ SASWG §°³ ±­¢µ§°³®-­¦·¦­ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯´≤ T©¦
«¶´µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ §°³ ¢¥°±µª¯¨ µ©ª´ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬ ª´ ±³°·ª¥¦¥ ª¯ A±±¦¯¥ªѯ C≤
T©¦ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬ ¤°¯´ª´µ´ °§ §°¶³ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯´≈ ¦¢¤© °§ Ѯ©ª¤© ·ª¦Ѯ´ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³®’´ ±³°±¦³µª¦´ ¢­°¯¨ ¢ ¥ªf¦³¦¯µ
¢ѯª´≤ T©¦ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯´ ¢³¦ ¯°µ ª¯µ¦¯¥¦¥ µ° £¦ ´µ³ª¤µ­º ª¯¥¦±¦¯¥¦¯µỀ µ©¦º ±³°·ª¥¦ ¥ªf¦³¦¯µ Ѯ¢º´ °§ ·ª¦Ѯª¯¨
µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³®≈ ª¯ °³¥¦³ µ° ¦­ª¤ªµ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ °£«¦¤µª·¦´≤ T° §¢¤ª­ªµ¢µ¦ ¥ª´¤¶´´ª°¯≈ µ©¦ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯´ ©¢·¦ £¦¦¯
¢³³¢¯¨¦¥ ª¯ ¢¯ ¢±±³°ѯª®¢µ¦ °³¥¦³≈ ´µ¢³µª¯¨ ¢µ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³® ¢¯¥ Ѯ°³¬ª¯¨≈ ª¯ ¢ ´¦¯´¦≈ °¶µѮ¢³¥´Ề £¦©¢·ª°¶³¢­
´±¦¤ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ề ª¯µ¦³¢¤µª¯¨ ªµ¦®´ề ±¦°±­¦ề ¦¯·ª³°¯®¦¯µ≤ E¢¤© °§ µ©¦´¦ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯´ ª´ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¦¥≈ ª¯ µ¶³¯≈ ª¯
µ©¦ §°­­°Ѯª¯¨ ´¶£´¦¤µª°¯´≤ T©¦ ´¦¤µª°¯ ¤°¯¤­¶¥¦´ Ѯªµ© ¢ £³ª¦§ µ¢£¶­¢³ ´¶®®¢³º °§ µ©¦ ¦¯µª³¦ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬ ¢¯¥
¢¯ ª­­¶´µ³¢µª°¯ °§ ©°Ѯ µ©¦ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬’´ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯´ ª¯µ¦³-³¦­¢µ¦≤
6Ẵ1 B¦©¢·ª°¶³¢­ SỸ¦¤ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯
T©ª´ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯ §°¤¶´¦´ °¯ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³® ´±¦¤ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯≤ EѨ¶ª·¢­¦¯µ­º≈ ªµ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³´ µ©¦ ´º´µ¦®-­¦·¦­
³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦®¦¯µ´ µ©¢µ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³® Ѯ°¶­¥ £¦ ¦ѯ±¦¤µ¦¥ µ° ´¢µª´§º ¢¯¥ µ©¦ ®¦µ©°¥´ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³® ¥¦·¦­°±¦³
®¢º ¶´¦ µ° ¥¦®°¯´µ³¢µ¦ ´¢µª´§¢¤µª°¯≤
F³°® µ©¦ ±¦³´±¦¤µª·¦ °§ ¢¯ ¢¶µ°¯°®°¶´ ´º´µ¦®≈ µ©¦ ®°´µ ¤©¢­­¦¯¨ª¯¨ ¢´±¦¤µ °§ µ©¦´¦ ³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦®¦¯µ´ ª´
¥¦ﬁ¯ª¯¨ µ©¦ ³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦¥ ±­¢µ§°³® £¦©¢·ª°¶³≤ H¦¯¤¦≈ µ©ª´ ¢´±¦¤µ ª´ ¦®±©¢´ª´¦¥ ª¯ µ©¦ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯’´ µªµ­¦≤ I¯
¢¥¥ªµª°¯≈ ¢ ¬¦º ¢´±¦¤µ °§ µ©ª´ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯ ª´ ¥¦ﬁ¯ª¯¨ µ©¦ ´¤°±¦ °§ µ©¦ ¢¶µ°¯°®°¶´ ¢´±¦¤µ´ °§ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³®≤
6ẴẸ I¯µ¦³¢¤µª¯¨ Iµ¦ỵ´
T©ª´ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯ §°¤¶´¦´ °¯ ªµ¦®´ µ©¢µ ¢³¦ ª¯µ¦¯¥¦¥ °³ ³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦¥ µ° ª¯µ¦³¢¤µ Ѯªµ© µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³®≈ £¶µ ¢³¦ ¯°µ
¥ª³¦¤µ­º °Ѯ¯¦¥ £º µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³® ¥¦·¦­°±¦³ °³ °±¦³¢µ°³≤
T©¦ ª¯µ¦³¢¤µª¯¨ ªµ¦®´ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯ ª¯¤­¶¥¦´ µ©¦ ¤¢´¦ Ѯ©¦³¦ µ©¦³¦ ¢³¦ ®¶­µª±­¦≈ ¯°µª°¯¢­­º ª¥¦¯µª¤¢­ ´º´µ¦®´Ề
§°³ ¦ѯ¢®±­¦≈ Ѯ©¦¯ ¢¯ ¢¶µ°¯°®°¶´ ·¦©ª¤­¦ ®¢¯¶§¢¤µ¶³¦³ ©¢´ ´°­¥ ®¢¯º ·¦©ª¤­¦´≈ ¦¢¤© °§ Ѯ©ª¤© ª´ ª¯µ¦¯¥¦¥
µ° £¦ ¶´¦¥ ª¯¥ª·ª¥¶¢­­º≤ Iµ ¢­´° ª¯¤­¶¥¦´ µ©¦ ¤¢´¦ Ѯ©¦³¦ µ©¦ Ѯª¥¦³ ´º´µ¦® ª¯¤­¶¥¦´ °±µª°¯¢­ ªµ¦®´ µ©¢µ ®¢º
°³ ®¢º ¯°µ £¦ ±³¦´¦¯µỀ §°³ ¦ѯ¢®±­¦≈ ¢¥¥ªµª°¯¢­ ³°¢¥´ª¥¦ ª¯§³¢´µ³¶¤µ¶³¦ µ©¢µ ª´ °¯­º ±³¦´¦¯µ ª¯ ­¢³¨¦ ¤ªµª¦´≤
T©ª´ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯ ®¢º ¢­´° ª¯¤­¶¥¦ ¢ ¤¦¯µ³¢­ ³¦±°´ªµ°³º≈ Ѯ©ª¤© ª´ ¶´¦¥ µ° ´¶±±°³µ °±¦³¢µª°¯≈ ®¢ª¯µ¦¯¢¯¤¦ ¢¯¥
§¶µ¶³¦ ¦¯©¢¯¤¦®¦¯µ °§ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³®≤
6Ẵ3 Ỗ¦°Ỹ­¦
T©ª´ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯ §°¤¶´¦´ °¯ ±¦°±­¦ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ Ѯªµ© ¢¯¥ ¢f¦¤µ¦¥ £º µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³®≈ ª¯¤­¶¥ª¯¨ µ©°´¦ °±¦³¢µª¯¨
°³ ¶´ª¯¨ µ©¦ ´º´µ¦®≤
T©¦ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯ ¢¥°±µ´ ¢ Ѯ©°­¦ ­ª§¦¤º¤­¦ ±¦³´±¦¤µª·¦≈ ª¯¤­¶¥ª¯¨ ¥¦´ª¨¯≈ ®¢¯¶§¢¤µ¶³¦≈ °±¦³¢µª°¯≈ ®¢ª¯µ¦¯¢¯¤¦
¢¯¥ ¥ª´±°´¢­≤ Iµ ª¯¤­¶¥¦´Ề µ©°´¦ °±¦³¢µª¯¨ µ©¦ ´º´µ¦®ề µ©°´¦ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ Ѯªµ© µ©¦ ´º´µ¦® (e.g., maintainers);
and bystanders in the operational environment of the platform. This latter classmay be highly important for
some autonomous systems (e.g., self-driving vehicles); conversely, it may be absent for other autonomous
systems (e.g., medical diagnosis systems).
The projection also includes people behaving in an adversarial manner.
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This projection focuses on items in the platform’s operational environment that are outside the control of
the platform developer or operator.
It includes, for example, other platforms and meteorological conditions, as well as things like terrain and
infrastructure. It covers normal operating conditions and abnormal situations (e.g., extreme weather and
unexpected terrain). It includes the potential for elements of the environment to be used in a hostile
manner.
6Ẵ5 S¶ỵỵ¢³º
Table 4 provides a brief summary of the four projections in the platform-level framework that has been
adopted by the SASWG.
Table 4: Summary of Projections Within the Platform-Level Framework
P³°«¦¤µª°¯ O¶µ­ª¯¦
Behavioural Speciﬁcation
Focused on platform-level speciﬁcation; includes deﬁning
the scope of autonomous aspects
Interacting Items
Focused on things intended or required to interact with
the platform, not directly owned by the platform
developer or operator
People
Focused on how the platform interacts with people;
adopts a whole lifecycle perspective
Environment
Focused on things in the operational environment that
are outside the control of the developer or operator
Experience in writing this document has demonstrated the potential for confusion with regards to these
projections and how they inter-relate. Firstly, it is important to remember the projections are a means to
an end, rather than an end in themselves. Users of this document are not necessarily expected to directly
align their development eforts with the projections. Prolonged discussions about whether a speciﬁc item
(e.g., lane markings on a road) are part of the environment or an interacting item should not be of critical
importance in establishing a safety argument for an autonomous system.
To that end, Figure 3 provides an alternative illustration of the platform-level projections and how the
inter-relate. For example, the people projection can, in some ways, be considered as a specialisation of the
environment projection.
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most general, least predictable
People
may, or may not, be predictable 
and manageable by design
Interacting Items
interactions managed by design
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7 Ỗ­¢µ§°³ỵ-L¦·¦­ Ọ³¢ỵ¦¸°³ự: ổỨỰ¦¤µª·¦´
T©ª´ ´¦¤µª°¯ ­ª´µ´ µ©¦ °£«¦¤µª·¦´ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ Ѯªµ© ¦¢¤© ±³°«¦¤µª°¯ °§ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³®-­¦·¦­ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬≤
7Ẵ1 B¦©¢·ª°¶³¢­ SỸ¦¤ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯
T©¦ £¦©¢·ª°¶³¢­ ´±¦¤ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯ ª´ ¤°¯¤¦³¯¦¥ Ѯªµ© Ѯ©¢µ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³® ´©°¶­¥ ¥° ¢¯¥≈ ¢­´°≈ Ѯ©¢µ
ªµ ´©°¶­¥ ¯°µ ¥°≤ T©¦´¦ ¤°¯¤¦³¯´ ¢³¦ ·ª¦Ѯ¦¥ ­¢³¨¦­º §³°® µ©¦ ±¦³´±¦¤µª·¦ °§ ¢¯ °±¦³¢µ°³ °³ ¶´¦³ °§ µ©¦
±­¢µ§°³®ề µ©¢µ ª´≈ µ©¦º ¢³¦ ­¢³¨¦­º ¤°¯¤¦³¯¦¥ Ѯªµ© ¦ѯµ¦³¯¢­­º-°£´¦³·¢£­¦ ¦f¦¤µ´≈ ³¢µ©¦³ µ©¢¯ µ©¦ ª¯µ¦³¯¢­
Ѯ°³¬ª¯¨´ ¢¯¥ ´µ³¶¤µ¶³¦ °§ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³®≤
T©¦³¦ ¢³¦ ´ªѯ °£«¦¤µª·¦´ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ Ѯªµ© µ©ª´ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯≤
ỖLT1-1Ề A­­ ¢´±¦¤µ´ °§ ±­¢µ§°³® £¦©¢·ª°¶³ µ©¢µ ¢³¦ ¢¤©ª¦·¦¥ ¶´ª¯¨ ¢¶µ°¯°®º-¦¯¢£­ª¯¨
µ¦¤©¯ª²¶¦´ ¢³¦ «¶´µªﬁ¦¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề U­µª®¢µ¦­º≈ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³® ©¢´ µ° £¦ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¦¥ ¢´ ¢¯ °·¦³¢­­ ¦¯µªµº≈ Ѯ©ª¤© ª´ ¥¦®°¯´µ³¢£­º
´¢§¦≤ H°Ѯ¦·¦³≈ µ©¦ ¯°·¦­µº °§ ¢¶µ°¯°®°¶´ ´º´µ¦®´≈ ¢¯¥ ¦´±¦¤ª¢­­º µ©¦ AI ¢¯¥ ồỒ µ¦¤©¯ªѨ¶¦´ µ©¢µ ¦¯¢£­¦
µ©¦®≈ ®¦¢¯´ µ©¦´¦ ¢´±¦¤µ´ ¯¦¦¥ ´±¦¤ª¢­ ¢µµ¦¯µª°¯≤ T° §°¤¶´ µ©¢µ ¢µµ¦¯µª°¯ µ©¦³¦ ª´ ¢ ¯¦¦¥ µ° ª¥¦¯µª§º ´¶¤©
µ¦¤©¯ªѨ¶¦´≈ ª¯¤­¶¥ª¯¨ ©°Ѯ µ©¦º ¤°¯µ³ª£¶µ¦ µ° ±­¢µ§°³® £¦©¢·ª°¶³≤
Gª·¦¯ µ©¦ ¤¶³³¦¯µ ­°Ѯ ®¢µ¶³ªµº °§ ¢¶µ°¯°®º-³¦­¢µ¦¥ µ¦¤©¯ªѨ¶¦´≈ µ©¦³¦ ª´ ¢ ´µ³°¯¨ ´¢§¦µº-³¦­¢µ¦¥ ¢³¨¶®¦¯µ
µ©¢µ Ѯ©¦³¦·¦³ ±°´´ª£­¦ ®°³¦ µ³¢¥ªµª°¯¢­ µ¦¤©¯ªѨ¶¦´ ´©°¶­¥ £¦ ¶´¦¥ {72}≤ C°¯´¦Ѩ¶¦¯µ­º≈ ¢´ Ѯ¦­­ ¢´
ª¥¦¯µª§ºª¯¨ Ѯ©¦³¦ ¢¶µ°¯°®º-³¦­¢µ¦¥ µ¦¤©¯°­°¨ª¦´ ¢³¦ ¶´¦¥≈ µ©¦ª³ ¶´¦ ´©°¶­¥ ¢­´° £¦ «¶´µªﬁ¦¥≤
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Ỉ¦§°³¦ ¶´¦´ °§ ¢¶µ°¯°®º-¦¯¢£­ª¯¨ µ¦¤©¯ªѨ¶¦´ ¤¢¯ £¦ «¶´µªﬁ¦¥≈ µ©¦º ®¶´µ ﬁ³´µ £¦ ª¥¦¯µªﬁ¦¥≤
T©¦³¦ ¢³¦≈ £³°¢¥­º-´±¦¢¬ª¯¨≈ µѮ° Ѯ¢º´ µ©¢µ µ©¦ ¶´¦ °§ ¢¶µ°¯°®º-³¦­¢µ¦¥ µ¦¤©¯ªѨ¶¦´ ¤¢¯ £¦ ª¥¦¯µªﬁ¦¥≈
´±¦¤ªﬁ¤¢­­º≈ µ°±-¥°Ѯ¯ ¢¯¥ £°µµ°®-¶±≤ I¯ ¢ µ°±-¥°Ѯ¯ ¢±±³°¢¤©≈ ³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦®¦¯µ´ ¤¢¯ £¦ µ¢¨¨¦¥ µ° ª¯¥ª¤¢µ¦
Ѯ©¦µ©¦³ µ©¦º ¢³¦ ¢¤©ª¦·¦¥ µ©³°¶¨© µ©¦ ¶´¦ °§ ¢¶µ°¯°®º-³¦­¢µ¦¥ µ¦¤©¯ªѨ¶¦´≤ T©ª´ µ¢¨¨ª¯¨ ¤°¶­¥ ´µ¢³µ ¢µ µ©¦
´º´µ¦®-­¦·¦­ ¢¯¥ £¦ ﬂ°Ѯ¦¥ ¥°Ѯ¯ µ° ­°Ѯ¦³ ­¦·¦­´ ¢´ ³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦®¦¯µ´ ¢³¦ ¥¦¤°®±°´¦¥ ¥¶³ª¯¨ ¢ µº±ª¤¢­ ´º´µ¦®´
¦¯¨ª¯¦¦³ª¯¨ ±³°¤¦´´≤ C°¯·¦³´¦­º≈ ª¯ ¢ £°µµ°®-¶± ¢±±³°¢¤©≈ ´±¦¤ªﬁ¤ ¤°®±°¯¦¯µ´ (or items, or sub-systems,
or algorithms) can be ﬂagged as using autonomy-related techniques, with this information ﬂowing up to
functions and platform-level behaviours that use those components.
Regardless of which approach is used, there should be a clear link from computations, through autonomy
architectures, to platform behaviour. These links enable evidence associated with objectives from the
computation and autonomy architecture frameworks to support platform-level safety arguments. They
also allow platform-level requirements and constraints to provide the context for lower-level activities.
An argument to justify use of an autonomy-enabling technique could be based on many factors:
performance, including an inability to achieve the associated function using traditional approaches, is often
an important one.
ỖLT1-2: A¤¤¦±µ¢£­º ´¢§¦ °±¦³¢µª°¯ §°³ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³® ª´ ¥¦ﬁ¯¦¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề In order to argue that a platform is “acceptably safe” there needs to be a deﬁnition of this term
for that particular platform, within its intended operational domain. In traditional safety engineering, this
deﬁnitionmay be comparatively simple, drawing upon contextual assumptions that signiﬁcantly simplify theSC
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operational domain. In contrast, a key feature of many autonomous systems is their intended use within
complex, diverse and dynamic environments. Consequently, a key aspect of deﬁning safety for autonomous
systems is understanding, and suitably bounding, interactions with these types of environment.
Given the nature of these environments, it may also be necessary to consider what safe operation means
should the platform be used outside the intended operational domain. This could, for example, involve
ﬁnding a way to safely stop operation.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Traditional techniques for hazard assessment, for example Hazard and Operability Study
(HAZOP) [27], may help generate an understanding of potential unsafe outcomes. However, to be
productive these techniques may need to focus on platform-level outcomes (e.g., the vehicle stops too
late) rather than component-level actions (e.g., the brakes are applied too late).
In addition, the consequences of a vehicle stopping too late are critically dependent on both the nature of
the operational domain and the speciﬁc situation pertaining at the time of the occurrence. Identifying
speciﬁc situations that correspond to unsafe outcomes is one challenge. Providing some form of
conﬁdence that all relevant situations have been identiﬁed is another. The notion of situation coverage
[3] may help, as might environmental hazard analysis [25].
Arguably, things that are unsafe can be viewed as stakeholder losses from the perspective of at least one
stakeholder. This view can include, for example, accidents that cause signiﬁcant environmental impact
representing a loss from the perspective of stakeholders in the local community. In addition, many (but
not all) autonomous systems exploit autonomy as part of a control loop. In such cases, accidents (i.e.,
stakeholder losses) can be viewed as a consequence of inadequate control. Given this discussion, there
may be value in a Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) based hazard analysis [46].
As well as being safe during use, there may also be a need to deﬁne a safe state, in which the platform
can be left for a prolonged period of time. Understanding this state (or collection of states), together with
trajectories by which they may be reached, is an important part of maintaining safety in the presence
of faults and failures (as discussed in Objective PLT1-4). Whilst it is a simple concept, deﬁning and
implementing a safe state is not trivial. For example, in the case of a self-driving car a safe state could
be one where the car is stopped. However, this might not be safe if the car is stopped in a driving lane on
a motorway, or if it is stopped on a level crossing, or if it is in any number of other dangerous locations.
Rigorous, structured analysis of the intended operational domain and associated environment may help.
ỖLT1-ẹ: T©¦ ´±¦¤ªﬁ¦¥ £¦©¢·ª°¶³ °§ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³® ª´ ±³¦¥ª¤µ¢£­¦, ¤°¯´ª´µ¦¯µ ¢¯¥ ´¢§¦Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Speciﬁcation of platform behaviour is needed for several reasons. For example: it is needed
to provide the expected outcome for system-level tests; in addition, it facilitates operation alongside other
entities within the intended operational domain. Predictability and consistency of platform behaviour are
important for similar reasons. The need for safe behaviour is obvious, noting that the deﬁnition of safety is
expected to be produced as part of the Objective PLT1-2.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Some aspects of behavioural speciﬁcation may be addressed by traditional systems
engineering techniques. However, one advantage of autonomy-enabling technologies is they do not need
a detailed, low-level behavioural speciﬁcation that has been decomposed from platform-level requirements
in a traceable, hierarchical manner. For such technologies, it is helpful to consider both intended
platform-level behaviour (i.e., “the platform should ...”) and unintended, or undesirable, behaviour (i.e., “the
platform should not ...”). These considerations may be usefully informed by iteratively specifying behaviour
and observing the results in speciﬁc scenarios (both hand-crafted and automatically-generated).
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The qualities of predictability and consistency do not necessarily require precisely identical, repeatable
behaviour in apparently similar situations. Demanding that level of determinism is deemed inappropriate
for at least two reasons. Firstly, minute changes in the autonomous system’s perception of the situation
could cause a ﬂip between two diferent but equally acceptable behaviours: more particularly, for an
autonomous system used in a domain of even moderate complexity, the chance that identical situations
will be presented is negligible, and this chance reduces as the domain gets more complex. Secondly,
there may be good reasons why a form of pseudo-randomness is included within the autonomy-enabling
algorithm. Whilst precise repeatability is not required, meaningful bounds need to be placed around
expected platform behaviour. Scenario-based sensitivity analysis may help inform this consideration.
ỖLT1-Ẻ: T©¦ ´±¦¤ªﬁ¦¥ £¦©¢·ª°¶³ ª´ ´¢§¦ ª¯ µ©¦ ±³¦´¦¯¤¦ °§ §¢¶­µ´ ¢¯¥ §¢ª­¶³¦´, ¢´ ¸¦­­ ¢´
§°³¦´¦¦¢£­¦ ®ª´¶´¦ ¢¯¥ ¢£¶´¦Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Objective PLT1-3 is focused on a fully-functioning platform that is being used as intended.
Unfortunately, neither of these criteria can be assumed for platforms subjected to real-world use by
humans. Consequently, this objective is concerned with platform behaviour in sub-optimal conditions.
This includes, for example, deliberate misuse that causes the platform to be used outside its intended
operational domain.
The concepts of faults and failures can be directly related to those of misuse and abuse. For example, a
fault in some part of the platform may cause an operator to deliberately misuse the platform in an attempt
to complete their task. For this reason it is convenient to combine these items in the same objective.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề This objective may raise the question of, “How many faults and failures should be tolerated?”
In considering this question, it should be noted that current safety-related systems often require human
intervention to handle cases involving multiple faults and failures. However, autonomous systems change
the role of the human operator, which may increase the number of faults and failures that have to be
handled by the platform, without human intervention. More generally, component failure rates could be
used to inform the number and types of faults and failures that should be considered within this objective.
Traditional safety engineering techniques, for example, redundancy, could be used to provide for safe
behaviour in the presence of faults and failures. Alternatively, or additionally, a Minimum Equipment List
(MEL) could be deﬁned, with the health of this equipment being monitored (as discussed in Objective
ARC1-1). There may be a need to consider the case of a platform that has sufered too many faults and
failures or, equivalently, a platform that is in operational use when the full MEL ceases to be available. To
handle such circumstances there may need to be a deﬁned safe state for the platform; there may also be a
need for the platform to maintain an ability, or trajectory, to reach this safe state (which could be identiﬁed
as part of Objective PLT1-2).
Detecting and preventing misuse and abuse is a diﬃcult challenge. Simplistically, misuse could be
construed as cases where a human operator tries to do something in opposition to the autonomous part
of the platform. However, that view fails to account for the fact that, in some circumstances, the human
might be correct: an illustration can be taken from traditional, non-autonomous software, where algorithms
prevented access to engine thrust reversers even though the aircraft was on the ground, leading to runway
excursion and loss of life [31]. Equally, there are cases that exhibit the converse, namely, the software is
correct and the human is not.
A clearer view could perhaps be formed by looking for situations where the human operator tries to
make the platform behave contrary to the safety-related requirements established via the previous two
objectives. For example, this could be an efective way of protecting against misuse that aims to deliberatelySC
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take the platform outside its intended operational environment. Requirements that relate to unintended
behaviour (i.e., “the platform should not ...”) are especially helpful in this regard. Thinking about the
potential for misuse and abuse can help establish requirements of this type.
ỖLT1-ẻ: T©¦ £¦©¢·ª°¶³ °§ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³® ª´ ·¦³ªﬁ¦¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Whereas other objectives in this projection have established requirements, this objective
is concerned with verifying that these platform-level requirements have been satisﬁed. This includes
providing artefacts to demonstrate (e.g., to a regulator) that veriﬁcation has been successfully completed.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề As with traditional systems, there are several ways to provide evidence that a given requirement
has been satisﬁed. However, in comparison to traditional systems, the potential behaviour of autonomous
systems is much less bounded. This is likely to require a gradual, progressive approach to Test,
Evaluation, Veriﬁcation and Validation (TEVV), beginning with simulation and real-world testing in controlled
environments (e.g., closed roads).
Simulation, in particular, is expected to play a signiﬁcant role in requirement veriﬁcation. For example, it
allows testing of cases that would be too expensive or too dangerous to consider in the real-world; this is
likely to be especially valuable for test cases involving platform faults and failures. Whilst simulations are
undoubtedly valuable, demonstrating that the simulation is a suitable representation of the real-world may
be a signiﬁcant challenge. This is important as there are many examples of autonomy-related techniques
exploiting ﬂaws in simulations [20]. It follows that unsuitable simulations could fail to detect important
errors in platform behaviour.
A key concept relating to veriﬁcation of platform requirements for autonomous systems is the notion of
coverage. Generally speaking, in operational use these requirements would be expected to be satisﬁed in
a wide range of situations, this breadth resulting from the the complexity of the environment the platform
has to operate in. Understanding how the veriﬁcation evidence covers this variety is a key issue: analyses
such as situation coverage [3] may assist. This notion of coverage needs to be combined with notions of
coverage relevant to computations (as discussed in Objectives COM1-3 and COM2-5).
ỖLT1-Ẽ: O±¦³¢µª°¯¢­ ®°¯ªµ°³ª¯¨ ª´ ´¶ﬃ¤ª¦¯µ µ° ª¥¦¯µª§º ¢¯¥ ´¶±±°³µ µ©¦ ®ªµª¨¢µª°¯ °§
¯¦¸ hazards, including emerging cyber security threats.
Discussion: Many safety-related systems include a form of monitoring; continuous, or periodic, with
BIT being one example. The open nature of the operational domain associated with many autonomous
systems means there is a need to include this type of monitoring at the platform level. This should help
capture cases where changes in the operational domain (or aspects of the operational domain that were
not fully understood during development) result in new hazards.
The nature of autonomy-enabling technologies (including AI and ML) means they rely heavily on data,
software and computational hardware. Consequently, cyber security is an important consideration. Hence,
monitoring to spot the emergence of hazards from that domain is important, especially given the pace at
which such hazards may emerge.
Examples: For the purposes of discussion, it is initially convenient to split operational monitoring into two
main categories: monitoring of the environment; and monitoring of the platform.
Monitoring the environment is important as, in general, autonomous systems are used in environments
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that are less constrained, and less prescriptive, than is the case for traditional systems. This increases the
likelihood of the platform being used outside the intended operational domain (either by accident or by
deliberate intent). Conversely, most, if not all, of the platform veriﬁcation will be based on the assumption
that the platform is being used inside the intended operational domain. This apparent inconsistency may
give rise to new hazards.
These hazards may need to be dealt with in two separate time scales. Firstly, if monitoring detects platform
use outside the intended operational domain then appropriate action should be taken to maintain safety.
This could, for example, involve achieving a deﬁned safe state for the platform; alternatively, it could
involve attempting to manoeuvre the platform back inside the intended operational domain. Secondly,
if monitoring routinely detects use outside the intended operational domain then this is indicative of a
need to change something about the platform (e.g., the system-level requirements, the assumptions made
during veriﬁcation, the way operators are trained).
Monitoring of the platform includes monitoring the sub-systems that provide inputs for the computation
(as discussed under Objective ARC1-1). It may also include monitoring that decisions (based on
autonomy-related technologies) have the expected consequences: for example, applying vehicle brakes
should lead to a reduction in speed.
In addition to the separate cases discussed above, there are some aspects of operational monitoring
that need to be considered more generally. For example, there may be a need to review information
from operational use to identify near misses or anomalous behaviour. There is also likely to be beneﬁt
in capturing at least a selection of operational inputs, for example, to support future support and
maintenance, as well as to monitor for potential distribution shift [61].
In these contexts there may be a need to make a decision on the extent of operational monitoring that
is required. It is conceivable that a ﬂeet of self-driving cars could cover thousands, or possibly millions, of
miles a day. In such cases it may be neither feasible nor appropriate to analyse every single operational
input seen by every single platform. Consequently, a reasoned argument as to what data will be analysed
and why is likely to be required. In some cases a uniform, random choice of platforms may be appropriate;
in other cases, there may be a speciﬁc desire to spread data collection across the operational domain as
far as possible, resulting in a prioritisation of platforms that have experienced more exotic parts of the
operational domain.
The ﬁnal part of operational monitoring is speciﬁcally aimed at cyber threats. This may include speciﬁc
on-platform monitors (e.g., to detect anomalous software behaviour, [21]). An understanding of what
aspects should be prioritised, from a monitoring perspective, could be gained by looking at the security
perimeter (i.e., interfaces into the platform) and the security environment [71].
Depending on the speciﬁcs of the deployment, monitoring could also involve comparing multiple platforms
within a ﬂeet. The intuition is that unexpected, or unexplained, behaviour in the case of one platform,
or a small number of platforms, could be indicative of a cyber-related issue. It could also be indicative
of a number of other issues as well, many of which would require investigation from a safety-related
perspective.
In addition to these platform-focused aspects of cyber-related monitoring, there is also likely to be a
need to monitor general, cyber-related information. This should include monitoring for information on
vulnerabilities associated with components and sub-systems used within the platform.
SC
SC
-1
53
A
(J
an
20
20
)
43
7
PỒ
AT
FO
R
M
-L
EV
EL
FR
A
M
EW
O
R
K:
O
B
JE
C
TI
VE
S
7ẴẸ I¯µ¦³¢¤µª¯¨ Iµ¦ỵ´
The interacting items projection considers items that are are intended or required to interact with the
platform, but are not directly owned by the platform developer or operator. Equivalently, this projection
considers things that the platform is expected to interface with. In some cases, the platform developer
may be able to exercise some degree of control over both sides of the interface (e.g., for platform test rigs);
alternatively, it could be because the developer contributes to an open standard, as may be the case for
roadside furniture.
There are three objectives associated with this projection.
ỖLT2-1: I¯µ¦³¢¤µª¯¨ ªµ¦®´ µ©¢µ ¢f¦¤µ µ©¦ ´¢§¦ °±¦³¢µª°¯ °§ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³® ¢³¦ ª¥¦¯µªﬁ¦¥
¢¯¥ ¶¯¥¦³´µ°°¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề At least some of the interacting items are likely to have the potential to afect safe operation.
The efect could arise if, for example, the item provided incorrect information and this was used without
on-platform checking. Alternatively, it could arise if the item placed the platform in a special conﬁguration,
for example, to facilitate maintenance and this conﬁguration was mistakenly left in place when the platform
was returned to operational use. Given this potential impact, it is important that all interacting items are
identiﬁed and their potential impact on safety is understood.
As well as being important in its own right, the understanding gained from satisfying this objective supports
the other objectives associated with this projection.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề There is a wide range of interacting items that could potentially afect safety. In addition
to of-platform information sources and maintenance equipment, other examples include training
information, technical publications and the process by which platform updates are achieved. Several of
these items can be viewed as being safety-related data. Consequently, Data Safety Guidancemay be helpful
[79].
Several approaches could be used to gain the understanding necessary for this objective. For example, part
of STPA [46] involves drawing a control structure, which illustrates entities, control actions and feedback
information. This should highlight key interacting items as well as their potential efect on the platform,
which is typically related to the information that is provided.
An alternative approach could involve looking at the platform from the perspective of a capability
management framework, for example, the Defence Lines of Development (DLODs) used by the UK Ministry
Of Defence (MOD), which are: training; equipment; personnel; information; doctrine and concepts;
organisation; infrastructure; and logistics [59]. Considering each of these “lines” should help identify
interacting items and, subsequently, their potential efects on safety.
ỖLT2-2: I¯µ¦³¢¤µª°¯´ ±³¦´¦³·¦ ±­¢µ§°³® ´¢§¦µºẴ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề This objective is concerned with interacting items that are behaving according to their design
intent. Since the platform developer has intentionally included these interactions, it is reasonable to
assume they also have a sound understanding of this intent. Consequently, much of this objective would
be expected to be satisﬁed via standard system and safety engineering approaches. However, there may
be a number of autonomy-related “edge cases” that may warrant speciﬁc investigation.
For example, in some situations, it is possible (perhaps likely) that multiple examples of the same44 SC
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autonomous system will be present in the same environment. This would be the case, for example, if
a manufacturer of self-driving vehicles had sold many vehicles within the same geographical region. Such
vehicles are clearly under the control of the platform developer, but they may not naturally be highlighted
by approaches used to identify interacting items.
This notion can easily be extended to interactions between diferent types of platform developed by
the same organisation. If, for example, there is an industry-wide standard for sharing information then
the notion can also be extended to cover platforms developed by other organisations; alternatively, or
additionally, these platforms could be covered by the various objectives associated with the environment
projection.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề It may be the case that the techniques used to verify platform behaviour (i.e., to satisfy
Objective PLT1-5) naturally extend, or can be easily extended, to cover the case of multiple platforms.
Whilst this would make a signiﬁcant contribution to the current objective, there remains a need to
describe, and justify, the test cases that are considered (e.g., how many platforms, what initial states and
conﬁgurations, and so on). These considerations could be informed by some notion of coverage, similar to
those discussed in Objective PLT1-5.
Notions of coverage would also be required if new veriﬁcation approaches needed to be developed in
relation to this objective. These may be further complicated by the possibility of diferent software versions
(including model variants) amongst the platforms.
If multiple instantiations are in operational use then each instantiation would be expected to comply with
all objectives. Nevertheless, having multiple instantiations provides a potential opportunity to enhance
ﬂeet-wide safety. Consider, for example, a large multi-national organisation responsible for running many
data centres. Every data centre would not be expected to be run at precisely the same software patch
level. In this context, diversity in patch levels ofers some protection against an unknown common mode
failure afecting all data centres. In addition, it allows for changes to be tested in a small number of data
centres before they are gradually rolled out.
Conceptually, diversity ofers the same beneﬁt for ﬂeets of autonomous systems. However, in this case,
a balance needs to be found between the known risks associated with older implementations and the
potentially unknown risks associated with a newly-produced implementation. An incorrect balance would
adversely afect platform safety.
It should also be noted that ﬂeet-level diversity will naturally arise if the platform exhibits online learning. In
this case, appropriate measures need to be in place to monitor and control this diversity. Otherwise, two
apparently identical autonomous systems may exhibit very diferent behaviours; this could confuse people
and other entities in the environment, with potentially unsafe results.
The ﬁrst step in managing diversity within a ﬂeet is to gain information on the individual platforms [9]. This
could involve reporting from every autonomous system, or from a suitably-sampled subset of them. With
this information, the developer could replicate platform behaviour in a synthetic environment (that has
been demonstrated to be suitably representative).
This allows the developer to measure performance in a number of standard scenarios (or situations). The
choice of scenarios would be expected to be described and justiﬁed as part of the computation’s assurance
argument. Care needs to be taken to ensure that the selection of scenarios is suitable for the intended
use. However, experience from other areas suggests this may be possible: for example, a standard set of
situations is used when testing an aircraft ﬂight simulator [28]. The notion of situation coverage could also
inform this decision [3].
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Using standard scenarios provides a practical measure of the impact of diversity across the various
instantiations. This may be supplemented by a theoretical measure of diversity, which could be calculated
by sampling from across the input domain and comparing the results provided by diferent instantiations.
Verifying safe behaviour in the presence of autonomous systems developed by other manufacturers may
be complicated, especially if manufacturers do not wish to share detailed, implementation-level information
about the behaviour of their systems. This could, potentially, be overcome if a central regulatory authority
received such information and, furthermore, investigated behaviours in multi-manufacture situations. This
might be achieved using an appropriately veriﬁed and validated simulation environment.
Such an approach places a signiﬁcant burden on the regulatory community, which they may be unwilling or
unable to accept. From a manufacturer’s perspective, an alternative would be to treat other autonomous
systems as essentially unpredictable. Robustness testing of behaviours, and information passed via an
agreed standard interface, would be helpful in this regard.
Conceptually, this approachmoves other manufacturers’ systems into the environment projection, so there
would be value in considering the objectives associated with that projection.
ỖLT2-ẹ: U¯¢·¢ª­¢£ª­ªµº °³ ¶¯³¦­ª¢£ª­ªµº °§ ª¯µ¦³¢¤µª¯¨ ªµ¦®´ ¥°¦´ ¯°µ ®¢¬¦ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³®
¶¯´¢§¦Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Although the distinction is not always rigid, generally speaking, it is easier to control things
that are part of the platform, rather than interacting items. For this reason, there is a greater chance
of interacting items being (or becoming) unavailable during operational use of the platform. Since the
platform should remain safe at all times, it follows that unavailability of interacting items should not result
in an unsafe platform.
Similarly, there is the possibility of interacting items being unreliable, for example, providing misleading
information. Should it occur, this unreliability should not result in an unsafe platform.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Arguably, a good understanding of what constitutes safe behaviour (from the objectives
associated with the behavioural speciﬁcation projection) combined with a good understanding of potential
impacts of interacting items (from Objective PLT2-1) should make a signiﬁcant contribution to satisfying
this objective (i.e., Objective PLT2-3).
There are, however, some subtleties. For example, there may be circumstances in which unavailability,
or unreliability, of interacting items causes a gradual reduction in operational performance until a point
is reached whereby the platform is no longer safe. This could occur if, for example, regular (but not
necessarily frequent) communications with a central control entity are required to account for distribution
shift. A suitable response to this gradual degradation could be, ﬁrstly, informing the operator and,
subsequently, placing the autonomous system in a safe, potentially non-operational, state.
7Ẵ3 Ỗ¦°Ỹ­¦
It is possible to imagine autonomous systems that interact with people in a very limited, very indirect way:
an autonomous system that manages load balancing across computational resources in order to deliver
communications functions could be one example. Despite this, most autonomous systems are expected
to involve signiﬁcant interaction with people. This is especially true for safety-related systems, which are
the focus of this document. Consequently, interactions between the platform and people need to be
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considered. These considerations need to cover the whole system lifecycle, as well as people directly
involved with the platform (e.g., operators and maintainers) and bystanders.
There are four objectives associated with this projection.
ỖLTẹ-1: S¢§¦µº-³¦­¢µ¦¥ ¥¦®¢¯¥´ °¯ ±¦°±­¦ ª¯µ¦³¢¤µª¯¨ ¸ªµ© µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³® ¢³¦ ³¦¢´°¯¢£­¦Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Despite their autonomous nature, some platforms may require people to perform certain
functions to maintain safety. For example, a person may be required to perform a monitoring function
and to take over control in of-nominal situations. Alternatively, a person may be required to perform
regular maintenance activities, including sensor calibrations. Regardless of their nature, if human actions
are necessary to maintain safety then these actions need to be reasonable; for example, they should not
exceed the expected limitations of the relevant demographic. Equivalently, a system cannot be made safe
by asking people to perform unreasonable actions.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Part of this objective relates to understand what safety-related demands are being placed on
people. The various objectives associated with the behavioural speciﬁcation projection should provide
a good understanding of safety from a holistic perspective. Techniques such as task analysis or the
Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) [45] may help identify those parts that rely on human
actions.
There are likely to be domain-speciﬁc considerations in determining whether these actions are
“reasonable”. For example, a function that any member of the general public is expected to complete
should be less demanding than a function that will only be completed by qualiﬁed staf.
Human actions are likely to be repeated many times during the life of an autonomous system; they
may be repeated many times during a single operational use of such a system. Consequently, generic
information on human performance (e.g., reliability, timeliness, attentiveness) may help inform judgements
on reasonableness.
ỖLTẹ-2: S¶ªµ¢£­¦ ª¯µ¦³§¢¤¦´ ¢³¦ ±³°·ª¥¦¥ §°³ ±¦°±­¦ µ©¢µ ®¢º ª¯µ¦³¢¤µ ¸ªµ© µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³®Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề In many cases, people would be expected to interact with the platform through designed
interfaces. Experience with traditional systems has demonstrated the importance of these interfaces.
Arguably, in the case of autonomous systems, these interfaces become even more important: partly
because of the unfamiliarity caused by the way autonomy changes the role of the human; and partly
because there are examples of humans over-riding system behaviour because of poor situational
awareness.
Although speciﬁcally-designed interfaces are of great importance, there may be cases where people
interact with a platform in a more general manner. For example, in the case of self-driving vehicles,
pedestrians may observe the vehicle’s trajectory, as well as other entities in the local environment, to form
an opinion of how the autonomous system will behave. In the longer-term, standards and norms that
govern these interactions may be deﬁned or emerge: the use of audible alarms when a vehicle is reversing
may be one example. However, currently, these interactions need careful thought from the perspective of
each autonomous system.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề To understand what interfaces are required, and what characteristics would make these
appropriate (or inappropriate), there is a need to understand the range of situations in which people
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will interact with the platform. Many of these situations should be identiﬁed as part of understanding
the platform’s behavioural speciﬁcation, including what constitutes safe operation (Objective PLT1-2). In
addition, there may be a need to search for other interactions with people that do not naturally arise
from such considerations. This could possibly be achieved by “walking through” typical use cases for the
platform, with the speciﬁc aim of identifying interactions with people. This should consider both pull-style
interfaces, where the person has to request information, and push-style interfaces, where the information
is always provided.
As well as understanding the situations where interactions occur, there is also a need to understand
the diferent types of people that may be involved. For example, the interface provided to a child may
be diferent from that provided to an adult. Similarly, the interface provided to a native speaker may
be diferent from that provided to someone unfamiliar with that language. To give one ﬁnal example,
the interface provided to a trained (and certiﬁed) operator may be diferent from that provided to a lay
person. Many of these considerations may be addressed by traditional Human-Machine Interface (HMI)
approaches.
Provided it was suﬃciently realistic (and demonstrated to be so), an interactive simulation could be a useful
tool to help develop the understanding discussed in the preceding paragraphs.
These traditional approaches may need to be supplemented with techniques associated with “Explainable
AI” [1]. In this context, there is a diference between local explainability, which relates to a single input, and
global explainability, which relates to the input domain (or a large portion of it). As outlined in the preceding
paragraph, there is also a need to account for the context within which the explanation is provided, or
required.
ỖLTẹ-ẹ: A±±³°±³ª¢µ¦ µ³¢ª¯ª¯¨ ª´ ±³°·ª¥¦¥ §°³ ±­¢µ§°³® ¶´¦³´ ¢¯¥ ®¢ª¯µ¢ª¯¦³´Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề A key aspect of many autonomous systems is that they change the role of the human. This
change in role means that additional training is likely to be beneﬁcial; furthermore, a diferent form of
training may also be helpful. More speciﬁcally, even though autonomy typically reduces the burden on
the human there may still be a need to train operators: this could, for example, involve education about
expected platform behaviour in both nominal and of-nominal situations. Similarly, some form of training
may be required for maintainers, for example, being able to manage updates of ML-based models.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề Training for users and maintainers is likely to be platform-speciﬁc. As for traditional systems,
there may be a need for formal certiﬁcation and, potentially, re-certiﬁcation.
The nature of ML-based models is such that autonomous systems may be updated more frequently than
is typically the case for current systems. This raises the importance of considering the impact of individual
changes and, especially, the cumulative impact of multiple changes. A time-based approach to re-training,
combined with a time-based bound on the scale and number of changes, could be adopted. Alternatively, a
metric that estimates the cumulative efect of multiple changes could be developed, with re-training being
invoked once that metric exceeds a threshold. In either case, care need to be taken to protect against a
conscious or unconscious desire to minimise re-training (e.g., to minimise opertaional costs) to such an
extent that platform operation becomes unsafe.
ỖLTẹ-Ẻ: T©¦ ±­¢µ§°³® ª´ ¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦­º ±³°µ¦¤µ¦¥ ¢¨¢ª¯´µ ©¢³® §³°® ¢¥·¦³´¢³ª¢­ ¢¤µ°³´Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề The possibility of people intending to deliberately cause the platform to behave in an unsafe48 SC
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manner needs to be considered. Given the extensive use of software and computational hardware in
autonomy-enabling technologies, there is a signiﬁcant cyber-related attack surface that adversaries may
seek to exploit.
However, this objective is intentionally wider than cyber-related considerations; it also includes other
activities that humans could take that afect platform behaviour, especially for efects that have
the potential to lead to unsafe behaviour. One example activity could be pedestrians and cyclists
positioning themselves to try and inﬂuence vehicle trajectories. Another example could be platform users
implementing unauthorised modiﬁcations, perhaps with the aim of altering a vehicle’s performance.
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề The potential scope of this objective is vast. From a cyber security perspective, the DfT
Guidelines for Cyber Security for Connected and Automated Vehicles are likely to be useful [23]. Likewise,
the combined development of a security case and a safety case may help [48].
From the speciﬁc perspective of autonomy-enabling technologies, protecting against the possibility of
training abuse (e.g., via data poisoning or through tainted pre-trained models [37]) is important. Coupling
this with monitoring of operational inputs and autonomous (or model) behaviour is likely to be beneﬁcial.
These concepts are also relevant to the autonomy architecture-level (e.g., Objectives ARC1-2 and ARC1-4).
An understanding of potential non-cyber efects may be gained, at least in theory, by a suitably broad red
teaming exercise [50]. Like all red team exercises, this would require a group of innovative thinkers; it is also
likely to require people with a good understanding of how the platform would respond to novel situations.
Given the wide potential behaviour associated with many autonomous systems, this understanding may be
diﬃcult to obtain. It could, possibly, be replaced by appropriate tests (including simulations). Adopting this
approach could result in a series of red team sessions, in which possible adversary actions are proposed,
with the results of these being determined oﬄine and fed back into a subsequent session.
If a suitable simulation was available, which included representations of the platform and adversarial actors,
then there may be value in adopting some form of automated red teaming.
7Ẵ4 E¯·ª³°¯ỵ¦¯µ
A key aspect of many autonomous systems is the complex, diverse and dynamic nature of the intended
operational domain. These characteristics mean it is impossible to precisely deﬁne beforehand what
entities will be present in the environment or how they will behave. The environment projection is
concerned with these entities, which the platform developer and operator have little or no control over, as
well as geographical and meteorological properties.
There are two objectives associated with this projection.
ỖLTẺ-1: E­¦®¦¯µ´ °§ µ©¦ ¦¯·ª³°¯®¦¯µ ³¦­¦·¢¯µ µ° µ©¦ ´¢§¦ °±¦³¢µª°¯ °§ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³® ¢³¦
ª¥¦¯µªﬁ¦¥ ¢¯¥ ¶¯¥¦³´µ°°¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề In order to make arguments about, and demonstrate, the safe operation of a platform it
is necessary to understand the environment in which the platform may be used, noting that this is not
necessarily the same as the intended operational domain. Part of this understanding is concerned with
interacting items (Objective PLT2-1) although the most signiﬁcant part comes from understanding entities
that may be present in, and properties of, the environment.
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E¹¢®±­¦´Ề In some cases, an understanding of the environment may be relatively easy to establish. This
may be the case for an autonomous system that forms part of an application to support medical diagnoses.
More generally, the approaches used to understand what constitutes safe behaviour (Objective PLT1-2)
and what interacting items may afect safety (Objective PLT2-1) are likely to help identify elements of the
environment that are relevant to this objective.
It is important that the environment is described and understood in an inclusive manner, without
jeopardising understandability. In some cases, it may be plausible to list all entities within a given class
(or sub-class) that may form part of the environment. Existing classiﬁcations, for example, of road vehicles,
may help in this endeavour. In other cases it may be appropriate to deﬁne parts of the environment by
exclusion; that is, the environment may contain everything apart from certain speciﬁed items.
The understanding of the environment needs to consider both nominal (i.e., expected) and of-nominal (i.e.,
unexpected) situations. The presence of emergency vehicles, or broken down vehicles may be examples
of the latter class. It may be helpful to develop a range of situations that apply to an entire class of
autonomous systems: for example, regardless of manufacturer, self-driving cars (operating in the same
geographical region) are likely to experience the same, or very similar, environments.
In terms of geographical and meteorological properties of the environment, bounds are likely to be
available from system-level requirements. These should, for example, identify minimum and maximum
operating temperatures. If it is relevant, they may also specify bounds on properties like altitude, vibration,
acceleration, gradient, and so on.
The potential efect of environmental properties on redundancy needs to be understood. For example,
suppose a platform is ﬁtted with a range of sensors to provide redundancy, but some of the sensors do
not function adequately in certain meteorological conditions (e.g., fog). In such circumstances, fog may not
immediately create an unsafe situation, although it may reduce safety margins. This could create a case
where a single failure resulted in unsafe operation, even though from a theoretical perspective the platform
was equipped with redundant sensors.
ỖLTẺ-2: Sªµ¶¢µª°¯¢­ ¢¸¢³¦¯¦´´ °§ µ©¦ ±­¢µ§°³®’´ ¦¯·ª³°¯®¦¯µ ª´ ®¢ª¯µ¢ª¯¦¥Ẵ
Dª´¤¶´´ª°¯Ề Situational awareness relates to the platform’s understanding of the environment. This
includes understanding what other entities exist, what courses of action these entities are likely to take
and what courses of action they could potentially take in a worst case (from a safety perspective) scenario.
This awareness is important as it forms the basis of decision making: making a correct decision based on
incorrect data could lead to unsafe outcomes.
The importance of situational awareness is also emphasised in the ﬁrst two components of common
models for autonomous systems, for example: Monitor, Analyse, Plan, Execute (MAPE); and Sense,
Understand, Decide, Act (SUDA).
E¹¢®±­¦´Ề For some platforms, maintaining situational awareness may be relatively straightforward. For
example, in the case of a medical diagnosis system, the associated environment could include data about
the image (e.g., the type of scanner used, the time and date at which the image was taken, an associated
patient identiﬁer); it could also include general healthcare information relevant to the patient (e.g., current
medication). For other platforms, maintaining suitable awareness of the environment (in all operating
conditions) could be a signiﬁcant challenge.
Some aspects of situational awareness may come from of-platform sources: mapping information may
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be a good example of this. Ensuring that safety-related impacts of such data have been considered is
important. The Data Safety Guidance may be valuable in this regard [79].
Other aspects of situational awareness may be more dynamic. Understanding the current meteorological
conditions is likely to be important. As noted earlier these could, potentially, reduce safety margins. The
impact of meteorological conditions on the environment also need to be considered: a wet or icy road
surface will afect braking distances, for example.
To understand what level of situational awareness is required, analysis needs to be conducted to
understand, for example, the accuracy and latency with which information is required. The control
structure diagram (associated with STPA [46]) may help identify the relevant pieces of information;
subsequent analyses could provide details of the properties this information needs to exhibit.
In many cases, the environment changes relatively smoothly with time. Consequently, there may be a need
to measure and propagate uncertainty about the environment and, especially, entities within it. This may
allow the platform to adopt certain behaviours to either reduce this uncertainty (e.g., by changing the way
sensors are used) or to reduce the potential consequences of it (e.g., by travelling more slowly).
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Table 6: Autonomy Architecture-Level Objectives
I¥ O£«¦¤µª·¦ P³°«¦¤µª°¯
ARC1-1 Failures of sub-systems that provide computation inputs are tolerated.
Tolerance
ARC1-2
Operational inputs inconsistent with the training, test and veriﬁcation data are
tolerated.
ARC1-3 Faults and failures internal to the computation are tolerated.
ARC1-4 Adversarial attempts to disrupt the computation are tolerated.
ARC1-5 Incorrect computation outputs are tolerated.
ARC2-1 Relevant information is presented to interacting parties.
Information
ProvisionARC2-2
Relevant information is available to support maintenance and future
development.
ARC2-3 Relevant information is preserved to support post-incident analysis.
ARC2-4 Information is managed securely.
ARC3-1 Inappropriate or unauthorised adaptations do not occur.
Adaptation
ARC3-2 Computation behaviour is appropriate before, during and after an adaptation.
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Table 7: Platform-Level Objectives
I¥ O£«¦¤µª·¦ P³°«¦¤µª°¯
PLT1-1
All aspects of platform behaviour that are achieved using autonomy-enabling
techniques are justiﬁed.
Behavioural
Speciﬁcation
PLT1-2 Acceptably safe operation for the platform is deﬁned.
PLT1-3 The speciﬁed behaviour of the platform is predictable, consistent and safe.
PLT1-4
The speciﬁed behaviour is safe in the presence of faults and failures, as well as
foreseeable misuse and abuse.
PLT1-5 The behaviour of the platform is veriﬁed.
PLT1-6
Operational monitoring is suﬃcient to identify and support the mitigation of new
hazards, including emerging cyber security threats.
PLT2-1
Interacting items that afect the safe operation of the platform are identiﬁed and
understood.
Interacting ItemsPLT2-2 Interactions preserve platform safety.
PLT2-3
Unavailability or unreliability of interacting items does not make the platform
unsafe.
PLT3-1 Safety-related demands on people interacting with the platform are reasonable.
People
PLT3-2 Suitable interfaces are provided for people that may interact with the platform.
PLT3-3 Appropriate training is provided for platform users and maintainers.
PLT3-4 The platform is appropriately protected against harm from adversarial actors.
PLT4-1
Elements of the environment relevant to the safe operation of the platform are
identiﬁed and understood. Environment
PLT4-2 Situational awareness of the platform’s environment is maintained.
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ệỸỸ¦¯¥ª¹ ệ C°ỵỸ¶µ¢µª°¯-L¦·¦­ Ọ³¢ỵ¦¸°³ự: J¶´µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯
T©ª´ ¢±±¦¯¥ªѯ ´¶®®¢³ª´¦´ µ©¦ ±³°¤¦´´ ¶´¦¥ µ° ¥¦·¦­°± µ©¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬ ¢¥°±µ¦¥ £º µ©¦
SASWG≤ I¯ ¥°ª¯¨ ´°≈ ªµ ±³°·ª¥¦´ ´°®¦ «¶´µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ §°³ µ©¦ ¤©°ª¤¦ °§ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬≤ Iµ ¢­´° ±³°·ª¥¦´ ´°®¦
¤°¯ﬁ¥¦¯¤¦ µ©¢µ µ©¦ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬ ¤°·¦³´ ¢­­ ³¦­¦·¢¯µ µ°±ª¤ ¢³¦¢´≤
I¯ªµª¢­­º≈ ¢ ´®¢­­-´¤¢­¦ ´¶³·¦º °§ ¦ѯª´µª¯¨ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬´ Ѯ¢´ ¤°¯¥¶¤µ¦¥≤ T©ª´ ª¥¦¯µªﬁ¦¥ µ©¦
ªµ¦®´ ­ª´µ¦¥ ª¯ T¢£­¦ 8≤
T¢£­¦ 8Ề C°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-Ồ¦·¦­ F³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬´ C°¯´ª¥¦³¦¥
S¦¤µª°¯ F³¢®¦¸°³¬
A≤1≤1 ồ°¥ªﬁ¦¥ S°§µѮ¢³¦ S¢§¦µº A´´¶³¢¯¤¦ P³ª¯¤ª±­¦´
A≤1≤2 T©¦ “F¢³ª¢ Sµ¢¤¬”
A≤1≤3  °¶µ©Ѯ¢ªµ¦ ¢¯¥ ﻿¦­­º’´ “Ờª¦Ѯ±°ª¯µ´”
A≤1≤4 G°°¨­¦’´ ồ¢¤©ª¯¦ Ồ¦¢³¯ª¯¨ Rubric
A.1.5 Ethical and Safety Principles
A.1.6 Burton’s “Making the Case” Argument
Each computation-level framework is brieﬂy summarised (subsection A.1) and a preferred framework is
selected. A top-level mapping between frameworks is completed, to conﬁrm that the chosen framework
incorporates all relevant parts of the other computation-level frameworks (subsection A.2). Similar,
top-level mappings from the chosen framework to, ﬁrstly, a typical software development approach and,
secondly, a generic approach to ML-based development are conducted; these demonstrate the framework
provides appropriate coverage of typical development activities (subsection A.3).
ệẴ1 C°ỵỸ¶µ¢µª°¯-L¦·¦­ Ọ³¢ỵ¦¸°³ự´
ệẴ1Ẵ1 �°¥ªﬁ¦¥ S°§µ¸¢³¦ S¢§¦µº ệ´´¶³¢¯¤¦ Ỗ³ª¯¤ªỸ­¦´
This computation-level framework is described in a paper presented at the 2017 SSS [8]. The
paper considers the “four plus one” software safety assurance principles [42] from the perspective of
non-traditional (e.g., ML / AI) software. A slightly revised and extended set of six (or “four plus two”)
principles are proposed:
• Principle One: Software safety requirements shall be deﬁned to address the software contribution to
system hazards;
• Principle Two-Primed: The software detailed design shall embody the intent of the software safety
requirements;
• Principle Three: Software safety requirements shall be satisﬁed;
• Principle Four: Hazardous behaviour of the software shall be identiﬁed and mitigated;
• Principle Four plus One: The conﬁdence established in addressing the software safety principles shall
be commensurate to the contribution of the software to system risk;
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• Principle Four plus Two: Software required to produce behaviour not predictable at design time
should consider the consequence of behavioural adaptations on its environment.
ệẴ1ẴẸ T©¦ “Ọ¢³ª¢ Sµ¢¤ự”
This computation-level framework is based on the information presented in a paper at the International
Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE) Workshop on Software Certiﬁcation (WoSoCer) [30].
This framework comprises ﬁve projections:
• Experience, which is focused on the data that is available to train a machine learning algorithm;
• Task, which is concerned with the performance of the implemented computation;
• Algorithm, which considers the type of algorithm (e.g., neural network, random forest, etc.);
• Software, which includes considerations such as the language in which the computation is
implemented;
• Hardware, which relates to the computational hardware that is used.
When using this framework it may be helpful to consider, at least, the Software and Hardware projections
from two perspectives, speciﬁcally training and operational use. For example, it is likely that the
computational hardware used for training will be diferent to that used during an operational deployment.
ệẴ1Ẵ3 Ị°¶µ©¸¢ªµ¦ ¢¯¥ ﻿¦­­º’´ “ḁª¦¸Ỹ°ª¯µ´”
This computation-level framework was presented at the 2018 SSS [26]. Building on the concept of distinct
viewpoints used in systems engineering, this paper identiﬁes six viewpoints. Although they were developed
from the perspective of Bayesian Networks, the paper suggests the viewpoints are applicable tomany types
of artiﬁcial intelligence software. The viewpoints are:
• Model, which relates to the structure and parametrisation of the model underlying the learnt
algorithm;
• Data, which covers all data acquisition, processing and storage concerns (including knowledge
engineering and expert elicitation);
• Computational, which includes the properties of all algorithms used for learning and reasoning tasks
within the system, their selection process, and the associated assumptions and design decisions;
• Operational, which focuses on the evolution and maintenance of the system after deployment;
• Technology, which covers the necessity, properties, constraints and assumptions of modelling
frameworks used in the system;
• Implementation, which addresses all “conventional” software and hardware engineering concerns,
including “normal” function allocation, requirements and associated veriﬁcation and validation
activities.
As with the “Faria Stack” considered above, there may be advantages in considering some of the above
viewpoints from both training and operational perspectives.58 SC
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ệẴ1Ẵ4 G°°¨­¦’´ �¢¤©ª¯¦ L¦¢³¯ª¯¨ ϖ¶Ứ³ª¤
This computation-level framework [13] includes a scoring mechanism that is intended to measure how
suitable a machine learning approach is for deployment. It is based on computations used in a web-like
environment, but may be of relevance to wider autonomous systems.
The framework includes four categories, each of which includes several considerations:
• Tests for Features and Data:
– Test that the distributions of each feature match your expectations;
– Test the relationship between each feature and the target, and the pairwise correlations
between individual signals;
– Test the cost of each feature;
– Test that a model does not contain any features that have been manually determined as
unsuitable for use;
– Test that your system maintains privacy controls across its entire data pipeline;
– Test the calendar time needed to develop and add a new feature to the production model;
– Test all code that creates input features, both in training and serving.
• Tests for Model Development:
– Test that every model speciﬁcation undergoes a code review and is checked in to a repository;
– Test the relationship between oﬄine proxy metrics and the actual impact metrics;
– Test the impact of each tunable hyper-parameter;
– Test the efect of model staleness;
– Test against a simpler model as a baseline;
– Test model quality on important data slices;
– Test the model for implicit bias.
• Tests for ML Infrastructure:
– Test the reproducibility of training;
– Unit test model speciﬁcation code;
– Integration test the full ML pipeline;
– Test model quality before attempting to serve it;
– Test that a single example or training batch can be sent to the model, and changes to internal
state can be observed from training through to prediction;
– Test models via a canary process before they enter production serving environments;
– Test how quickly and safely a model can be rolled back to a previous serving version.
• Monitoring Tests for ML:
– Test for upstream instability in features, both in training and serving;
– Test that data invariants hold in training and serving inputs;
– Test that your training and serving features compute the same values;
– Test for model staleness;SC
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– Test for Not a Number (NaN) or inﬁnities appearing in your model during training or serving;
– Test for dramatic or slow-leak regressions in training speed, serving latency, throughput, or
Random Access Memory (RAM) usage;
– Test for regressions in prediction quality on served data.
For each item above, one point is awarded for manual tests (including documenting and distributing the
results). A second point is awarded if tests are run automatically and repeatedly. A score is calculated for
each of the four categories by adding the scores for each of the listed items. The overall score is then the
minimum of these four category scores.
ệẴ1Ẵ5 Eµ©ª¤¢­ ¢¯¥ S¢§¦µº Ỗ³ª¯¤ªỸ­¦´
This computation-level framework identiﬁes a perspective on the ethics governing decisions around
safety-critical autonomous systems [58]. It aligns with the Modiﬁed Software Safety Assurance Principles
(discussed above) and is applicable to ethics only so far as these afect safety.
• Principle One: Ethics requirements governing the autonomous system behaviour shall be deﬁned.
• Principle Two: The intent of the ethics requirements shall be maintained throughout decomposition.
• Principle Three: Ethics requirements shall be satisﬁed.
• Principle Four: The autonomous system shall continue to be safe, and emergent behaviour of the
autonomous system which conﬂicts with the ethics requirements shall be identiﬁed and mitigated
• Principle Four plus One: The degree of rigour required to address these ethical principles shall be
commensurate with the contribution of the autonomous system to system risk.
ệẴ1Ẵ6 B¶³µ°¯’´ “�¢ựª¯¨ µ©¦ C¢´¦” ệ³¨¶ỵ¦¯µ
This computation-level framework comes from a paper presented at the 2017 International Conference
on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security [14]. The paper outlines an assurance case structure for a
highly automated driving system, which could possibly be extended to cover a wide range of autonomous
systems. A Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) approach is used; key features include:
• GOAL G1: The residual risk associated with functional insuﬃciences in the object detection function
is acceptable;
• CONTEXT C1: Deﬁnition of functional and performance requirements on the object detection
function;
• ASSUMPTION A1: Assumptions on the operational proﬁle of the system’s environment;
• ASSUMPTION A2: Assumptions on attributes of inputs to the machine learning function;
• ASSUMPTION A3: Assumptions on the performance potential of machine learning;
• STRATEGY S1: Argument over causes of functional insuﬃciencies in machine learning;
• SUBGOAL G2: The operating context is well deﬁned and reﬂected in training data;
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• SUBGOAL G3: The function is robust against distributional shift in the environment;
• SUBGOAL G4: The function exhibits a uniform behaviour over critical classes of situations;
• SUBGOAL G5: The function is robust against diferences between its training and execution platforms;
• SUBGOAL G6: The function is robust against changes in its system context.
ệẴẸ Ọ³¢ỵ¦¸°³ự �¢ỸỸª¯¨´
Following discussions4, the SASWG selected the “Faria Stack” as the basis for the computation-level
framework. The following paragraphs brieﬂy discuss each projection of the “Faria Stack”, taking into account
the other frameworks outlined in the preceding subsection. Within these discussions:
• For reasons of brevity, only the top-level of Google’s Machine Learning Rubric is considered.
• Due to their similarity to the Modiﬁed Software Safety Assurance Principles, the Ethical and Safety
principles are not explicitly considered.
• For simplicity, only the goals and subgoals are considered from Burton’s “Making the Case” Argument.
The discussions also include a “Not Addressed” pseudo-projection, which captures considerations that
do not readily relate to any of the projections. By checking the contents of this pseudo-projection, and
conﬁrming that it contains nothing signiﬁcant, conﬁdence can be gained that the adopted framework
covers all relevant topics.
ệẴẸẴ1 E¹Ỹ¦³ª¦¯¤¦
Consideration of the data used to develop the algorithm directly relates to Douthwaite and Kelly’s Data
viewpoint, and also to the Tests for Features and Data category from Google’s Machine Learning Rubric.
The way the data reﬂects the operating context directly relates to Subgoal G2 from Burton’s “Making the
Case” Argument.
ệẴẸẴẸ T¢´ự
Understanding the task should also include understanding the way it contributes to the wider system and,
also, any associated computation (or software) safety requirements. This consideration relates to Principle
One of the Modiﬁed Software Safety Assurance Principles.
Performance measurement against the intended task ought to include explicit measures against
requirements (including safety requirements). It also ought to consider whether the computation has
introduced any new hazards. These considerations relate to Principles Three and Four of the Modiﬁed
Software Safety Assurance Principles. They also relate to Goal G1 from Burton’s “Making the Case”
Argument.
More generally, performance management relates to the Tests for Model Development category from
Google’s Machine Learning Rubric.
4 SASWG 7, 17 April 2018, York.SC
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The properties of the operationally-ﬁelded computation relate to Douthwaite and Kelly’s Computational
viewpoint.
ệẴẸẴ3 ệ­¨°³ªµ©ỵ
The link between choice of algorithm and intended task mirrors the link between requirements (including
safety requirements) and detailed design. This relates to Principle Two-Primed of the Modiﬁed Software
Safety Assurance Principles.
Part of choosing a speciﬁc algorithm also includes choosing hyper-parameters (e.g., number of nodes
and layers in a neural network). This relates to Douthwaite and Kelly’s Model viewpoint. More general
algorithm-related choices relate to Douthwaite and Kelly’s Computational viewpoint.
ệẴẸẴ4 S°§µ¸¢³¦
The choice of software (for both development and operational use) is part of detailed design. This relates
to Principle Two-Primed of the Modiﬁed Software Safety Assurance Principles. It also relates to Douthwaite
and Kelly’s Technology and Implementation viewpoints, and also to the Tests for ML Infrastructure category
from Google’s Machine Learning Rubric.
ệẴẸẴ5 H¢³¥¸¢³¦
The choice of hardware (for both development and operational use) is part of detailed design. This relates
to Principle Two-Primed of the Modiﬁed Software Safety Assurance Principles, to Douthwaite and Kelly’s
Implementation viewpoint, and also to the Tests for ML Infrastructure category from Google’s Machine
Learning Rubric.
The possibility of diferent behaviour on development (training) and operational (execution) platforms
relates to Subgoal G5 from Burton’s “Making the Case” Argument.
ệẴẸẴ6 N°µ ệ¥¥³¦´´¦¥
The chosen computation-level framework does not readily address Principle Four plus One of the Modiﬁed
Software Safety Assurance Principles: “The conﬁdence established in addressing the software safety
principles shall be commensurate to the contribution of the software to system risk”. This is not a signiﬁcant
concern as this principle is a cross-cutting issue for all assurance, and thus not something that has to be
speciﬁcally addressed at the computation level.
Likewise, the framework does not readily address Principle Four plus Two: “Software required to produce
behaviour not predictable at design time should consider the consequence of behavioural adaptations
on its environment.”. This is not a signiﬁcant concern as adaptation is considered at the autonomy
architecture-level (Section 4).
From the perspective of Douthwaite and Kelly’s “Viewpoints” the chosen computation-level framework
does not readily address the Operational viewpoint. This is more readily addressed at the autonomy
architecture-level and the platform-level (Section 4 and Section 6, respectively).
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Similarly, the Monitoring Tests for ML category from Google’s Machine Learning Rubric are addressed at
other framework levels, as is Subgoal G3 from Burton’s “Making the Case” Argument.
Finally, the chosen computation-level framework does not readily address Subgoal G4 of Burton’s “Making
the Case” Argument: “The function exhibits a uniform behaviour over critical classes of situations”. It is
not immediately clear whether this, especially the “uniform behaviour” part, is a generic requirement that
should be satisﬁed by ¦·¦³º computation. If it is a requirement for a particular application then it should
be addressed by the Task projection (via the relationship to Principle One of the Modiﬁed Software Safety
Assurance Principles).
ệẴẸẴ7 ϖ¦­¢µª°¯´©ªỸ S¶ỵỵ¢³º
For ease of reference, the relationships outlined above are summarised in Table 9. Note that this
presentation is deliberately simple and top-level.
Table 9: Relationships between Computation-Level Frameworks
Considered
Sµ¢¤¬ L¦·¦­
M°¥ªﬁ¦¥ S°Ѝµ¸¢³¦
S¢Ѝ¦µº  ´´¶³¢¯¤¦
P³ª¯¤ªѧ­¦´
D°¶µѝ¸¢ªµ¦ ¢¯¥
﻿¦­­º’´
“Vª¦¸ѧ°ª¯µ´”
 °°ѐ­¦’´ M¢¤ѝª¯¦
L¦¢³¯ª¯ѐ ϖ¶£³ª¤
B¶³µ°¯’´ “M¢¬ª¯ѐ
µѝ¦  ¢´¦”
 ³ѐ¶®¦¯µ
Experience - Data
Tests for Features
and Data
Subgoal G2
Task
Principles One, Three
and Four
Computational
Tests for Model
Development
Goal G1
Algorithm Principle Two-Primed
Model and
Computational
- -
Software Principle Two-Primed
Technology and
Implementation
Tests for ML
Infrastructure
-
Hardware Principle Two-Primed Implementation
Tests for ML
Infrastructure
Subgoal G5
N°µ A¥¥³¦´´¦¥
P³ª¯¤ª±­¦ F°¶³ ±­¶´
O¯¦, P³ª¯¤ª±­¦ F°¶³
±­¶´ T¸°
O±¦³¢µª°¯¢­
M°¯ªµ°³ª¯¨ T¦´µ´ §°³
ML
S¶£¨°¢­ G4
Overall, the preceding analysis indicates that, based on the selected comparator frameworks, there are no
signiﬁcant omissions from the chosen computation-level framework.
ệẴ3 S°§µ¸¢³¦ ¢¯¥ �L Ị¦·¦­°Ỹỵ¦¯µ �¢ỸỸª¯¨´
Table 10 maps the framework’s projections to the activities involved in a generic software development
[87].
This mapping shows that the chosen computation-level framework is suﬃciently complete to address
typical software development activities.
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Table 10: Mapping Projections to Typical Software Development
E¹ѧ¦³ª¦¯¤¦ T¢´¬  ­ѐ°³ªµѝ® S°Ѝµ¸¢³¦ H¢³¥¸¢³¦
Plan Y
Requirements Y
Design Y Y Y
Implement Y Y Y Y Y
Test Y
Transition Y Y
To provide further conﬁdence, Table 11 maps the projects to the steps that are required to produce a
useful ML-based computation [84]. This mapping demonstrates the framework ﬁts well with development
in an ML context, with most development steps mapping to a single projection.
Table 11: Mapping Projections to Typical ML Development
E¹ѧ¦³ª¦¯¤¦ T¢´¬  ­ѐ°³ªµѝ® S°Ѝµ¸¢³¦ H¢³¥¸¢³¦
Frame the question Y
Collect data Y
Select features Y
Choose algorithm Y
Choose metrics Y
Conduct experiment Y Y
Interpret results Y
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ệỸỸ¦¯¥ª¹ B C°ỵỸ¶µ¢µª°¯-L¦·¦­ ổỨỰ¦¤µª·¦´: J¶´µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯
T©ª´ ¢±±¦¯¥ªѯ ±³°·ª¥¦´ ´°®¦ ¢¥¥ªµª°¯¢­ «¶´µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ §°³ µ©¦ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ °£«¦¤µª·¦´ ­ª´µ¦¥ ª¯ µ©¦ ®¢ª¯
£°¥º≤ T©ª´ ª´ ¢¤©ª¦·¦¥ £º ®¢±±ª¯¨ µ©°´¦ °£«¦¤µª·¦´ µ° ´¦±¢³¢µ¦­º ±¶£­ª´©¦¥ ®¢µ¦³ª¢­≈ ´±¦¤ªﬁ¤¢­­ºỀ
• A ´¶¨¨¦´µ¦¥ ­ª´µ °§ ³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦®¦¯µ´ §°³ ¢ ´µ¢¯¥¢³¥ µ° ´¶±±°³µ µ©¦ ¶´¦ °§ ǰǰ´ ª¯ ´¢§¦µº-¤³ªµª¤¢­ ¢±±­ª¤¢µª°¯´
{10}≤ T©ª´ ´°¶³¤¦ ¥¢µ¦´ §³°® 1⁴⁴Ẽ≤ C°¯´¦Ѩ¶¦¯µ­º≈ ªµ ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢ ´°¶¯¥ µ©¦°³¦µª¤¢­ £¢´ª´≈ ª¯¥¦±¦¯¥¦¯µ
§³°® ³¦¤¦¯µ µ³¦¯¥´≈ ¢¨¢ª¯´µ Ѯ©ª¤© ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ °£«¦¤µª·¦´ ¤¢¯ £¦ ¤°®±¢³¦¥≤ H°Ѯ¦·¦³≈ ªµ´
¤°¯´ª¥¦³¢µª°¯´ ¥° ¯°µ ¦¯¤°®±¢´´ µ©¦ ­¢µ¦´µ ³¦´¦¢³¤© ¥ª³¦¤µª°¯´≤ I¯ ¢¥¥ªµª°¯≈ Ѯ©ª­´µ ®¢¯º °§ ªµ´
³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦®¦¯µ´ ¢³¦ ¢±±­ª¤¢£­¦ µ° ¢ ¯¶®£¦³ °§ ồỒ ¢±±³°¢¤©¦´≈ µ©¦º ©¢·¦ £¦¦¯ ¥¦³ª·¦¥ ª¯ µ©¦ ´±¦¤ªﬁ¤
¤°¯µ¦ѯµ °§ ǰǰ´≤
• A¯ ¢¯¢­º´ª´ °§ ¨¢±´ ª¯ ¢ ¤¶³³¦¯µ ¢¶µ°®°µª·¦ ´µ¢¯¥¢³¥ Ѯªµ© ³¦¨¢³¥´ µ° µ©¦ ¶´¦ °§ ồỒ ¢±±³°¢¤©¦´
{72}≤ T©ª´ ´°¶³¤¦ ¥¢µ¦´ §³°® 2018≈ ´° ªµ ¦¯¤¢±´¶­¢µ¦´ ³¦¤¦¯µ ³¦´¦¢³¤©≤ H°Ѯ¦·¦³≈ µ©¦ ¤©°´¦¯
´µ¢¯¥¢³¥≈ ´±¦¤ªﬁ¤¢­­º I¯µ¦³¯¢µª°¯¢­ O³ganization for Standardization (ISO) 26262 [47] is a functional
safety standard; that is, it only addresses unsafe behaviours caused by system malfunctions. For ML
approaches, there is also a need to consider the Safety Of The Intended Function (SOTIF).
For the reasons outlined above, the computation-level objectives derived by the SASWG would not be
expected to directly match the contents of either reference. Nevertheless, the objectives would be
expected to cover all relevant issues raised in the reference material.
It is emphasised that the mappings established below are top-level and approximate. This is considered
appropriate as the mappings are intended to justify (or, if necessary, reﬁne) the computation-level
objectives. More speciﬁcally, the mappings discussed in this appendix were not a key part of the process
by which the computation-level objectives were derived.
BẴ1 ϖ¦Ѩ¶ª³¦ỵ¦¯µ´ §°³ ¢ NN Sµ¢¯¥¢³¥
Table 12 lists the requirements noted in [10]. Note that these requirements use the term Artiﬁcial Neural
Network (ANN), rather than NN, which is preferred in the current document. Where appropriate, relevant
computation-level objectives are highlighted. If no objectives are relevant, justiﬁcation for this is provided.
Table 12: Computation-Level Objectives Compared against
Requirements for a NN Standard
Sµ¢¯¥¢³¥ ϖ¦²¶ª³¦®¦¯µ ϖ¦­¦·¢¯µ O£«¦¤µª·¦´
Specify how the high-level goals of, or requirements for, the ANN module
are to be obtained
COM2-1, COM2-2
Specify what should be done to ensure that the training data adequately
represent the attainment of the high-level goals
COM1-3
Specify what type of networks can be used, and how each type is to be
unambiguously designated
COM3-1
Specify how the input-output characteristics are to be unambiguously
designated
COM1-1, COM1-2
Specify how the developer must describe the way in which the
performance function for the network operates during training
COM2-3
SC
SC
-1
53
A
(J
an
20
20
)
65
Ỉ
C
O
ồ
PU
TA
TI
O
ǰ
-Ồ
EỜ
EỒ
O
Ỉ
JE
C
TI
ỜE
SỀ
JU
ST
IF
IC
AT
IO
ǰ
Sµ¢¯¥¢³¥ ϖ¦²¶ª³¦®¦¯µ ϖ¦­¦·¢¯µ O£«¦¤µª·¦´
S±¦¤ª§º Ѯ©¢µ ¥¦µ¢ª­´ µ©¦ Aǰǰ ¥¦·¦­°±¦³ ®¶´µ ±³°·ª¥¦ ³¦¨¢³¥ª¯¨ µ©¦ Ѯ¢º ª¯
Ѯ©ª¤© µ©¦ Aǰǰ ®°¥¶­¦ ª¯µ¦³§¢¤¦´ Ѯªµ© µ©¦ ³¦´µ °§ µ©¦ ´º´µ¦®
O¶µ °§ ´¤°±¦: A¶µ°¯°®º ¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦-­¦·¦­
S±¦¤ª§º µ©¦ ¦ѯµ¦¯µ °§ ¬¯°Ѯ­¦¥¨¦≈ ³¦­¢µª¯¨ µ° ¯¦¶³¢­ ¯¦µѮ°³¬´≈ ³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦¥ °§
®¢¯¢¨¦®¦¯µ ¢¯¥ ¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ µ¦¢® ±¦³´°¯¯¦­
O¶µ °§ ´¤°±¦: Sµ¢ﬃ¯¨
S±¦¤ª§º Ѯ©¢µ ¥¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ ®°¥¦­ ª´ µ° £¦ ¶´¦¥ §°³ µ©¦ Aǰǰ ®°¥¶­¦ COồ5-1
S±¦¤ª§º ¢¯º °¶µ±¶µ´ Ѯ©ª¤© µ©¦ Aǰǰ ®°¥¶­¦ ª´ ³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦¥ µ° ±³°¥¶¤¦ ª¯
¢¥¥ªµª°¯ µ° ªµ´ ±³ª®¢³º §¶¯¤µª°¯¢­ °¶µ±¶µ
COồ2-1
S±¦¤ª§º Ѯ©¦µ©¦³ §°³®¢­ ®¦µ©°¥´ °³ ³ª¨°³°¶´ ¢³¨¶®¦¯µ ¢³¦ µ° £¦ ¶´¦¥ µ°
¥¦·¦­°± µ©¦ ´°§µѮ¢³¦ Ѯ©ª¤© ª®±­¦®¦¯µ´ µ©¦ ¯¦¶³¢­ ¯¦µѮ°³¬
COồ4-1≈ COồ4-2
S±¦¤ª§º Ѯ©¢µ ®¦µ©°¥´ ¢³¦ µ° £¦ ¶´¦¥ §°³ Ѩ¶¢­ªµº ¢´´¶³¢¯¤¦ ª¯ µ©¦ µ³¢ª¯¦¥
¯¦µѮ°³¬
COồ1-1≈ COồ4-1≈ COồ5-1
S±¦¤ª§º µ©¢µ µ©¦ Ờ¦³ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯ ¢¯¥ Ờ¢­ª¥¢µª°¯ (V&V) team should use
generalisation tests on the trained network to verify that it has learned the
principles implicit in the training data
COM2-3, COM2-6, COM2-7
Specify that the V&V team should validate a Safety-Critical Artiﬁcial Neural
Network (SCANN) by investigating the behaviour of the SCANN over the
whole of the input space
COM2-5
Specify how the developers should check that the initial safety
assessments made for the system are not afected by the ANN module
and how failures in other modules would afect the system, given the
intended operation of the ANN
O¶µ °§ ´¤°±¦: P­¢µ§°³®-­¦·¦­
Specify that developers establish possible failure modes of the ANN
module itself and the consequences
O¶µ °§ ´¤°±¦: A¶µ°¯°®º ¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦-­¦·¦­
−´¶±±°³µ¦¥ £º  OM1-4,  OM2-4,
 OM3-2,  OM5-2,  OM5-2√
Specify how HAZOP is to proceed, regarding the operation of network O¶µ °§ ´¤°±¦: P­¢µ§°³®-­¦·¦­
Specify the brief and form of the HAZOP committee, as well as guide words
for their use
O¶µ °§ ´¤°±¦: P­¢µ§°³®-­¦·¦­
Specify that a certiﬁcation standard should insist that the developers build
the network is such a way that the necessary data are available so that it is
possible to do Failure Mode and Efects Analysis (FMEA) and HAZOP
COM3-3, COM3-4
It is apparent that all relevant requirements established by [10] are covered by one or more of the
computational objectives derived by the SASWG. This provides further conﬁdence in the identiﬁed
computation-level objectives.
BẴẸ �L-ϖ¦­¢µ¦¥ G¢Ỹ´ ª¯ ¢¯ ệ¶µ°ỵ°µª·¦ Sµ¢¯¥¢³¥
The analysis of ISO 26262 identiﬁed a number of impacted or new Process Requirements (PRs). The
associated phase and description are reproduced (from [72]) in Table 13. Relevant computation-level
objectives are then highlighted; if there are no such objectives then justiﬁcation is provided.
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T¢£­¦ 13Ề C°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-Ồ¦·¦­ O£«¦¤µª·¦´ C°®±¢³¦¥ ¢¨¢ª¯´µ I®±¢¤µ¦¥ °³
ǰ¦Ѯ PRs
Pѝ¢´¦ D¦´¤³ªѧµª°¯ ϖ¦­¦·¢¯µ O£«¦¤µª·¦´
(5) Initiation Best practices: coding guidelines COM3-2, COM4-1
(5) Initiation ML decision gate O¶µ °§ ´¤°±¦: A¶µ°¯°®º ¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦-­¦·¦­
(6) Software safety
requirements
Requirements speciﬁcation COM1-3, COM2-1, COM2-2
(6) Software safety
requirements
Requirements veriﬁcation COM2-3, COM2-5
(7) Architectural design Fault tolerance O¶µ °§ ´¤°±¦: A¶µ°¯°®º ¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦-­¦·¦­
(8) Software unit design,
implementation
Best practices: notations COM3-2, COM4-1
(8) Software unit design,
implementation
Best practices: design principles COM3-2
(8) Software unit design,
implementation
Best practices: data set collection and
veriﬁcation
COM1-1, COM1-2
(8) Software unit design,
implementation
Best practices: model selection COM3-1
(8) Software unit design,
implementation
Best practices: feature selection COM1-3
(8) Software unit design,
implementation
Best practices: training COM3-2, COM4-1, COM5-1
(8) Software unit design,
implementation
Best practices: data set splitting O¶µ °§ ´¤°±¦: A±±³°¢¤©-´±¦¤ªﬁ¤
(8) Software unit design,
implementation
Best practices: validation COM2-3, COM3-2
(8) Software unit design,
implementation
Best practices: testing COM2-3, COM2-7, COM4-2, COM5-2
(8) Software unit design,
implementation
Best practices: testing structural coverage COM2-5
(8) Software unit design,
implementation
Best practices: test vs. operating
environment
COM1-4, COM2-6, COM4-1
(8) Software unit design,
implementation
Best practices: test result explanation COM3-3, COM3-4
(8) Software unit design,
implementation
Best practices: veriﬁcation
COM2-3, COM2-4, COM2-5, COM2-6,
COM3-4
It is apparent that all impacted or new PRs established by [72] are covered by one or more of the
computational objectives derived by the SASWG, or are intentionally outside the scope of this framework.
This, again, provides further conﬁdence in the computation-level objectives.
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ệỸỸ¦¯¥ª¹ C Ỗ­¢µ§°³ỵ-L¦·¦­ Ọ³¢ỵ¦¸°³ự: J¶´µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯
T©ª´ ¢±±¦¯¥ªѯ ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢ £³ª¦§≈ °¶µ­ª¯¦ ´¶³·¦º °§ ±­¢µ§°³®-­¦·¦­ §³¢®¦Ѯ°³¬´ µ©¢µ ¤°¶­¥ £¦ ¶´¦¥ µ° ´µ³¶¤µ¶³¦
µ©ª¯¬ª¯¨ ¢£°¶µ µ©¦ ´¢§¦µº (or assurance) of autonomous systems. For ease of reference, Table 14 lists the
frameworks that are considered.
Table 14: Platform-Level Frameworks Considered
S¦¤µª°¯ F³¢®¦¸°³¬
C.1.1 Waymo’s System Safety Report
C.1.2 The Twelve Safety Elements from the NHTSA
C.1.3 HORIBA MIRA Framework
C.1.4 Uber Advanced Technologies Group
C.1.5 AAIP BOK
C.1.6 AI Safety Landscape Categories
Each platform-level framework is brieﬂy summarised (subsection C.1) and a preferred framework is
developed. A top-level mapping between frameworks is completed, to conﬁrm that the chosen framework
incorporates all relevant parts of the other platform-level frameworks (subsection C.2).
CẴ1 Ỗ­¢µ§°³ỵ-L¦·¦­ Ọ³¢ỵ¦¸°³ự´
CẴ1Ẵ1 Ὅ¢ºỵ°’´ Sº´µ¦ỵ S¢§¦µº ϖ¦Ỹ°³µ
This platform-level framework comes from Waymo’s System Safety Report5. This report establishes ﬁve
distinct safety areas:
• Behavioural safety, which is about the behaviour of the vehicle on the road, including the decisions it
makes. This is the most novel of the safety areas.
• Functional safety, which considers how the system operates in the presence of faults and failures.
This appears to be standard system safety, including the use of redundant sub-systems, for example.
• Crash safety, which is about protecting people in the event of a crash. This appears to be normal
automotive crash safety.
• Operational safety, which covers the interaction between Waymo vehicles and their passengers. This
seems to be mainly focused on the user interface, which includes helping the passenger understand
what the vehicle is perceiving and what it is doing on the road.
• Non-collision safety, which considers how the vehicle could harm those it interacts with in non-crash
situations (including passengers, ﬁrst responders and bystanders).
5 https://storage.googleapis.com/sdc-prod/v1/safety-report/waymo-safety-report-2017-10.pdf.
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CẴ1ẴẸ T©¦ T¸¦­·¦ S¢§¦µº E­¦ỵ¦¯µ´ §³°ỵ µ©¦ NHTSệ
This platform-level framework comes from “Automated Driving Systems 2.0: A Vision for Safety”, published
by the US National Highway Traﬃc Safety Administration (NHTSA)6. This introduces twelve “safety elements”:
1. System Safety;
2. Operational Design Domain;
3. Object and Event Detection and Response;
4. Fallback (Minimum Risk Condition);
5. Validation Methods;
6. Human Machine Interface;
7. Vehicle Cybersecurity;
8. Crashworthiness;
9. Post-Crash Automated Driving System (ADS) Behaviour;
10. Data Recording;
11. Consumer Education and Training;
12. Federal, State and Local Laws.
CẴ1Ẵ3 HổϖIBệ �Iϖệ Ọ³¢ỵ¦¸°³ự
This platform-level framework is described in an HORIBA MIRA presentation [12]. The presentation
describes an Autonomous Driver (AD); the following bullets summarise the high-level, generic features
of the framework.
• STRATEGY: Argument split according to functionality that is intended, unintended and due to
malicious intent.
• CLAIM: Intended Behaviour - The absence of unreasonable risk associated with the intended
behaviour of the [autonomous system] has been achieved.
– STRATEGY: Argument structured by the rationale for, and satisfaction of, speciﬁed requirements
(REQs).
– CLAIM: Requirements Rationale - Meeting the REQs yields the absence of unreasonable risk
associated with the intended behaviour of the [autonomous system].
– CLAIM: Requirements Satisfaction - The [autonomous system] behaves according to the REQs.
(In this area, the framework also introduces: virtual testing; physical testing; and testing diversity
and number.)
• CLAIM: Malfunctioning Behaviour - The absence of unreasonable risk associated with malfunctioning
behaviour of the [autonomous system] has been achieved.
• CLAIM: Malicious Intent - The absence of unreasonable risk associated with malicious attack of the
[autonomous system] has been achieved.
6 https://www.nhtsa.gov/manufacturers/automated-vehicles-manufacturers.70 SC
SC
-1
53
A
(J
an
20
20
)
C
PỒ
AT
FO
R
M
-L
EV
EL
FR
A
M
EW
O
R
K:
JU
ST
IF
IC
AT
IO
N
CẴ1Ẵ4 UỨ¦³ ệ¥·¢¯¤¦¥ T¦¤©¯°­°¨ª¦´ G³°¶Ỹ
This platform-level framework is the safety case framework developed by Uber Advanced Technologies
Group7. This framework is intended for use with self-driving vehicles, especially passenger-carrying cars
on public roads. This is a narrower scope than the current document, which addresses all autonomous
systems. For reasons of brevity only the ﬁve top-level goals associated with this framework are listed below:
• G1 - Proﬁcient: The Self-Driving Vehicle is acceptably safe during nominal operation.
• G2 - Fail-Safe: The Self-Driving Vehicle is acceptably safe in presence of faults and failures.
• G3 - Continuously Improving: Any anomaly that could afect the safety of the Self-Driving Vehicle is
identiﬁed, evaluated, and resolved with appropriate corrective and preventative actions.
• G4 - Resilient: The Self-Driving Vehicle is acceptably safe in case of reasonably foreseeable misuse
and unavoidable events.
• G5 - Trustworthy: The Self-Driving Enterprise is trustworthy.
CẴ1Ẵ5 ệệIỖ Bổ﻿
This platform-level framework is part of the structure of the AAIP BOK [41]. This has a vast scope: it
aims to be cross-domain, cross-technology and cross-application, covering all aspects of assurance and
regulation of Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS). The current document has similar aims with regards
to breadth of domains, technologies and applications: however, regulation-speciﬁcs are not a focus. For
reasons of brevity only the top-level items are listed below:
• Deﬁning required behaviour.
• Implementation of an RAS to provide the required behaviour.
• Understanding and controlling deviations from required behaviour.
• Gaining approval for operation of RAS.
Note that a more detailed, objective-level comparison between this document and the AAIP BOK is
provided in Appendix D.
CẴ1Ẵ6 ệI S¢§¦µº L¢¯¥´¤¢Ỹ¦ C¢µ¦¨°³ª¦´
This platform-level framework is based on work associated with the AI Safety 2019 conference. This
presents a series of seven categories8, one of which is underpinning and one of which is overarching.
These are illustrated in Table 15.
7 https://uberatg.com/safetycase/.
8 https://www.ai-safety.org/landscape-categories.SC
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Table 15: AI Safety Landscape Categories
Safety-related Ethics, Security and Privacy
Speciﬁcation and
Modelling
Veriﬁcation and
Validation
Runtime
Monitoring and
Enforcement
Human-Machine
Interaction
Process
Assurance and
Certiﬁcation
AI Safety Foundations
Most of the categories are self-explanatory; the exception is AI Safety Foundations. This includes concepts
such as uncertainty and generality, as well as characteristics like levels of autonomy and safety criticality.
More generally, this category collects concerns in AI safety that span multiple other categories.
CẴ1Ẵ7 C©°ª¤¦ °§ Ọ³¢ỵ¦¸°³ự
Whilst they provide a useful structure against which a chosen framework can be benchmarked, none of
the preceding frameworks are suitable for use by the SASWG: they are either too focused on a speciﬁc
type of platform, often a self-driving car, whereas the SASWG’s work aims to cover all types of autonomous
system; or they adopt a balanced view of system safety, whereas the SASWG’s work deliberately targets
aspects related to autonomy.
Consequently, having been informed by the frameworks listed above (and related items) a four-projection
framework has been developed. These projections are described detail in Section 6. For ease of reference,
a summary is provided below:
• B¦©¢·ª°¶³¢­ S±¦¤ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯, which is about what the platform is required to do (and not do).
• I¯µ¦³¢¤µª¯¨ Iµ¦®´, which is about things intended or required to interact with the platform, not directly
owned by the platform developer or operator.
• P¦°±­¦, which is about how the platform interacts with people.
• ị¯·ª³°¯®¦¯µ, which is about things in the operational domain outside the control of the platform
developer or operator.
CẴẸ Ọ³¢ỵ¦¸°³ự �¢ỸỸª¯¨´
The following paragraphs discuss the relationship between the projections in the adopted framework and
the aspects of the other frameworks outlined in the preceding subsection. Given the complexity of the
items in the various frameworks, only top-level relationships are described.
The discussions also include a “Not Addressed” pseudo-projection, which captures considerations that do
not readily relate to any of the projections in the adopted framework. By checking the contents of this
pseudo-projection, and conﬁrming that it contains nothing signiﬁcant (from the perspective of the current
document), conﬁdence can be gained that the adopted framework covers all relevant topics.
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CẴẸẴ1 B¦©¢·ª°¶³¢­ SỸ¦¤ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯
This projection relates to the Behavioural Safety, Functional Safety and Crash Safety elements fromWaymo’s
System Safety Report.
It also relates to ﬁve of the NHTSA Safety Elements, speciﬁcally: Object and Event Detection and Response;
Fallback (Minimum Risk Condition); Crashworthiness; Post Crash Automated Driving System Behaviour; and
Federal, State and Local Laws.
Two of the top-level elements from the HORIBA MIRA framework are also relevant, speciﬁcally: Intended
Behavior and Malfunctioning Behaviour.
The majority of the Uber Advanced Technologies Group framework is relevant to this projection. In
particular, Proﬁcient; Fail-Safe; Continuously Improving; and Resilient are all relevant.
Likewise, the majority of the top-level items from the AAIP BOK are relevant, speciﬁcally: Deﬁning Required
Behaviour; Implementing Required Behaviour; and Understanding and Controlling Deviations.
Finally, two of the AI Safety Landscape Categories are relevant: Speciﬁcation and Modelling; and Veriﬁcation
and Validation.
CẴẸẴẸ I¯µ¦³¢¤µª¯¨ Iµ¦ỵ´
No elements from any of the frameworks are directly relevant to this projection. This is because none of
the frameworks explicitly highlight the of-platform elements of the wider system. Instead, considerations
of this type are implicitly included within discussions relating to the platform. However, as indicated by the
objectives in Section 7, interacting items can have signiﬁcant safety implications. Consequently, they are
deemed worthy of separate identiﬁcation.
CẴẸẴ3 Ỗ¦°Ỹ­¦
Two elements from Waymo’s System Safety Report are relevant: Operational Safety; and Non-Collision
Safety.
There are three NHTSA Safety Elements that are relevant: HumanMachine Interface; Vehicle Cybersecurity;
and Consumer Education and Training.
A single top-level element from the HORIBA MIRA framework is relevant, namely, Malicious Intent.
None of the top-level items in the Uber Advanced Technologies Group framework are relevant to this
projection.
Likewise, none of the AAIP BOK top-level items are relevant either.
Two of the AI Safety Landscape Categories are relevant, speciﬁcally: Safety-related Ethics, Security and
Privacy; and Human-Machine Interface.
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CẴẸẴ4 E¯·ª³°¯ỵ¦¯µ
The Operational Design Domain safety element from the NHTSA directly maps to this projection, as does
the Runtime Monitoring and Enforcement AI Safety Landscape category.
None of the other frameworks have items that directly map to this projection. This does not mean that
these frameworks ignore the environment; it just means that these types of consideration appear at a
lower-level, having been brigaded in a diferent fashion to the framework adopted by the SASWG.
CẴẸẴ5 N°µ ệ¥¥³¦´´¦¥
All elements from Waymo’s System Safety Report are directly addressed by the collection of projections
used in the framework adopted by the SASWG.
There are three NHTSA Safety Elements that are not directly addressed: System Safety; Validation Methods;
Data Recording. The ﬁrst of these is addressed by all three SASWG frameworks (i.e., by the entirety of the
current document); the other two are addressed by the Computation-Level framework (Section 2).
All elements from the HORIBA MIRA framework are directly addressed.
There is a single top-level element from the Uber Advanced Technologies Group framework that is not
directly addressed: Trustworthy. This element relates to the trustworthiness of the self-driving enterprise,
which is a much wider consideration than the safety assurance objectives of the current document.
There is also a single top-level element from the AAIP BOK that is not directly addressed: Gaining Approval.
This relates to liaison with certiﬁcation authorities, which is outside the scope of the current document.
There are two AI Safety Landscape Categories that are not directly addressed, speciﬁcally: Process
Assurance and Certiﬁcation; and AI Safety Foundations. The former of these is outside the scope of the
current document; the latter is a broad category that spans much of the content of the current document.
CẴẸẴ6 ϖ¦­¢µª°¯´©ªỸ S¶ỵỵ¢³º
For ease of reference, the relationships outlined above are summarised in Table 16. Note that this
presentation is deliberately simple and top-level.
Table 16: Relationships between Platform-Level Frameworks Considered
F³¢®¦¸°³¬
B¦ѝ¢·ª°¶³¢­
Sѧ¦¤ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯
I¯µ¦³¢¤µª¯ѐ
Iµ¦®´
P¦°ѧ­¦ E¯·ª³°¯®¦¯µ Not Addressed
Waymo’s System
Safety Report
Behavioural
Safety,
Functional
Safety, Crash
Safety
-
Operational
Safety,
Non-Collision
Safety
- -
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F³¢®¦¸°³¬
B¦ѝ¢·ª°¶³¢­
Sѧ¦¤ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯
I¯µ¦³¢¤µª¯ѐ
Iµ¦®´
P¦°ѧ­¦ E¯·ª³°¯®¦¯µ Not Addressed
NHTSA Safety
Elements
Object and Event
Detection and
Response,
Fallback,
Crashworthiness,
Post Crash
Automated
Driving System
Behaviour,
Federal State
and Local Laws
-
Human Machine
Interface, Vehicle
Cybersecurity,
and Consumer
Education and
Training
Operational
Design Domain
Sº´µ¦® S¢§¦µº,
−V¢­ª¥¢µª°¯
M¦µ©°¥´, D¢µ¢
R¦¤°³¥ª¯¨ ¢³¦
¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-
­¦·¦­√
HORIBA MIRA
Intended
Behaviour,
Malfunctioning
Behaviour
- Malicious Intent - -
Uber Advanced
Technologies
Group
Proﬁcient,
Fail-Safe,
Continuously
Improving,
Resilient
- - - T³¶´µ¸°³µ©º
AAIP BOK
Deﬁning
Required
Behaviour,
Implementing
Required
Behaviour,
Understanding
and Controlling
Deviations
- - - G¢ª¯ª¯¨ A±±³°·¢­
AI Safety
Landscape
Categories
Speciﬁcation and
Modelling,
Veriﬁcation and
Validation
-
Safety-related
Ethics Security
and Privacy,
Human-Machine
Interface.
-
P³°¤¦´´ A´´¶³¢¯¤¦
¢¯¥  ¦³µªﬁ¤¢µª°¯,
AI S¢§¦µº
F°¶¯¥¢µª°¯´
Overall, the preceding analysis indicates that, based on the selected comparator frameworks, there are no
signiﬁcant omissions from the chosen platform-level framework.
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ệỸỸ¦¯¥ª¹ Ị C°ỵỸ¢³ª´°¯ ¸ªµ© ệệIỖ B°¥º °§ ﻿¯°¸­¦¥¨¦
T©ª´ ¢±±¦¯¥ªѯ ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢ ©ª¨©-­¦·¦­ ¤°®±¢³ª´°¯ £¦µѮ¦¦¯ µ©¦ °£«¦¤µª·¦´ ¦´µ¢£­ª´©¦¥ ª¯ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ¢¯¥
µ©¦ A´´¶³ª¯¨ A¶µ°¯°®º I¯µ¦³¯¢µª°¯¢­ P³°¨³¢®®¦ (AAIP) Body Of Knowledge (BOK) [41] structure.
To simplify presentation, each main section of the BOK argument structure is considered separately in the
following subsections, with relevant objectives being highlighted. Brief explanations are provided for cases
where there are no related objectives, for example, because of a diference in scope between the BOK and
this document. For example, the BOK is concerned with an argument that covers the entire system (or
platform); conversely, this document is intentionally focussed on aspects related to autonomy.
Note that the comparison reported in this appendix is deliberately high-level, with the aim of identifying
whether there are any notable omissions from the collection of objectives discussed in this document. In
particular, matching an objective to a BOK element does not necessarily mean that satisfying the objective
will provide suﬃcient evidence to fully address the BOK element.
ỊẴ1 Ị¦ﬁ¯ª¯¨ ϖ¦Ѩ¶ª³¦¥ B¦©¢·ª°¶³
Table 17 shows relevant objectives for BOK elements associated with the “deﬁning required behaviour”
section of the BOK argument structure.
Table 17: Objectives Comparison: Deﬁning Required Behaviour
BO﻿ E­¦®¦¯µ ϖ¦­¦·¢¯µ O£«¦¤µª·¦
1.1 Identifying hazards PLT1-2, PLT1-4, PLT2-2
1.1.1 Deﬁning system scope PLT1-1, PLT1-2
1.1.2 Deﬁning the operating environment PLT1-2, PLT2-1, PLT3-2, PLT4-1
1.1.3 Deﬁning operating scenarios PLT1-2, PLT2-1, PLT3-2, PLT4-1
1.2 Identifying hazardous system behaviour PLT1-6, PLT2-3, PLT4-2
1.2.1 Considering human/ machine interactions PLT3-1, PLT3-2, PLT3-3
1.3 Deﬁning safety requirements PLT1-2, PLT1-3, PLT2-2
1.2.1 Validation of safety requirements PLT1-5
1.4 Impact of security on safety PLT1-4, PLT1-6, PLT3-4
This table prompts several observations. Firstly, the related objectives all come from the platform-level
framework: since this framework is primarily concerned with requirements, this is reassuring. Secondly,
most of the BOK elements have multiple related objectives: this is a consequence of the diferent structural
approaches that have been used; this also emphasises the point that, whilst they were a useful aid when
deriving objectives, the projections (and frameworks) need not be slavishly followed. Thirdly, all of the
platform-level objectives appear at least once in the table. Fourthly, considering a more detailed point, the
BOK diferentiates between the operating environment (1.1.2) and operating scenarios (1.1.3); conversely,
this document distinguishes between the platform (i.e., behavioural speciﬁcation), interacting items and
the (wider) environment.
More generally, this discussion indicates that the objectives listed in this document provide an appropriate
level of coverage of the “deﬁning required behaviour” section of the BOK argument structure. ThisSC
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observation provides some conﬁdence in these objectives.
ỊẴẸ IỵỸ­¦ỵ¦¯µ¢µª°¯ µ° Ỗ³°·ª¥¦ µ©¦ ϖ¦Ѩ¶ª³¦¥ B¦©¢·ª°¶³
Table 18 shows relevant objectives for BOK elements associated with the “implementation to provide the
required behaviour” section of the BOK argument structure.
Table 18: Objectives Comparison: Implementation to Provide the
Required Behaviour
BO﻿ E­¦®¦¯µ ϖ¦­¦·¢¯µ O£«¦¤µª·¦
2.1 System-level veriﬁcation PLT1-5
2.2 Implementation of SUDA elements
A­­ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ ¢¯¥ ¢¶µ°¯°®º
¢³¤©ªµ¦¤µ¶³¦-­¦·¦­ °£«¦¤µª·¦´
2.2.1 Deﬁning requirements for SUDA elements COM1-3, COM2-1, COM2-2
2.2.1.1 Validation of requirements for SUDA elements COM2-1, COM2-2
2.2.2 Deﬁning requirements on components COM1-3, COM2-1, COM2-2
2.2.2.1 Validation of requirements on components COM2-1, COM2-2
2.2.3 Controlling interactions between components PLT1-3, ARC1-1, ARC1-5
2.2.4 Veriﬁcation of requirements for SUDA elements PLT1-5, ARC1-5
2.3 Implementing requirements using ML A­­ ¤°®±¶µ¢µª°¯-­¦·¦­ °£«¦¤µª·¦´
2.3.1 Suﬃciency of training data COM1-1, COM1-2, COM1-3
2.3.2 Efective learning
COM2-3, COM2-4, COM2-5, COM3-1,
COM3-2
2.3.3 Veriﬁcation of the learned model COM2-5, COM2-6, COM2-7, COM3-3
2.4 Controlling interactions with other systems PLT2-1, PLT2-2, PLT2-3, PLT4-1
2.5 Controlling interactions at the system-level PLT1-1, PLT1-3
2.6 Handling change during operation ARC2-2, ARC3-1, ARC3-2, PLT2-3
2.6.1 Monitoring RAS operation
PLT1-6, ARC1-1, ARC1-2, ARC1-3,
ARC1-4
2.7 Using simulation COM2-6, ARC3-1, PLT1-5
2.8 Explainability COM3-3, ARC2-1, PLT3-2
Consideration of this table highlights a number of points. For example, the BOK breaks the system
down into SUDA elements and further down into components, whereas this document focuses on
autonomy-enabling technologies that may be used within, or to deliver, elements and components. This
means the AAIP provides a more balanced, system-wide perspective; conversely, by design, this document
focuses on aspects related to autonomy.
It is also apparent that the BOK explicitly highlights simulation (BOK Element 2.7). Given the importance of
this topic, this explicit highlighting is advantageous. Within the current document, simulation is considered
at each framework level. Whilst this potentially dilutes the importance of the topic, it does allow speciﬁc
aspects to be addressed in greater detail: for example, considerations associated with platform-level78 SC
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simulation are somewhat diferent to those associated with computation-level activities.
Although mappings can be, and have been, made, this document’s consideration of issues related ﬂ¦¦µ´ of
autonomous systems (e.g., Objective PLT2-3) is not readily apparent in the BOK.
Overall, the preceding discussions do not suggest there are any signiﬁcant omissions in the objectives listed
in this document from the perspective of the “implementation to provide the required behaviour” section
of the BOK.
ỊẴ3 U¯¥¦³´µ¢¯¥ª¯¨ ¢¯¥ C°¯µ³°­­ª¯¨ Ị¦·ª¢µª°¯´ §³°ỵ ϖ¦Ѩ¶ª³¦¥
B¦©¢·ª°¶³
Table 19 shows relevant objectives for BOK elements associated with the “understanding and controlling
deviations from required behaviour” section of the BOK argument structure.
Table 19: Objectives Comparison: Understanding and Controlling
Deviations from Required Behaviour
BO﻿ E­¦®¦¯µ ϖ¦­¦·¢¯µ O£«¦¤µª·¦
3.1 Identiﬁcation of potential deviation from required behaviour
ARC1-1, ARC1-2, ARC1-3, ARC1-4,
ARC1-5, PLT1-4, PLT3-2, PLT3-4
3.1.1 Identifying ‘Sensing’ deviations
3.1.2 Identifying ‘Understanding’ deviations
3.1.3 Identifying ‘Deciding’ deviations
3.1.4 Identifying ‘Acting’ deviations
3.1.5 Identifying infrastructure deviations
3.1.6 Identifying ML deviations
3.1.7 Identifying interaction deviations
3.1.8 Identifying human / machine interaction deviations
3.2 Mitigating potential deviations PLT1-4
3.2.1 Failure mitigation ARC1-3
3.2.2 Managing assurance deﬁcits O¶µ °§ ´¤°±¦
This table clearly illustrates the diferent philosophies adopted by the BOK and this document. As noted
earlier, the former adopts a balanced, system-wide approach that addresses all aspects of safety; it also
separately highlights each of the SUDA elements. Conversely, this document is deliberately focused on
autonomy-related items and is largely agnostic of where these are used within a system (or platform)
architecture.
The table also shows the BOK’s explicit focus on assurance, something that is more implicit within the
current document. In particular, the lack of objectives that directly relate to the management of assurance
deﬁcits (BOK Element 3.2.2) is not considered to be a signiﬁcant omission. This should occur naturally
through appropriate consideration of the various objectives in this document.
More generally, there do not appear to be any signiﬁcant omissions in the objectives listed in this document
from the perspective of the “understanding and controlling deviations from required behaviour” section ofSC
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the BOK.
ỊẴ4 G¢ª¯ª¯¨ ệỸỸ³°·¢­ §°³ ổỸ¦³¢µª°¯
Table 20 shows relevant objectives for BOK elements associated with the “gaining approval for operation”
section of the BOK argument structure.
Table 20: Objectives Comparison: Gaining Approval for Operation
BO﻿ E­¦®¦¯µ ϖ¦­¦·¢¯µ O£«¦¤µª·¦
4.1 Conforming to rules and regulations
O¶µ °§ ´¤°±¦4.1.1 Identifying applicable rules and regulations
4.1.2 Understanding the requirements rules and regulations
4.2 Risk acceptance
O¶µ °§ ´¤°±¦4.2.1 Evaluating risks and beneﬁts of RAS operation
4.2.2 Consideration of ethical issues
4.3 Provision of suﬃcient conﬁdence in the required behaviour COM2-5, PLT1-2, PLT1-5
4.4 Provision for investigation of incidents and accidents COM3-4, ARC2-3
This table illustrates the diferent scopes of the BOK and the current document. In particular, the BOK
includes laws and regulations, which are intentionally out of scope for this document, as they are expected
to be addressed by standard system engineering processes. The BOK also explicitly considers ethics and
risks of deployment. The former, whilst important, is out of scope for this document. The latter is not
identiﬁed as a separate item in this document, but satisfying the associated objectives should provide a
considerable body of evidence to inform risk evaluations.
Given these considerations, and taking into account the intended scope of this document, this table does
not suggest any signiﬁcant omissions in this document’s objectives from the perspective of the “gaining
approval for operation” section of the BOK.
ỊẴ5 N°¯-ϖ¦­¢µ¦¥ ổỨỰ¦¤µª·¦´
Collectively, the preceding four tables include all but four of the objectives listed in this document.
Collectively, these four objectives make up the software and hardware projections, both of which relate to
the computation-level. These considerations were motivated by the autonomy-focused, projection-based
way that objectives were derived. In contrast, this low-level, cross-cutting concern does not readily appear
from the approach adopted within the BOK. Despite this, the objectives remain important.
The SASWG view the diferent approaches adopted by the BOK and this document as strengths rather
than weaknesses. Taking diferent approaches to largely the same question (accepting there is some
diference in the respective scopes) helps ensure nothing is overlooked. To that end, the top-level
mappings established in this appendix provide some conﬁdence that the collection of objectives listed
in this document are appropriate to their intended use.
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ệỸỸ¦¯¥ª¹ E C°ỵỸ¢³ª´°¯ ¸ªµ© UL4600
T©ª´ ¢±±¦¯¥ªѯ ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢ ©ª¨©-­¦·¦­ ¤°®±¢³ª´°¯ £¦µѮ¦¦¯ µ©¦ °£«¦¤µª·¦´ ¦´µ¢£­ª´©¦¥ ª¯ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ
¢¯¥ ¢ ¥³¢§µ ·¦³´ª°¯ (dated 2 October 2019) of UL4600 [82] which has been developed by Underwriters
Laboratories (UL) and Edge Case Research (ECR).
The relative publication timings of UL 4600 and this document, together with the draft nature of UL4600,
meant that an objective-by-objective comparison was neither feasible nor sensible. Consequently, the
comparison has focused on identifying objectives or projections from the current document that map to
the various section headings in UL4600. This provides some conﬁdence that relevant topics have been
addressed: it does not indicate that compliance with this document guarantees compliance with UL4600,
or vice versa.
Each section of UL4600 that contains objectives is considered in turn below. This is followed by a very brief
summary of the conclusions from this comparison exercise.
EẴ1 UL4600 S¦¤µª°¯´
EẴ1Ẵ1 S¢§¦µº C¢´¦ ¢¯¥ ệ³¨¶ỵ¦¯µ´
This section of UL4600 is mainly concerned with the structure, content and presentation of the
platform-level safety case. These considerations are outside the scope of this document. However, it is
noted that a platform-level safety argument would be expected to be supported by the sort of evidence
produced via compliance with the objectives in this document.
EẴ1ẴẸ ϖª´ự ệ´´¦´´ỵ¦¯µ
This section of UL4600 considers fault and hazard identiﬁcation, risk evaluation and risk mitigation. These
topics are considered in various places in this document. Examples include Objectives PLT1-2, PLT1-3 and
PLT1-4, which relate to the behavioural speciﬁcation projection within the platform-level framework. Other
projections in that framework are also relevant, including: Objective PLT2-3, which considers interacting
items; Objective PLT3-1, which considers people; and Objective PLT4-1, which considers the environment.
EẴ1Ẵ3 I¯µ¦³¢¤µª°¯ ¸ªµ© H¶ỵ¢¯´ ¢¯¥ ϖ°¢¥ U´¦³´
The title of this UL4600 section illustrates how its scope (or at least its genesis) difers from this document.
In particular, UL4600 has an implicit focus on autonomous road vehicles, whereas this document is
intended to cover a much wider variety of autonomous systems including, for example, medical diagnosis
systems.
The general contents of this UL4600 section are addressed by projections in the platform-level framework,
for example: Objective PLT2-2 in the interacting items projection; Objective PLT3-1 in the people
projection; and Objective PLT4-1 in the environment projection. There are, inevitably, some diferences
in the detail: for example, UL4600 explicitly identiﬁes animals, whereas this document is less prescriptive
in terms of possible elements of the environment.
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EẴ1Ẵ4 ệ¶µ°¯°ỵº Ọ¶¯¤µª°¯´ ¢¯¥ S¶ỸỸ°³µ
This section of UL4600 considers (using the terminology of this document) autonomy-enabling techniques.
It also considers deﬁnition of the operational design domain and speciﬁc platform-level functions that may
be autonomy-related (e.g., sensing, perception, planning, prediction). Considerations related to timing are
also included.
At the platform-level, use of autonomy-enabling techniques is addressed by the by the behavioural
speciﬁcation projection, for example, Objective PLT1-1. With regards to platform-level functions, this
document is less descriptive than UL4600. However, similar notions are represented, for example: sensing
and perception are related to Objective PLT4-2 in the platform-level framework; understanding the
performance of ML algorithms is addressed by Objectives COM2-3 and COM2-4, from the task projection
in the computation-level framework; likewise, timing requirements are addressed by Objective COM2-2.
EẴ1Ẵ5 S°§µ¸¢³¦ ¢¯¥ Sº´µ¦ỵ E¯¨ª¯¦¦³ª¯¨ Ỗ³°¤¦´´¦´
The contents of this section of UL4600 are clearly described by its title. From the perspective of
this document, software development processes are covered by Objective COM4-1 from the software
projection in the computation-level framework; likewise, (computational) hardware development processes
are covered by Objective COM5-1 from the hardware projection in the computation-level framework.
Software and hardware processes are explicitly included as there are autonomy-speciﬁc considerations
relevant to these areas. Conversely, within the current document there is no corresponding objective for
system-level engineering processes. This reﬂects a deliberate focus on aspects directly related to autonomy
and the associated desire to avoid duplicating existing guidance on general topics. More speciﬁcally, the
autonomy architecture-level framework should allow autonomy-enabling technologies to be incorporated
within standard system engineering processes.
EẴ1Ẵ6 Ị¦Ỹ¦¯¥¢Ứª­ªµº
This section of UL4600 considers maintaining safety in the presence of faults, including fault detection
and recovery. The use of redundancy and isolation are also covered, as are incident response and cyber
security.
Within the current document, dependability (including fault prevention and fault tolerance) is covered
at all three framework levels. Relevant examples include: Objectives COM4-2 and COM5-2 at
the computation-level; all of the objectives related to the tolerance projection in the autonomy
architecture-level; and Objectives PLT1-4 and PLT1-6 at the platform-level. Likewise, incident response
is covered across a number of levels, for example, via Objectives COM3-4, ARC2-3 and PLT3-2. The same
is also true for cyber security; relevant items include Objectives ARC1-4, ARC2-4, ARC3-1, PLT1-6 and
PLT3-4.
EẴ1Ẵ7 Ị¢µ¢ ¢¯¥ N¦µ¸°³ựª¯¨
This section of UL4600 considers data communications and networks (essentially, data in motion), data
storage (essentially, data at rest) and associated infrastructure. The section appears to focus on data
communications to, from and within a platform, that is, “platform data”: data associated with training
algorithms using ML is covered in the “Autonomy Functions and Support” section. The concept of “platform
data” is less explicit in this document than in UL4600. Nevertheless, relevant concepts are covered. For82 SC
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example, data-related faults and failures should bemanaged by Objectives ARC1-1 and ARC1-3, regardless
of whether the data is in motion or at rest.
EẴ1Ẵ8 ḁ¦³ªﬁ¤¢µª°¯Ẳ ḁ¢­ª¥¢µª°¯ ¢¯¥ T¦´µ
In addition to the three topics listed in the section title, this section of UL4600 also includes run-time
monitoring and updates to the safety case. Within this document, the concepts of veriﬁcation, validation
and test are considered at both the computation-level (e.g., Objectives COM2-3 and COM2-5) and the
platform-level (e.g., Objective PLT1-5). Run-time monitoring is addressed through Objective PLT1-6. The
speciﬁc nature and construct of a safety case are outside the scope of this document; likewise, updates to
the safety case are also out of scope.
EẴ1Ẵ⁴ T°°­ ϒѬ́ѣѠﬁ¤́ѫѠѦѥ≈  ʼḿḾ ́ѥ¥ ￼Ѐѐ́¤Ѱ  ѦѤѧѦѥЀѥѫѪ
The contents of this UL4600 section are as indicated by its title. From the perspective of this document,
qualiﬁcation of software and hardware engineering tools is covered by Objectives COM4-1 and COM5-1,
respectively. Commercial Of-The-Shelf (COTS) items are not explicitly addressed by this document,
mainly because some readers can interpret the term too narrowly, for example, excluding open source
frameworks and pre-trained ML models. However, some relevant concepts are covered, for example, by
Objectives ARC1-4 and PLT3-4.
 ≤1≤1◊ ￼ѠЍЀ¤Ѱ¤ѣЀ  Ѧѥ¤ЀѩѥѪ
This section of UL4600 steps through typical lifecycle phases, including requirements, design,
manufacturing, operation and disposal. It also includes ﬁeld modiﬁcations and updates.
This document does not include such an explicit listing of lifecycle phases. However, aspects of these
are addressed, for example, in Objectives ARC2-2, PLT1-6 and PLT3-3. Updates are covered by the
adaptation projection at the autonomy architecture-level. Allowable ﬁeld modiﬁcations are considered in
the same way; unauthorised ﬁeld modiﬁcations are covered, for example, by Objectives ARC1-4, PLT1-4
and PLT3-4.
 ≤1≤11 �́ѠѥѫЀѥ́ѥ¤Ѐ
This section of UL4600 includes maintenance and other aspects of non-operational safety. In this
document, maintenance is addressed via Objectives PLT3-2 and PLT3-3. Other aspects of non-operational
safety are less explicit in this document than in UL4600: they are at least partially addressed by, for
example, Objectives PLT1-2, PLT1-4, PLT2-2 and PLT4-1.
 ≤1≤12 �ЀѫѩѠ¤Ѫ ́ѥ¥ Ḿ́ЍЀѫѰ ϑЀѩЍѦѩѤ́ѥ¤Ѐ Iѥ¥Ѡ¤́ѫѦѩѪ
This section of UL4600 is mainly concerned with creating andmonitoring platform-level Safety Performance
Indicators (SPIs). The need to continually-demonstrate safety is not as explicit in this document as it is in
UL4600. However, the same notion is considered by Objective PLT1-6, in the platform-level framework.
This is supported by Objective ARC2-2, in the autonomy architecture-level framework, and Objectives
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COM2-3 and COM2-4, in the computation-level framework.
 ≤1≤13 AѪѪЀѪѪѤЀѥѫ
This section of UL4600 is concerned with assessing conformance to UL4600, including the use of
independence and monitoring. This type of conformance is outside the scope of this document.
 ≤2 ḾѬѤѤ́ѩѰ
The preceding discussions have provided a high-level comparison between a draft version of UL4600
(dated 2 October 2019) [82] and this document. Whilst there are some intentional diferences in scope,
this UL4600-based analysis has not identiﬁed any signiﬁcant omissions from this document.
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AѧѧЀѥ¥Ѡ¹ F  ѦѤѧ́ѩѠѪѦѥ ¸Ѡѫ© ʼ  D ϑѩѠѥ¤ѠѧѣЀѪ Ѧѥ AI
I¯ ồ¢º 201⁴≈ ®¦®£¦³ ¤°¶¯µ³ª¦´ °§ µ©¦ OEC  ¢¥°±µ¦¥ ¢ ¯¶®£¦³ °§ ±³ª¯¤ª±­¦´⁴ °¯ AI≤ T©ª´ ¢±±¦¯¥ªѯ
±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢ ©ª¨©-­¦·¦­ ª¯¥ª¤¢µª°¯ °§ ©°Ѯ µ©¦ ¤°¯µ¦¯µ´ °§ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ®¢º ´¶±±°³µ µ©¦´¦ ±³ª¯¤ª±­¦´≤
I¯ ¨¦¯¦³¢­≈ AI °¯­º ©¢´ ¢¯ ¦f¦¤µ Ѯ©¦¯ ªµ ª´ ¦®£°¥ª¦¥ Ѯªµ©ª¯ ¢ Ѯª¥¦³ ´º´µ¦® (or platform). Consequently,
all three frameworks used in this document are potentially relevant to the OECD principles. The following
paragraphs indicate how the projections and, where relevant, objectives associated with these frameworks
relate to each of the principles.
F≤1 ϑѩѠѥ¤ѠѧѣЀѪ
F≤1≤1 AI Ѫ©ѦѬѣ¥ ỨЀѥЀﬁѫ ѧЀѦѧѣЀ ́ѥ¥ ѫ©Ѐ ѧѣ́ѥЀѫ ỨѰ ¥ѩѠѭѠѥѐ Ѡѥ¤ѣѬѪѠѭЀ ѐѩѦ¸ѫ©≈ ѪѬѪѫ́Ѡѥ́ỨѣЀ
¥ЀѭЀѣѦѧѤЀѥѫ ́ѥ¥ ¸Ѐѣѣ≠ỨЀѠѥѐ≤
This principle is focused on the efects of the AI. This relates most directly to the requirements that are
placed on the behaviour of the associated platform: this is addressed in the behavioural speciﬁcation
projection within the platform-level framework.
F≤1≤2 AI ѪѰѪѫЀѤѪ Ѫ©ѦѬѣ¥ ỨЀ ¥ЀѪѠѐѥЀ¥ Ѡѥ ́ ¸́Ѱ ѫ©́ѫ ѩЀѪѧЀ¤ѫѪ ѫ©Ѐ ѩѬѣЀ ѦЍ ѣ́ ≈¸ ©ѬѤ́ѥ
ѩѠѐ©ѫѪ≈ ¥ЀѤѦ¤ѩ́ѫѠ¤ ѭ́ѣѬЀѪ ́ѥ¥ ¥ѠѭЀѩѪѠѫѰ≈ ́ѥ¥ ѫ©ЀѰ Ѫ©ѦѬѣ¥ Ѡѥ¤ѣѬ¥Ѐ ́ѧѧѩѦѧѩѠ́ѫЀ
Ѫ́ЍЀѐѬ́ѩ¥Ѫ – ЍѦѩ Ѐ¹́ѤѧѣЀ≈ Ѐѥ́ỨѣѠѥѐ ©ѬѤ́ѥ ѠѥѫЀѩѭЀѥѫѠѦѥ ¸©ЀѩЀ ѥЀ¤ЀѪѪ́ѩѰ – ѫѦ
ЀѥѪѬѩЀ ́ Ѝ́Ѡѩ ́ѥ¥ ΟѬѪѫ ѪѦ¤ѠЀѫѰ≤
From the perspective of this guidance document, the “rule of law” part of this principle is expected to be
covered by standard systems engineering process. Hence, it is not directly related to any projection (or
objective).
The “human rights” and “democratic values” pieces are, arguably, about platform-level requirements: these
are covered by the behavioural speciﬁcation projection within the platform-level framework. Including
appropriate interfaces (e.g., to support explanation of an AI-based decision) may also be relevant; this
relates to Objective PLT3-2.
In order for an AI to respect diversity, this must be included in the data used to support the
AI’s development: considerations associated with the experience projection, in the computation-level
framework, are relevant here.
The current document’s focus on safety assurance means that safeguards are considered from multiple
viewpoints. For example: Objectives COM4-2 and COM5-2 provide safeguards against software and
hardware misbehaviour; the tolerance projection, in the autonomy architecture-level framework, provides
safeguards against faults, failures and adversarial attempts to disrupt a computation; Objective ARC3-2
provides safeguards against inappropriate adaptation; and Objective PLT1-4 provides safeguards against
foreseeable misuse and abuse.
Finally, the people projection, within the platform-level framework, supports the need for human
intervention, where necessary.
9 https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/.
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F≤1≤3 ḿ©ЀѩЀ Ѫ©ѦѬѣ¥ ỨЀ ѫѩ́ѥѪѧ́ѩЀѥ¤Ѱ ́ѥ¥ ѩЀѪѧѦѥѪѠỨѣЀ ¥ѠѪ¤ѣѦѪѬѩЀ ́ѩѦѬѥ¥ AI ѪѰѪѫЀѤѪ
ѫѦ ЀѥѪѬѩЀ ѫ©́ѫ ѧЀѦѧѣЀ Ѭѥ¥ЀѩѪѫ́ѥ¥ AI≠Ứ́ѪЀ¥ ѦѬѫ¤ѦѤЀѪ ́ѥ¥ ¤́ѥ ¤©́ѣѣЀѥѐЀ ѫ©ЀѤ≤
In general, publishing information against the objectives listed in this document will support transparency
and responsible disclosure. This information should also allow for reasonable challenge. This could
arise, for example, as part of a formal certiﬁcation process; alternatively, it could come from less formal
interactions with the general public.
In addition, the objectives associated with the information provision projection, within the autonomy
architecture-level framework, should ensure that people are provided with accurate information.
Furthermore, the objectives associated with the people projection, in the platform-level framework, should
ensure that appropriate information is provided in an intelligible manner.
F≤1≤Ẻ AI ѪѰѪѫЀѤѪ ѤѬѪѫ ЍѬѥ¤ѫѠѦѥ Ѡѥ ́ ѩѦỨѬѪѫ≈ ѪЀ¤ѬѩЀ ́ѥ¥ Ѫ́ЍЀ ¸́Ѱ ѫ©ѩѦѬѐ©ѦѬѫ ѫ©ЀѠѩ ѣѠЍЀ
¤Ѱ¤ѣЀѪ ́ѥ¥ ѧѦѫЀѥѫѠ́ѣ ѩѠѪựѪ Ѫ©ѦѬѣ¥ ỨЀ ¤ѦѥѫѠѥѬ́ѣѣѰ ́ѪѪЀѪѪЀ¥ ́ѥ¥ Ѥ́ѥ́ѐЀ¥≤
Arguably, all of the objectives in this document are relevant to this principle. Picking out some speciﬁc
examples: Objective PLT1-2 leads to a deﬁnition of “safe operation”; Objective PLT1-4 maintains safety in
the presence of faults and failures, as well as foreseeable misuse and abuse; Objective PLT1-6 provides
monitoring during operational use (e.g., to identify new hazards, as part of continual assessment and
management); Objective COM1-4 protects against distribution shift; Objective ARC1-2 ensures the
platform is tolerant to “out of support” operational inputs; Objective ARC1-4 protects against adversarial
attempts to disrupt a computation; Objective ARC3-1 protects against inappropriate or unauthorised
adaptations; and the people projection, within the platform-level framework, explicitly covers the whole
system lifecycle.
F≤1≤ẻ ʼѩѐ́ѥѠѪ́ѫѠѦѥѪ ́ѥ¥ Ѡѥ¥ѠѭѠ¥Ѭ́ѣѪ ¥ЀѭЀѣѦѧѠѥѐ≈ ¥ЀѧѣѦѰѠѥѐ Ѧѩ ѦѧЀѩ́ѫѠѥѐ AI ѪѰѪѫЀѤѪ
Ѫ©ѦѬѣ¥ ỨЀ ©Ѐѣ¥ ́¤¤ѦѬѥѫ́ỨѣЀ ЍѦѩ ѫ©ЀѠѩ ѧѩѦѧЀѩ ЍѬѥ¤ѫѠѦѥѠѥѐ Ѡѥ ѣѠѥЀ ¸Ѡѫ© ѫ©Ѐ ́ỨѦѭЀ
ѧѩѠѥ¤ѠѧѣЀѪ≤
This principle is mainly concerned with the legal and regulatory environment within which AI systems are
used. These considerations are deliberately outside the scope of the current document. Nevertheless,
requiring compliance with the objectives in this document may be one way of holding to account those
responsible for developing, deploying or operating such systems.
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AѧѧЀѥ¥Ѡ¹ G KѥѦ¸ѥ IѪѪѬЀѪ
T©ª´ ¢±±¦¯¥ªѯ ±³°·ª¥¦´ ¢ ­ª´µ °§ ¬¯°Ѯ¯ ª´´¶¦´≤ T©¦´¦ ¢³¦ ªµ¦®´ µ©¢µ Ѯ¦³¦ ª¥¦¯µªﬁ¦¥≈ £¶µ ¯°µ ³¦´°­·¦¥≈ ¥¶³ª¯¨
µ©¦ ¤³¦¢µª°¯ °§ µ©¦ ¤¶³³¦¯µ ·¦³´ª°¯ °§ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ≤ G¦¯¦³¢­­º ´±¦¢¬ª¯¨≈ ³¦´°­¶µª°¯ °§ µ©¦´¦ ª´´¶¦´ ¯¦¦¥´ ¢
¨³¦¢µ¦³ ¢®°¶¯µ °§ ¬¯°Ѯ­¦¥¨¦ ¢¯¥ ¦ѯ±¦³ª¦¯¤¦ µ©¢¯ ª´ ¤¶³³¦¯µ­º ¢·¢ª­¢£­¦≤ O¤¤¢´ª°¯¢­­º≈ ³¦´°­¶µª°¯ ³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦´
®°³¦ ³¦´°¶³¤¦ µ©¢¯ Ѯ¢´ ¢·¢ª­¢£­¦ µ° ´¶±±°³µ µ©¦ ±³°¥¶¤µª°¯ °§ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ≤ I¯ ¢­­ ¤¢´¦´≈ µ©¦ ª´´¶¦ Ѯ¢´
¥¦¦®¦¥ ´¶ﬃ¤ª¦¯µ­º ª®±°³µ¢¯µ µ° Ѯ¢³³¢¯µ ´±¦¤ªﬁ¤ ¤¢±µ¶³¦ ¢¯¥ µ³¢¤¬ª¯¨≤
ǰ°µ¦ µ©¢µ µ©¦ §°­­°Ѯª¯¨ ­ª´µ ª´ ¯°µ ª¯µ¦¯¥¦¥ µ° £¦ ¤°®±­¦µ¦≤
• T©¦ °£«¦¤µª·¦´ ª¯ µ©ª´ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ©¢·¦ £¦¦¯ ¥¦·¦­°±¦¥ ­¢³¨¦­º §³°® ¢ µ©¦°³¦µª¤¢­ £¢´ª´≤ Ef°³µ´ ©¢·¦
£¦¦¯ ®¢¥¦ µ° ±³°·ª¥¦ ¤°¯ﬁ¥¦¯¤¦ ª¯ µ©¦ °£«¦¤µª·¦´≈ §°³ ¦ѯ¢®±­¦≈ £º ¤°®±¢³ª¯¨ µ©¦® Ѯªµ© ¢ ¯¶®£¦³
°§ ³¦­¢µ¦¥ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ´≤ H°Ѯ¦·¦³≈ µ° ¥¢µ¦≈ µ©¦ °£«¦¤µª·¦´ ©¢·¦ ¯°µ £¦¦¯ “±³°·¦¯ µ©³°¶¨© ¶´¦”≤ I¯
±¢³µª¤¶­¢³≈ µ©¦³¦ Ѯ°¶­¥ £¦ ´ª¨¯ªﬁ¤¢¯µ ·¢­¶¦ ª¯ ¤°®±­¦µª¯¨ ´¦·¦³¢­ Ѯ°³¬¦¥ ¦ѯ¢®±­¦´≤
• Aµ µ©¦ ®°®¦¯µ≈ µ©¦ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ®¢¬¦´ ¯° ¥ª´µª¯¤µª°¯ £¦µѮ¦¦¯ ¥ªf¦³¦¯µ ¤³ªµª¤¢­ªµº ­¦·¦­´≈ §°³ ¦ѯ¢®±­¦≈
 AỒ´ °³ SIỒ´≤ A´ ¦ѯ¦®±­ªﬁ¦¥ £º µ©¦ ­¢´µ °§ µ©¦ “§°¶³ ±­¶´ °¯¦” ´°§µѮ¢³¦ ´¢§¦µº ¢´´¶³¢¯¤¦ ±³ª¯¤ª±­¦´
{42}≈ ªµ ª´ £¦¯¦ﬁ¤ª¢­ µ° µ¢³¨¦µ ¦f°³µ µ°Ѯ¢³¥´ ®°³¦ ¤³ªµª¤¢­ ´º´µ¦® ¦­¦®¦¯µ´≤ I¯ °³¥¦³ µ° ¢¤©ª¦·¦ µ©ª´≈
´°®¦ §°³® °§ ¨³¢¥¶¢µª°¯ ª´ ¯¦¤¦´´¢³º≤ T©ª´ ¤°¶­¥ £¦ ¢¤©ª¦·¦¥ £º ³¦Ѩ¶ª³ª¯¨ ¤¦³µ¢ª¯ °£«¦¤µª·¦´ °¯­º
µ° £¦ ¤°®±­¦µ¦¥ ¢µ ©ª¨©¦³ ¤³ªµª¤¢­ªµº ­¦·¦­´≤ A­µ¦³¯¢µª·¦­º≈ ©ª¨©¦³ ¤³ªµª¤¢­ªµº ­¦·¦­´ ®¢º ³¦Ѩ¶ª³¦ ´°®¦
°£«¦¤µª·¦´ µ° £¦ ¤°®±­¦µ¦¥ Ѯªµ© ª¯¥¦±¦¯¥¦¯¤¦≤ A¯°µ©¦³ ¢±±³°¢¤© ª¯·°­·¦´ ¢¥¥³¦´´ª¯¨ ¢¯ °£«¦¤µª·¦
®°³¦ µ©°³°¶¨©­º ¢´ µ©¦ ¤³ªµª¤¢­ªµº ­¦·¦­ ª¯¤³¦¢´¦´≤ Iµ ª´ ¶¯¤­¦¢³ Ѯ©ª¤© ¤°®£ª¯¢µª°¯ °§ µ©¦´¦ °±µª°¯´ Ѯª­­
£¦ ®°´µ ¢±±³°±³ª¢µ¦ §°³ µ©¦ SASWG’´ Ѯ°³¬ £¶µ≈ ¢µ µ©¦ ¤¶³³¦¯µ µª®¦≈ ªµ ª´ ¤°¯´ª¥¦³¦¥ ­ª¬¦­º µ©¢µ ®°´µ
°£«¦¤µª·¦´ Ѯª­­ ¯¦¦¥ µ° £¦ ´¢µª´ﬁ¦¥≈ ³¦¨¢³¥­¦´´ °§ ¤³ªµª¤¢­ªµº ­¦·¦­≤
• Aµ µ©¦ ®°®¦¯µ≈ µ©¦ ¥°¤¶®¦¯µ ®¢¬¦´ ­ªµµ­¦ ¥ª´µª¯¤µª°¯ £¦µѮ¦¦¯ ¥ªf¦³¦¯µ µº±¦´ °§ ồỒ ¢±±³°¢¤©≤ I¯
´°®¦ ¤¢´¦´ µ©ª´ ®¢º £¦ ¤¢±µ¶³¦¥ ª¯ µ©¦ ¥¦µ¢ª­¦¥ ³¦´±°¯´¦ µ° ¢¯ ¢´´°¤ª¢µ¦¥ Ѯªµ© ¢¯ °£«¦¤µª·¦Ề §°³
¦ѯ¢®±­¦≈ O£«¦¤µª·¦ COồ3-2 ³¦­¢µ¦´ µ° ±³°µ¦¤µª¯¨ ¢¨¢ª¯´µ µº±ª¤¢­ ¦³³°³´≈ Ѯ©ª¤© Ѯª­­ ¥ªf¦³ £¦µѮ¦¦¯
¥ªf¦³¦¯µ µº±¦´ °§ ồỒ ¢±±³°¢¤©≤ H°Ѯ¦·¦³≈ µ©¦³¦ ¢³¦ ´¦·¦³¢­ ±­¢¤¦´ Ѯ©¦³¦ ¢ ®°³¦ ¯¶¢¯¤¦¥ ¢±±³°¢¤©
®¢º £¦ ®°³¦ ·¢­¶¢£­¦≤ O¯¦ ´¶¤© ¢³¦¢ ª´ µ©¦ ³¦­¢µª°¯´©ª± £¦µѮ¦¦¯ µ©¦ ¢¥¢±µ¢µª°¯ ±³°«¦¤µª°¯
(discussed in subsection 5.3) and ML approaches that continue to learn during operational use.
• Objective COM2-7 notes the diference between algorithm instances, which may produce
diferent results, and algorithm variants, which are expected to produce diferent results in some
circumstances. It is not clear at which point an algorithm ceases to be a variant and becomes
something that should be considered as an item in its own right. A key consideration is how easily
safety assurance evidence can be transferred between items. More generally, this topic is related to
reuse and software product line engineering.
• Currently, the document does not provide much information on integration of Software (SW) and
Hardware (HW); neither SW-SW integration nor SW-HW integration is considered in any detail.
Although the objectives associated with the autonomy architecture-level framework are helpful in
this regard, this is an area that may be addressed in more detail in future editions.
• The discussion section associated with each objective provides suggestions for how the objective may
be at least partially met. However, at the moment, there are many cases where it is not clear how
best to satisfy an objective and, equally important, how best to demonstrate this satisfaction. A larger
amount of practical experience is needed before this speciﬁc type of guidance can be provided.
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AAIP A´´¶³ª¯¨ A¶µ°¯°®º I¯µ¦³¯¢µª°¯¢­ P³°¨³¢®®¦
A  A¶µ°¯°®°¶´  ³ª·¦³
A S A¶µ°®¢µ¦¥  ³ª·ª¯¨ Sº´µ¦®
AI A³µªﬁ¤ª¢­ I¯µ¦­­ª¨¦¯¤¦
Aǰǰ A³µªﬁ¤ª¢­ ǰ¦¶³¢­ ǰ¦µѮ°³¬
AS A¶µ°¯°®°¶´ Sº´µ¦®´
ỈIT Ỉ¶ª­µ-I¯ T¦´µ
ỈO﻿ Ỉ°¥º O§ ﻿¯°Ѯ­¦¥¨¦
Cồ C°¯ﬁ¨¶³¢µª°¯ ồ¢¯¢¨¦®¦¯µ
Cǰǰ C°¯·°­¶µª°¯¢­ ǰ¦¶³¢­ ǰ¦µѮ°³¬
COTS C°®®¦³¤ª¢­ Of-T©¦-S©¦­§
CPU C¦¯µ³¢­ P³°¤¦´´ª¯¨ U¯ªµ
 AỒ  ¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ A´´¶³¢¯¤¦ Ồ¦·¦­
 §T  ¦±¢³µ®¦¯µ §°³ T³¢¯´±°³µ
 ỒO   ¦§¦¯¤¦ Ồª¯¦ °§  ¦·¦­°±®¦¯µ
 ǰǰ  ¦¦± ǰ¦¶³¢­ ǰ¦µѮ°³¬
ECR Edge Case Research
FMEA Failure Mode and Efects Analysis
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
FRAM Functional Resonance Analysis Method
GAN Generative Adversarial Network
GPU Graphical Processing Unit
GSN Goal Structuring Notation
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study
HMI Human-Machine Interface
HW Hardware
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ISSRE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering
MAPE Monitor, Analyse, Plan, Execute
MC/DC Modiﬁed Condition / Decision Coverage
MEL Minimum Equipment List
ML Machine Learning
MOD Ministry Of Defence
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NaN Not a Number
NCSC National Cyber Security Centre
NHTSA National Highway Traﬃc Safety Administration
NN Neural Network
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCA Principal Component Analysis
PDI Parameter Data Item
PR Process Requirement
PSH Product Service History
RAM Random Access Memory
RAS Robotics and Autonomous Systems
REQ requirement
RL Reinforcement Learning
RNN Recurrent Neural Network
SASWG Safety of Autonomous Systems Working Group
SCANN Safety-Critical Artiﬁcial Neural Network
SCSC Safety Critical Systems Club
SEU Single Event Upset
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SMS Safety Management System
SoC System-on-Chip
SOTIF Safety Of The Intended Function
SOUP Software of Uncertain Pedigree
SPI Safety Performance Indicator
SSS Safety-critical Systems Symposium
STPA Systems Theoretic Process Analysis
SUDA Sense, Understand, Decide, Act
SVM Support Vector Machine
SW Software
SWaP Size, Weight and Power
TEVV Test, Evaluation, Veriﬁcation and Validation
TPU Tensor Processing Unit
TQL Tool Qualiﬁcation Level
TTV Training, Test and Veriﬁcation
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UCI University of California, Irvine
UL Underwriters Laboratories
V&V Veriﬁcation and Validation
WCET Worst Case Execution Time
WoSoCer Workshop on Software Certiﬁcation
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